

Current History

A WORLD AFFAIRS MONTHLY

APRIL, 1979

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Current History

APRIL, 1979

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This issue focuses on the nations of South Asia and international politics in that area. As our introductory article points out: "... Americans are increasingly aware of the importance of South Asia and South Asians in man's future on this planet. After all, South Asia contains the second largest aggregation of people in the world, nearly one-fifth of the human race. In many respects it is the heartland of the third—or fourth—world and of the nonaligned world."

The United States and South Asia

BY NORMAN D. PALMER

Professor of Political Science and South Asian Studies, University of Pennsylvania

IN the total context of United States foreign policy, South Asia has generally been a low-priority area. It has been given a higher priority only when internal problems or intra-regional tensions threaten wider spillover effects, as happened in 1971, or when the United States has been particularly concerned with the activities of the Soviet Union or China in the area, as happened in 1962 (in the case of China) and in 1971 (in the case of the Soviet Union). United States relations with the countries of South Asia have been officially cordial; but they have been limited and unbalanced and have generally lacked warmth. Unofficial contacts have been extensive, but these contacts are far fewer and far more superficial than they should be, given large and complex societies in our interdependent world.

In 1971, South Asia became an international crisis area because of the crisis in Pakistan. This crisis led to a brutal civil war in what was then East Pakistan, increasing Indian concern and involvement and culminating in the Indo-Pakistani war in December and the defeat and breakup of Pakistan. There were many international repercussions. The United Nations Security Council tried to end the hostilities; the United States and China apparently sided with Pakistan against India, which was championed by the Soviet Union.

The United States soon demonstrated that it was willing to recognize the new realities in South Asia. This caused strains in its relations with Pakistan, which had come under the firm control of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, a long-time critic of the United States. But United States relations with India improved and United States diplomacy overcame, at least in part,

the resentments in the new nation of Bangladesh caused by the American position during the 1971 crisis. New strains developed in Indo-American relations during the emergency in India in 1975-1977. While the United States refrained from official criticisms of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's politics during the emergency, many Americans were vocal in their criticism and many Indian opponents of the Gandhi regime were cordially received in the United States, much to Gandhi's displeasure.

The results of the presidential election in the United States in November, 1976, were greeted with apprehension in Pakistan and with anticipation in India. Both countries apparently believed that "Democrats favor India, Republicans favor Pakistan." President Jimmy Carter was an unknown quantity; but his election seemed to presage a new kind of politics in the United States, perhaps more in keeping with the interests of the countries of South Asia and elsewhere in the developing world.

In 1977, new governments came to power not only in the United States but also in India and Pakistan, both unanticipated, and in Sri Lanka, where Sirimavo W.R.D. Bandaranaike's defeat in the July elections was no surprise, although the magnitude of her rejection was unforeseen. Political changes led to improved relations between the United States and India, but not Pakistan. While the United States welcomed political change in India, it became increasingly doubtful about the ability of the Janata government to govern India effectively or to retain its support and credibility. It also became increasingly disturbed by the apparent inability of the military regime in Pakistan to deal with growing threats to internal

stability or with new pressures resulting from the alarming turn of events in the neighboring Muslim countries of Afghanistan and Iran.

THE UNITED STATES AND INDIA

The Democratic platform in 1976 contained a remarkable section on South Asia, which showed a recognition of old and new realities and of basic United States interests in the region, especially in India. This section included the following points:

India has now achieved a considerable degree of hegemony over the subcontinent. . . . future American policy should accept this fact.

The degree to which American interests are involved here and the extent to which American policies can influence trends in this region will both remain debatable issues. Unquestionably, however, some of the major battles in the global war against human misery must be fought here with broader repercussions.

The United States has every reason to hope that India is successful in its struggle for economic improvement and political unity. . . .

In general, the United States should pursue a low-posture policy in South Asia. . . .

This section of the platform attracted far more attention in South Asia than it did in the United States. In India, the explicit recognition of "a considerable degree of hegemony over the subcontinent" was welcomed (conversely, this tended to confirm Pakistan's view that the United States was moving steadily toward a pro-Indian position). But the special attention to South Asia and United States interests there in one party platform and not in the other was not interpreted in India as heralding any basic change in the United States approach to South Asia. Shortly after the two conventions in the United States, *The Times of India*, in an editorial entitled "More Realistic," wrote:

In a broad sense the Democratic party's views on America's future relations with the countries of South Asia do not appear to be markedly different from those of the [Gerald] Ford administration. Both agree, for instance, on India's preeminent position in the subcontinent and on the necessity to come to terms with this reality. Similarly, both want the U.S.A. to adopt a profile which is in keeping with its limited interests in this part of the world. They seem to share the belief that South Asia is of importance to the United States primarily, though not exclusively, because it is a major element in the Sino-Soviet quarrel. Indeed, both are convinced that it would be to Washington's disadvantage if any one of the states in the region were to weaken or disintegrate. . . . Thus the rival parties in the presidential elections do not seem to place South Asia high up on their list of foreign policy priorities. And when they do, it is largely to emphasize their willingness to establish economic and technological cooperation on a level which is acceptable to all sides.

Although an improved climate in Indo-American relations was evident even before 1977, the advent of

new governments in the United States and India in the early months of 1977 led to a marked improvement both in the climate of their relations and in their substance. The ending of the prolonged emergency and the restoration of basic freedoms in India came as a relief to Americans concerned with human rights. Through exchanges of personal correspondence and in other ways, President Carter and Prime Minister Morarji Desai began to get acquainted with each other. Desai's views on economics and foreign policies seemed to be more congenial to United States interests than were those of his predecessor, Indira Gandhi. There were more frequent official visits between the United States and India. The United States-India Joint Commission and its subcommittees, which had been inactive during the emergency in India, were given a new impetus. Even the United States Congress began to take a more active and sympathetic interest in India. In November, 1977, seven members of the Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee of the House Committee on International Relations visited India "as part of a new congressional effort to get acquainted with India." American and Indian businessmen, journalists, scholars and others in the private sector began to meet and to interact more extensively than had been possible for some years. The appointment of Robert Goheen, a former president of Princeton University who was born in India, as the United States ambassador to India was warmly received in India. And the appointment of Nani Palkhivala, a distinguished Indian lawyer and a leading critic of Gandhi's abridgement of fundamental freedoms during the emergency, as India's ambassador to the United States was welcomed in Washington.

The marked improvement in Indo-American relations was dramatized by President Carter's official visit to India in early January, 1978, and Prime Minister Desai's visit to the United States six months later. President and Mrs. Carter received a remarkably warm reception in India. The President addressed a large public meeting and a special session of members of the Indian Parliament, and he spent many hours in conferences with Prime Minister Desai. The mutual desire for improved relations was expressed in two documents issued at the conclusion of his visit: a joint communiqué and the "Delhi Declaration," which Ambassador Palkhivala called "a document of historic significance," but which attracted little attention in either India or the United States. During his stay in the United States in June, Prime Minister Desai addressed large audiences in New York, California and Nebraska, the Special Session on Disarmament of the United Nations General Assembly in New York, and the National Press Club in Washington, D.C. He appeared on the popular television program, "Meet the Press," and met

with many members of Congress, and with President Carter and other administration leaders.

In the joint communiqué issued at the end of Desai's visit, the President and the Prime Minister reaffirmed their satisfaction with the improvement of relations between their two countries. The communiqué, however, also gave clues to issues in dispute. In spite of all the evidences of improved relations and the genuine desire for such improvement, misunderstandings and differences in priorities remained, and new complications had been added.

At least three areas of basic estrangement were mentioned gently in the joint communiqué, when the leaders "agreed that the dialogue between the two countries" on nuclear issues "will continue," and when they referred to their discussions of "the development of economic exchanges between their two countries" and "questions of world peace."

NUCLEAR ISSUES

Differences between the United States and India on a wide variety of nuclear issues have continued. India continues to be critical of the nuclear policies and "power politics" of both superpowers, and especially of the United States. Prime Minister Desai is as firm as Gandhi ever was in insisting that India will not adhere to the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, in spite of heavy pressure to do so, unless the major nuclear powers substantially reduce their own nuclear stockpiles and cooperate with other states in developing nuclear policies on "a basis of equality."

A specific nuclear issue, namely, the question of the continued supply by the United States of enriched uranium for the atomic power plant at Tarapur, near Bombay, was probably the most widely publicized single aspect of Indo-American relations in India in 1978. Under an agreement for cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy, which came into force in 1963, the United States had agreed to supply enriched uranium for the Tarapur plant for 30 years; but since India's nuclear explosion of May, 1974, the United States has been reluctant to supply uranium to India, until and unless it receives satisfactory assurances regarding nuclear safeguards and the handling of spent fuel from the Tarapur plant.

In his address to the Indian Parliament on January 2, 1978, President Carter announced that the supply of enriched uranium for the Tarapur plant would be resumed, but apparently he and Prime Minister Desai disagreed sharply over the question of nuclear safeguards. Desai apparently refused to give a specific pledge that India would never use plutonium produced at Tarapur for the manufacture of atomic weapons, although he has repeatedly stated that India is interested only in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and will not manufacture nuclear weapons.

In the Indian press, the most widely publicized

sentence in the joint communiqué issued at the conclusion of Desai's official visit to the United States concerned fuel for Tarapur. "President Carter," the communiqué stated, "pledged to make every effort consistent with American law to maintain fuel supplies for Tarapur and continue nuclear cooperation with India." This pledge coincided with a vote in the House Committee on International Relations approving the shipment of 7.6 million tons of enriched uranium to India.

Some enriched uranium is being shipped to India, but uncertainty about the American supply and differences over nuclear issues remain. Fortunately, in India as well as the United States, there is a growing feeling that, as *The Statesman* suggested shortly after the Prime Minister's American visit, this issue "should not be allowed to distort the whole gamut of relations between the two major countries."

In the economic field, the Indo-American relationship is unbalanced. The United States is India's major trading partner, whereas trade with India is an infinitesimal part of total United States foreign trade and has in fact been relatively declining.

In recent years, economic issues have been discussed extensively, on both official and unofficial levels. A wide range of multilateral and bilateral economic, trade and investment issues was on the agenda of the meeting of the Economic and Commercial Subcommission of the United States-India Joint Commission in late October, 1977. The United States delegation welcomed "the liberalization of India's import regime," and the Indian delegation "emphasized the need for further increasing and diversifying India's exports to the United States." Vast differences on economic issues surfaced at a meeting of the joint executive committee of the Indo-United States Business Council in September, 1977. According to the Washington correspondent of *The Times of India*, Indian members criticized "the present approach of the United States business community"; they also reacted strongly to American criticisms of the Janata government's interpretation of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act of 1973 and other government restrictions on trade and investment from outside private sources, which, the Americans alleged, constituted "unfair discrimination against foreign firms." Indian spokesmen insist that India is not hostile to multinationals or to foreign collaboration in India's development. But key members of the Janata government, including the Minister for Industries, are unfriendly to foreigners. And Indian treatment of two major American multinationals, IBM and Coca-Cola, led those concerns to close their operations in India.

In 1978, for the first time since 1971—except for relatively small special grants—India received economic assistance from the United States. In August, three aid agreements were signed, amounting to a

commitment of about \$60 million, and Indian and American officials agreed that continuing aid from the United States would be needed for some time to come. But this is a touchy matter, in view of Indian and American sensitivities on the aid issue; and the resumption of direct bilateral United States aid to India may create more problems than opportunities in developing more equitable Indo-American relations.

INTERNATIONAL ISSUES

The United States and India differ on nuclear and on many other global issues. These differences are due in part to their differences in levels of development, historical experience, ways of life and priorities of concerns. India is a leading champion of the New International Economic Order, of the nonaligned movement and of the anti-colonial and anti-racial movements. Although Americans believe that the United States is not unsympathetic to these movements, many Indians (in common with many others in the third world), suspect the sincerity of American sympathy. India is a leading critic of United States foreign policy. Indians and Americans, with different priorities and interests, differ on the way to ensure world peace and to right international wrongs, although they share a common desire to achieve these objectives.

India and the United States also disagree about the continuing naval presence of the superpowers, and especially the United States, in the Indian Ocean. India is a strong advocate of the concept of the Indian Ocean as "a zone of peace," free of the rivalries of the major powers. She objects especially to the existence of foreign "bases" in the Indian Ocean. Even before relations between the Soviet Union and Somalia soured, India seemed to worry more about the American "base" on Diego Garcia than about the Soviet "base" at Berbera. India welcomed President Carter's advocacy of Indian Ocean demilitarization, but Indian suspicions that this was likely to be only pious rhetoric was apparently confirmed when the American President began to discuss the more modest objective of "first freezing the present circumstances." Indian leaders also welcomed talks between the United States and the Soviet Union on Indian Ocean issues, which began in June, 1977, but these seemed to have no concrete results.

India still has doubts about the intentions of the superpowers in the Indian Ocean, and her leaders believe that this ocean cannot be "a zone of peace" as long as outside powers engage in naval or other military operations in the area. This viewpoint was clearly stated in one paragraph of the Carter-Desai joint communiqué of June 15, 1978:

The President described the state of talks between U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. on the stabilization of their military presence in the Indian Ocean. The Prime

Minister expressed the hope that these discussions would continue and result in the eventual removal of all great power military presence in the Ocean.

THE UNITED STATES AND PAKISTAN

From 1954 until the early 1960's Pakistan was the "most allied ally" of the United States in Asia. Pakistan's disillusion with the course of American policy became increasingly manifest in the early 1960's, especially when the United States rushed emergency military aid to India during the Sino-Indian border war in October, 1962, during the presidency of John Kennedy, whose administration the Pakistanis regarded as much too pro-Indian. Thereafter, Pakistanis increasingly felt that they could not depend on their American ally and that the relationship between Pakistan and the United States was unequal and probably unproductive.

In 1971, the United States-Pakistan relationship seemed to revive with the United States "tilt toward Pakistan," which was in fact a far more complicated and less biased policy than is generally supposed. The United States did not approve of the brutalities of the Pakistani army in what was then East Pakistan, and it sought to help to avoid a major confrontation between Pakistan and India in the subcontinent (with the danger of even larger spillover effects). But United States leaders were also conscious of long-standing ties with Pakistan; they did not want to see the disintegration of that country; and they continued to be suspicious of India's intentions in the subcontinent and beyond. In addition, President Richard Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, were viscerally more sympathetic to Pakistan than to India. And they had a special reason to support Yahya Khan, who had succeeded Ayub Khan in early 1969, because of his "courier role" in the covert contacts between the United States and the People's Republic of China. During the Indo-Pakistan war in December, 1971, the United States helped to forestall strongly anti-Pakistan resolutions in the United Nations Security Council. The dispatch of a United States naval task force to the Bay of Bengal during the war raised fears in India and hopes in Pakistan, both of which proved to be exaggerated.

Since 1971, United States-Pakistan relations have been rather cool. Pakistanis noted the many evidences that the United States fully recognized and accepted "the new order of power" in South Asia and India's even more dominant position in that region. The United States did not want to become involved in Pakistan's internal problems under a strong-armed regime headed by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who had often been critical of United States policies.

Bhutto's deposition by a military coup in July, 1977, evoked mixed reactions in the United States. There was little regret for Bhutto, especially after his

"rigging" of the national elections in March, 1977, his increasing resort to force to quell the growing opposition to his rule, and his wild charges against the United States. But the advent of another military regime in Pakistan, with unknown leaders and unknown intentions, raised new doubts and apprehensions.

Pakistanis apparently believe that the United States should give Pakistan more assistance. Recent developments in Afghanistan and Iran have added new pressures and concerns. Pakistanis have expressed alarm (witness President Zia ul-Haq's interview with the *Times* (London) in September, 1978) over what they regard as the ultra-cautious "wait-and-see" attitude of the United States toward these developments. Pakistan has long veered from an aligned to a nonaligned policy. A representative of Pakistan attended the nonaligned conference in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, in the summer of 1978, in an "observer" status. Pakistan's leaders have often expressed disillusionment with CENTO (the Central Treaty Organization), and they are contemplating withdrawal from this multilateral Western military alliance.

ARMS SALES AND NUCLEAR REPROCESSING

In India, Pakistan's threats to withdraw from CENTO have been interpreted as efforts to pressure the United States to change its policies regarding arms sales to Pakistan and Pakistan's efforts to get a nuclear reprocessing plant from France. These are the most obvious issues in dispute in current United States-Pakistan relations.

For some years, Pakistan has been trying to buy sophisticated military aircraft from the United States, to replace obsolescent planes of American manufacture obtained in the days of the more active United States-Pakistan alliance. Since the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965, when the United States suspended military aid to both India and Pakistan (an action that obviously hurt Pakistan more than India), American military equipment has been available to Pakistan only on a limited basis. The Nixon and Ford administrations approved a proposed sale to Pakistan of 110 A-7 Corsair long-range fighter-bombers; but in June, 1977, President Carter announced that he had decided to withhold the sales of these aircraft. At this writing, the United States has not yielded to Pakistani pressures to reverse this decision, despite Pakistan's threats to withdraw from CENTO and President Zia's renewed requests for combat planes and other military equipment and assistance, in the light of new threats from Afghanistan after the coup in that country in April, 1978.

United States efforts to secure the cancellation of the March, 1976, nuclear reprocessing plant agreement between Pakistan and France have been bitterly resented in Pakistan. For some time, French spokes-

men insisted that France would abide by her agreement, in spite of strong American opposition; but in 1978 France sought to modify the arrangement in ways that would in effect abrogate her agreement to provide a nuclear reprocessing plant. In a press conference on August 23, 1978, President Zia announced that he had received "a very polite letter" from French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing requesting basic modifications in the French-Pakistani agreement. The effective withdrawal of France's agreement to supply Pakistan with a nuclear reprocessing plant led to Pakistani criticisms of France and to much stronger criticisms of the United States.

OTHER SOUTH ASIAN STATES

United States policies toward South Asia are understandably focused on American relations with the two major states of the region, India and Pakistan. Relations with the other states of South Asia naturally receive less attention and an even lower priority. But they have no means been inconsequential, and they are not always shaped primarily by larger regional or global considerations. It would therefore be a mistake to neglect United States relations with the weaker states of South Asia, even though these relations are limited in nature and are overshadowed by relations with India and Pakistan. These relations have been generally cordial. But this does not mean that these states can be taken for granted.

American relations with Sri Lanka and Nepal have been cordial. The victory of the United National party in Sri Lanka in the general elections of July, 1977, was welcomed in the United States. United States interest in Sri Lanka was indicated in a State Department document issued in the spring of 1978 on American security assistance to more than 80 countries: "An independent Sri Lanka, economically stable and secure, is important to the overall peace and stability of the South Asian region."

The same phrases describe basic United States interests in Nepal. The United States is sympathetic to Nepal's new emphasis on regional cooperation and to Nepal's desire to avoid becoming a victim of great power rivalries. Nepal, in turn, seems to be satisfied with her relations with the United States and would apparently welcome even closer relations, especially in the area of economic aid. Nepal's objectives were
(Continued on page 180)

Norman D. Palmer is a contributing editor of *Current History*. He is the author of *The Indian Political System*, rev. ed. (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1971), *South Asia and United States Policy* (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1966) and *Elections and Political Development: The South Asian Experience* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1975). He has been in South Asia 11 times over a period of more than 25 years.

"What economic, social, political and economic changes will occur as a result of continued demographic growth in South Asia? Thus far, government programs intended to reduce birth rates significantly have not been successful."

The Demographic Conundrum in South Asia

BY THOMAS D. ANDERSON

Professor of Geography, Bowling Green State University

NO treatment of South Asia seems complete without some attention to population. South Asia ranks second only to East Asia in total numbers, and its estimated 864 million people in 1978 constituted one-fifth of mankind (see Table 1). Other factors compound the demographic circumstances. Most serious are rates of natural increase that exceed the growth of economies in a region with the world's lowest rank in per capita gross national product (see Table 2). The situation is exacerbated by generally low levels of nutrition, health and literacy and by climates subject to drought or flood. The result has been demographic pressures of a scale unprecedented in world history. Because population growth has been identified as a significant variable, much attention has been devoted to its moderation.

South Asia consists of Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India (including Sikkim), Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Occupying an area of somewhat less than two million square miles, except for Nepal and Bhutan the countries bear little resemblance in size, location and physical character. Environments range from the winter-cold mountains and deserts of landlocked Afghanistan to the rainy tropical island of Sri Lanka. Dryness dominates in Pakistan and wetness in Bangladesh, with a gradual increase of summer maximum rainfall from west to east over the intervening Indian plain. The lowland river plains of the Indus in Pakistan and the Ganges-Brahmaputra in India and Bangladesh are the center of life south of the Himalayas; both coastal plain and plateau form the fundament for dense settlement in South India.

Except for the long independent buffer state of Afghanistan, the political map of South Asia dates

essentially from the end of British colonial rule in 1947, when partition created Hindu India and the present Muslim states of Pakistan and Bangladesh. The demographic impact of partition began early. Within a few years, exchanges of Hindus and Muslims between India and present Pakistan alone totaled over 10 million, with a 1.8 million balance favoring Pakistan.¹ Other millions abandoned their homes in two-way flows between India and what is now Bangladesh. Massacres during this period helped deepen the bitterness that has colored relations between India and Pakistan ever since.

The long-term deleterious effects of partition were assured by the division of the coherent economic unities of the Punjab and Bengal along religious lines. Because the agricultural economy of the Punjab is dependent on an interconnected irrigation network begun by the British in the 1880's, adjustments to the international division were complex and were not wholly satisfactory to either party. Water control in flood-plagued Bengal is also important. A diversion barrage on the Ganges built by India at Farakka necessitated a diplomatic settlement with respect to the allocation of low water flows.²

Adequate demographic information for the region is available. Under British direction, an all-India decennial census was begun in 1881, and the practice has continued since independence with only minor variations. Because of the war of separation in 1971, Pakistan and Bangladesh postponed their last census until 1972. Sri Lanka held her first national censuses in 1953 and 1963, but chose 1971 for her latest one.³ There never has been a census in Afghanistan. The best available statistics derive from a government-sponsored national survey administered by a team of Americans in 1972-1973.⁴ The most serious known deficiency of this study of Afghanistan is that it did not sample nomads, a group estimated variously at 9 to 16 percent of the population. Table 1 shows data published by The Environmental Fund. Although not verifiable, these figures represent recent estimates compiled by this reputable organization.

According to The Environmental Fund, in 1978 the rate of population increase for South Asia was 2.3 percent annually, as compared with a world rate of

¹Mohammad Afzul, *The Population of Pakistan* (Islamabad: Institute of Development Economics, 1974), p. 26.

²R.D. Sawvell, "Crisis on the Ganges: The Barrage at Farakke," *Geography*, vol. 63, no. 278 (January, 1978), pp. 49-52. See also the article by M. Rashiduzzaman, "The Political Evolution of Bangladesh," in this issue, pp. 167 ff.

³U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Sri Lanka, Country Demographic Profiles*, ISP-DP-8 (Washington, D.C.: November, 1977), p. 1.

⁴U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Afghanistan: A Demographic Uncertainty* International Research Document no. 6, ISP-RD-6 (Washington, D.C.: September, 1978), p. 1.

TABLE 1: Demographic Data for South Asia (1978)⁵

	Afghanistan	Bangladesh	Bhutan	India	Nepal	Pakistan	Sri Lanka
1. Total Population (in millions)	14.4	85.8	1.3	656.5	13.7	7.7	14.3
2. Growth Rate (in percent)	2.2	2.7	2.4	2.1	2.5	3.0	1.5
3. Crude Birth Rate per 1,000	52	47	43	37	46	45	27
4. Crude Death Rate per 1,000	30	19	19	15	21	14	9
5. Increase in Population since 1950 (in percent)	85	101	74	78	73	119	90
6. Increase in Population since 1950 (in millions)	6.6	43.1	0.54	286.7	5.8	42.2	6.7
7. Estimated Population in Year 2000 (in millions)	NA	144.3	2.1	1,059.8	23.2	146.9	21.3
8. Births per Fertile Woman (average)*	6.9	7.2	6.2	5.7	6.2	7.2	4.2
9. Percent of Literacy*	8	25	5	29	12	14	82
10. Year of Latest Population Census	NA	1974	1969	1971	1972	1972	1971

*1977 figure

2.0 percent. Earlier, Worldwatch Institute estimated that for 1975 the rates were 2.13 percent and 1.64 percent, respectively.⁶ The areas of agreement between the two seems more important than the discrepancies. The figures suggest that, aside from Sri Lanka, the countries of South Asia exhibit rates of increase higher than the world average, although lower than the averages for any other third world region except East Asia. The critical component, however, is the magnitude of the base population. The past and present impact of these growth rates on already populous countries is illustrated on lines 6 and 7 of Table 1. For example, between 1950 and 1978 India added to her population as many people as live in the United States and Mexico combined! Over the same period, Bangladesh added a total equivalent to 80 percent of the population of France.

Although they are inexact devices because of our inability accurately to foresee changes in growth rates, population projections are useful, demonstrating the demographic consequences of continued increase. The simplest procedure employs the Rule of 70, wherein one determines the number of years needed to double a base number by dividing the percent of annual increase into 70.⁷

Projections for the year 2000 illustrate the magnitude and immediacy of population dynamics in con-

temporary South Asia. Prompt action is apparently needed to lower the rates of increase. There is a deceptive simplicity about such projections, however. Population growth rates do not remain constant over long periods. In South Asia, there are indications of lessening growth rates in each country over the past few years, but in each case the pace is far slower than was planned.

Since the mid-1960's or earlier, every government in the region has devoted money and effort to programs designed to reduce national birth rates. But even if current family planning objectives are overachieved, the momentum of increase will add numbers of people for at least another half century. For several decades, when children already born attain childbearing age, the total annual increase will be raised even as the per capita number of births declines. Statistical models differ in complexity, but regardless of which is employed, demographic prospects for the turn of the century and beyond remain grim.

Because the ratio of cropland to population is so low and population totals and growth rates so high in Bangladesh, that state is cited most often as a place where the "triage concept" is applicable. The thrust of this argument is that wherever demographic conditions are especially difficult, international aid should be withdrawn and devoted instead to areas where the potentials for demographic amelioration are more promising. In short, Bangladesh should be left to inexorable Malthusian positive checks (famine, disease, war), which would trim her excess numbers to a level commensurate with her resource base.

But ignoring the moral dimensions of this concept, even the feasibility of a Malthusian solution has been questioned. Taking as a base the increased mortality caused by recent disasters (tidal bore in 1970, war in

⁵Adapted from Wilson Prichett III, *World Population Estimates, 1978*, and *1977 (Washington, D.C.: The Environmental Fund).

⁶Lester Brown, *World Population Trends: Signs of Hope, Signs of Stress*, Worldwatch Paper 8 (Washington, D.C.: Worldwatch Institute, October, 1976), p. 33.

⁷Thomas D. Anderson, "Use of the 'Rule of 70' in Teaching About Population," *Journal of Geography*, vol. 75, no. 4 (January, 1976), pp. 227-230.

1971, famine in 1974) in conjunction with different possible fertility patterns, C. Stephen Baldwin constructed several projection models for the period 1975-2000. He concluded that even assuming a level of catastrophes unprecedented anywhere else in the world over the next 25 years, unless there are sharp reductions in the natural growth rate the population of Bangladesh will reach 156 million by 2006.⁸

Demographic change has followed a roughly similar pattern throughout the former British colonial lands. Early in the century, rates of growth fluctuated but were quite low. Indeed, they did not attain a 1.0 percent annual increase until the 1920's and they reached 2.0 percent only after 1950.⁹ The increase is attributed to declines in mortality. Successful efforts to control diseases like plague and cholera and to almost eliminate famine were followed by steady reductions in the ravages of malaria, smallpox, typhoid and tuberculosis. Recent emphasis has been placed on the eventual elimination of these ailments, along with respiratory and intestinal disorders. In Pakistan, the results have been a lowering of the crude death rates from 40 per 1,000 in 1900 to 19 per 1,000 in 1960.¹⁰ In Bangladesh, the estimated drop was from 50 per 1,000 in 1900 to 20 per 1,000 in 1968.¹¹ Decreases of a comparable magnitude occurred elsewhere in the region.

Indian awareness of the need for family planning in the face of unprecedented rates of population increase was translated into action soon after India became independent. In her first five year plan (1951-1956) India became the first country in the world to enact a government-sponsored national family planning program aimed at reducing population growth.¹² Pakistan took comparable action in 1955, followed by newly separated Bangladesh in 1973. A government

⁸C. Stephen Baldwin, "Catastrophe in Bangladesh: An Examination of Alternative Population Growth Possibilities, 1975-2000," *Asian Survey*, vol. 17, no. 4 (April, 1977), pp. 245-57.

⁹Pravin Vasaria and Anrudh K. Jain, *India, Country Profiles* (New York: The Population Council, May, 1976), pp. 9-10.

¹⁰Afzul, *op. cit.*, pp. 17-18.

¹¹Just Faaland and J.R. Parkinson, *Bangladesh: The Test Case of Development* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1976), p. 98.

¹²Vasaria, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

¹³Population Reference Bureau, *World Population Growth and Response, 1965-1975: A Decade of Global Action* (Washington, D.C.: April, 1976), pp. 69-100.

¹⁴Vasaria, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

¹⁵S. Chandraseker, *Infant Mortality, Population Growth and Family Planning in India* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1972), pp. 35-39.

¹⁶U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Measurement of Infant Mortality in Less Developed Countries*, International Research Document no. 5, ISP-RD-5 (Washington, D.C.: August, 1978), p. 11.

¹⁷Population Reference Bureau, *op. cit.*, pp. 78-100.

¹⁸Faaland, *op. cit.*, p. 109.

program began in Sri Lanka in 1965; the program had been preceded in 1953 by a private Family Planning Association. In Nepal, the same sequence occurred in 1965 and 1968.

Under the regime of Muhammad Daoud, Afghanistan had no official program, but her internationally affiliated Family Guidance Association was established in 1968 and operated with strong support from the Ministry of Health.¹³ The socialist objectives of the current government of Muhammad Taraki undoubtedly include the continuation if not the expansion of these activities. The region's increasing investment in family planning programs is clear evidence that every government recognizes that a reduction of birth rates will serve the national interest.

Illiteracy and isolation are impediments to the gathering of improved demographic data. Except in Sri Lanka, literacy rates are low everywhere, particularly in rural areas. School programs focus on the young, of course, and another decade of effort is expected to show vast improvement, especially in India. Rural isolation is even more serious. For example, despite possession of the world's fourth longest rail network, roughly 60,000 kilometers, India has only a little more than 30,000 kilometers of roads, two-thirds of which are only one lane.¹⁴

Cultural barriers are also inimicable to demographic data collection, including the belief that to count the members of a household will bring evil on the house. Another barrier is the practice of purdah, in which the family females are secluded from the view of strangers. The custom has a Muslim origin but has diffused into Hindu communities. Because of purdah, some census data are obtained only from the family head, who may or may not choose to be candid. In addition to their illiteracy, many adults in South Asia do not know their own ages. In most cultures, the celebration of birthdays is not important. Wherever age data relies on personal estimation, there is a distinct cultural bias toward numbers that are multiples of five.¹⁵ Nationwide systems of vital registration are badly needed for statistical estimations. Thus far, only India and Sri Lanka have such systems, and even in these countries the systems are of comparatively recent origin and uneven distribution.¹⁶

Delivery of family planning education and materials is accomplished largely by means of local clinics. In 1975 in India, for example, there were 1,919 urban centers, 16 central family planning field units, 5,132 rural centers, 33,048 subcenters and 505 mobile teams—all staffed by about 55,000 medical and support personnel. The approximate number of clinics was 250 in Nepal; 700 in Pakistan, and 525 in Sri Lanka.¹⁷ A total of over 9,000 had been planned for Bangladesh beginning in 1973, but implementation has been slowed by flood and famine and by government instability and ineptitude.¹⁸ Presumably the estab-

lishment and function of 180 regional family planning clinics scheduled in Afghanistan have been delayed because of disruptions associated with the change in government. Supplementing these regional and local clinics in each country are mobile teams and home extension workers, who reach couples who cannot or will not visit the clinics.

Most clinics provide basic medical treatment and advice, and also cooperate in the demographic data gathering process. The linkage between family planning and health care is a deliberately fostered image. Provision of curative and preventive medical care is often accompanied by unsolicited information on birth control. The political benefits of a visible presence of government-sponsored social services in the villages are fully appreciated by regional and national leaders.

The main thrust of family planning has been focused on pregnancy prevention. Because the first programs had no precedent, not all approaches were successful. In India, the first heavily promoted technique was the rhythm method; it was inexpensive and violated no religious precepts. It was soon learned, however, that illiterate rural peoples have a poorly developed sense of time. Success was therefore limited. The distribution of necklaces with beads for each day of the menstrual cycle was a clever adjustment, but the use of colors to mark the fertile periods was not. In the absence of electricity, light at night is limited, and the red (stop) and green (go) beads eventually gave way to square and round beads.

Current programs employ a variety of approaches, including contraceptive devices, sterilization of both men and women, and a qualified legalization of abortion in Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka. Despite the requirement that abortion be justified on "medical grounds," it has become a legal birth control option in these countries. Abortion under modern conditions remains a minor practice, although some observers suggest that folk methods are used frequently in rural areas.¹⁹

For roughly two decades beginning in the 1950's, South Asia, and India in particular, was the international test area for new approaches to birth control. The obvious need was facilitated by the fact that governments were receptive to advice from technologically advanced countries and that a large corps of

nationals with advanced educations could communicate in English. By the 1970's the number of these nation-to-nation agreements declined in favor of multilateral agreements, often involving United Nations agencies.

Condoms are favored both by government agencies and by acceptors of the programs. They are provided free under some circumstances although a moderate fee has been more effective. Items provided without cost are often viewed as having less value. Part of the 1974-1978 population planning program in Pakistan was a "contraceptive inundation" scheme. This tactic combines wide distribution of oral contraceptives and condoms with man-woman teams which meet with couples on a door-to-door basis. All media were employed to advertise these visiting teams and to raise public consciousness.²⁰ Similar personal visitations were instituted in Bangladesh under the five-year plan beginning in 1974. The success of this effort has been hampered by inadequate personnel and funding as well as by the cultural barriers between the urban-based teams and the villagers. Nonetheless, the program is an improvement over earlier programs that placed less emphasis on the motivational dimensions of birth limitation.²¹ In Sri Lanka, a program called *Preethi* (which means happiness in both Sinhalese and Tamil) began in 1973. Under this plan, contraceptives are promoted like soft drinks and soap in an approach called "social marketing," which has a social rather than a profit goal.²²

Contraceptives like jellies, creams and foam tablets are not emphasized. Their use presupposes money for renewal and personal privacy, and neither is generally available. On the other hand, since its introduction in 1965, insertion of the intrauterine device (IUD) has been strongly promoted in India. Its advantages include freedom from continual expense and special preparations. Despite its imperfections, which include spontaneous and sometimes unnoticed rejection from the body, insertion of the IUD was given a high priority in the fifth five year plan (1974-1979).

Sterilizations, mainly vasectomies, have been a major part of family planning programs in South Asia in the past decade. They are aimed at individuals who are already parents. In India, a large program has been in operation and had been responsible for 10 million sterilizations by 1973.²³ In fact, excesses connected with the vasectomy program have been cited as a contributing factor in the defeat of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in the elections of March, 1977. Gandhi had appointed her son, Sanjay, to be director of a five-point program of social transformation, which included the vasectomy operations. By 1977, his high-handed zeal had produced a series of almost compulsory mass sterilizations, the details of which grew more lurid with each account. Once the election was scheduled, his actions helped to sway millions of

¹⁹*Ibid.*, p. 103.

²⁰Population Reference Bureau, *op. cit.*, pp. 92-93.

²¹Ashok K. Dutt and Nawajesh Ahmed, "Population Pressures in Bangladesh," *Focus*, vol. 25, nos. 3 and 4 (November-December, 1974), pp. 8-10.

²²Paul Harrison, "Sri Lanka Sells Small Family Policy," *Geographical Magazine*, vol. 48, no. 7 (April, 1976) pp. 399-401.

²³India, Ministry of Health and Family Planning, *Progress of Family Planning Program in India* (New Delhi: Government of India, 1971), p. 23.

TABLE 2: Annual Growth Rates in Per Capita Gross National Product for South Asia

	GNP in Dollars	World Rank in Amount	Growth Rates in 1960-75	Percent 1970-75	Population Growth in Percent 1970-75	GNP Growth 1970-75
Sri Lanka	190	100	2.0	1.1	2.1	0.5
Pakistan	160	104	3.3	0.8	2.0	-2.3
Afghanistan	150	106	-0.2	2.1	3.0	0.8
India	140	107	1.3	0.5	2.2	2.1
Nepal	110	118	0.3	0.7	1.7	1.1
Bangladesh	90	120*	0.6	-2.3	2.1	0.7
Bhutan	NA	NA	NA		2.3	-0.1

*Last among the nations for which data were published

From *World Bank Atlas/1977* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank), pp. 6 and 16.

voters to abandon their traditional support of the Congress party.²⁴

In addition to programs aimed at teaching people how to limit births, there is an increased appreciation of the importance of why. When motivated to prevent births, couples will employ folk methods or seek out contraceptives. If not so inclined, neither propaganda nor free samples of devices alter their behavior. For most adults living in a traditional society, the advantages of small family size are not obvious. The litany of factors favoring high fertility bears repetition. Sons provide old age security, not available from any other source. Births are sought at least until enough sons are born to assure the survival of at least one to maturity. If the process produces many daughters as well, so be it. In a non-cash economy, children do not cost money to feed and in fact they can help spread the burden of labor, if only by chasing birds out of ripening grain fields. Fatalism is also a factor. Z.M. Zaidi reported that in Bangladesh 99 percent of the Muslims and 98 percent of the Hindus believe that man has no control over his means of livelihood, which is assigned by God.²⁵ Similar views retard the acceptance of other options intended to modify personal circumstances.

In the classic interpretation of demographic transition, based on European experiences, the prospect for improvement of one's material standard of living has been recognized as a powerful stimulus toward reduced family size. There is little evidence that this factor will influence large segments of the population in South Asia.

²⁴Educational Resources Center, *The Emergency in India*, News and Reviews from ERC (New Delhi, October, 1977), pp. 21-24.

²⁵Z.M. Zaidi, *The Village Culture in Transition: Study of East Pakistan Rural Society* (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1970), p. 99.

²⁶*World Bank Atlas: Population, Per Capita Product, and Growth Rates* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1977), pp. 6 and 16.

²⁷C. Gregory Knight and R. Paul Wilcox, *Triumph or Triage: The World Food Problem in Geographical Perspective*, Resource Paper no. 75-3.

Economic data that assign monetary value to goods for which no price is paid can present misleading pictures of actual living conditions in traditional societies. On the other hand, they provide reasonable measures of the availability of cash to purchase those items associated with modern life-styles. Against this standard, the data in Table 2 suggest economic decline everywhere in the region. Conditions are most favorable in India and even India seems barely to be "keeping up."

A cliché that seems obligatory in descriptions of the subcontinent refers to the "starving millions." This concept needs clarification. Starvation means to die from lack of sufficient food; famine is reserved for mass starvation on a regional scale and has been a rare event since 1900. Starvation remains, sadly, a far too frequent event, but the term can scarcely have general application in countries that face steadily increasing numbers. People who are dying do not procreate. Hunger is a more accurate term and has two components: undernutrition, in which insufficient calories result in loss of energy and weight; and malnutrition, with symptoms of disease caused by the inadequate intake of certain nutrients. Either or both these conditions affect major segments of the region's peoples, especially in those weeks before harvest. One recent study classed Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India and Nepal as having deficit diets in terms of calorific needs. Pakistan and Sri Lanka were ranked only one point higher on a scale of six.²⁷

The conclusion seems clear. Available food is barely sufficient to support present numbers, and accelerating human distress seems destined to occur if the

(Continued on page 184)

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"China's primary objective in South Asia is to contain Soviet influence and power," notes this observer, who concludes that "China's relations with India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and other South Asian countries can be understood only in light of the Chinese perception of the contemporary world. The Chinese believe that the Soviet 'social imperialists' constitute . . . 'the greatest threat' to world peace. . . ."

China's Policy toward South Asia

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THE South Asian subcontinent—an area of 1,627,000 square miles with a population of more than 600 million, i.e., one-sixth of the world population and about half the third world—is divided into three sovereign states: India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Not a primary tension area threatening direct superpower confrontation, except in 1962, 1965 and 1971, the area has nonetheless seen active diplomatic competition. The interrelations of the global policies of major powers—the United States, the Soviet Union and China—and regional tensions in the area have been of significance to the emerging patterns of alignment in South Asia. New alignments have been particularly important in view of the Sino-Japanese friendship treaty, Sino-American diplomatic relations and, above all, the growing Sino-Soviet rift.

Under China's current forward-looking foreign policy, South Asia is apparently a low-profile area. East Asia, Indochina, the Korean Peninsula and relations with the United States, European countries (both West and East) and Africa are high priority goals for China in her competition with and threats from the Soviet Union. In the 1950's and 1960's and in 1970-1971, South Asia had a special significance. Sino-Indian and, subsequently, Sino-Pakistani relations have had a sometime turbulent, sometime friendly, history during more than three decades.

The emergence of a Communist China under Chairman Mao Tse-tung in 1949, in declared alliance with the Soviet Union, caused anxiety in the United States, particularly because East-West cold war tensions were at their height. In Asia, however, and especially in India (which China later fought in 1962 and which became a close friend of the Soviet Union during the height of the subsequent Sino-Soviet rift in the 1960's and 1970's), the rise of a strong China was greeted.

China undertook active diplomacy to win the

¹See Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's speech on September 30, 1954, delivered to the Lok Sabha in *Nehru's Speeches* (New Delhi: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India).

²Sen Gupta Bhabani, *Fulcrum of Asia* (New York: Pegasus, 1970).

friendship of the newly independent Afro-Asian countries. An especially friendly tie developed between India and China, after Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's vigorous support of China during the Korean War; in 1954, the two countries signed a treaty based on the so-called five principles of coexistence. China's next-door neighbors, including Thailand, the Philippines and Japan, did not respond to China's friendly gestures, but many Afro-Asian countries were favorably impressed by China at the first Afro-Asian conference at Bandung in 1955.

Many Asians regarded the emergence of a new and powerful China as a great feat of Asian nationalism, not as a triumph of international communism controlled and directed by the Soviet Union. Nehru, for one, believed that China and India could form a third force in the world to act as a bridge between Moscow and Washington¹—an immature assessment, because at that time Mao did not trust any friendship or alliance with a bourgeois Asian regime like the Nehru government in India.

In the initial years of new Chinese nationalism (1949-1952), China's foreign policy was dominated by doctrinaire and ideological considerations. The focal point of her foreign policy was China's alliance with Moscow, following the concept of the "world of two camps." This was a period of ideological intransigence and revolutionary militancy for the Communist world. Under Soviet influence and desperately needing Soviet assistance for security and for economic development, Mao apparently followed Soviet policy, treating the newly independent Asian countries like India and Pakistan as "stooges of Anglo-American imperialism." This distorted attitude toward the new Asian countries was adopted in deference to the Kremlin. In fact, China recognized the dynamics of the new countries in Asia sooner than the Soviet Union, whose rigid and indifferent attitude began to change only after the death of Soviet leader Joseph Stalin in 1953.² China's friendship with India during the Korean War is an illustration of the way China's policy of "uniting with revolutionaries" was transformed into a policy of "union with all." Though

China has long been a magnet for her Asian neighbors, the Chinese have neither the desire nor the ability to seek hegemony in Asia. No doubt, they perceive Asia as their natural cultural domain, and they must eventually play a crucial role in the search for stability there.

China's attitude to her Asian neighbors, however, cannot be adequately explained without reference to her global perception and to her relations with the superpowers: the United States and the Soviet Union. Chinese leaders prefer to discuss foreign policy in ideological terms. Chairman Hua Kuo-feng, for instance, in the foreign policy section of his report to the eleventh Communist party congress on August 12, 1977, outlined China's current perception of the world and her foreign policy priorities in Maoist terms.³

China's relations with the superpowers greatly influenced China's relations with her next-door Asian neighbors. The twenty years of hostile Sino-American relationships (1950-1970) had a great impact on China and her Asian neighbors. And the current Sino-Soviet conflict has also had considerable influence in shaping China's attitudes.

THE POST-CULTURAL REVOLUTION PERIOD

When China emerged on the world stage after the self-imposed isolation of the Cultural Revolution period (1966-1969), she was confronted with a new global situation. Twenty years of the American policy of containment and hostility toward Peking have been overshadowed by menacing threats from the Soviet Union. The United States withdrawal from Indochina was imminent, and a low-profile American policy toward the Asia/Pacific region was enunciated by President Richard Nixon in the 1969 doctrine that bears his name. At the same time, the growing Soviet involvement in Asia aimed to isolate and weaken China. The Soviet intention was evident in Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev's Asian collective security plan and in Soviet Premier Andrei Kosygin's scheme for a regional economic grouping.⁴ To meet the changed global situation, China tried to adjust her foreign policy goals and strategy. Her foreign policy objectives in 1969-1976 included improved relations with the United States as a counterbalance to the Soviet Union and improved relations with her Asian neighbors, particularly Japan. Tokyo, Hanoi and New Delhi became focal points of Chinese policy as China tried to win the friendship of nonaligned countries.⁵

³New China News Agency (NCNA), August 22, 1977.

⁴G.W. Choudhury, *Brezhnev's Collective Security Plan for Asia* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, 1976).

⁵Choudhury, *Chinese Perception of the World* (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America), 1977.

⁶The author was a member of the Pakistani President's entourage.

After a decade of friendly relations, China and India engaged in a border war in 1962 that resulted in a military debacle for India. Sino-Indian relations were frozen during 1962-1975, and Moscow took full advantage of this freeze. India became the Soviet Union's strongest partner in its policy of isolating and weakening China. At the same time, India's prime enemy, Pakistan, became China's chief informal ally in South Asia. In November, 1970, in Peking, Chinese leaders told Pakistan's President Yahya Khan that India and China might resume full diplomatic relations, broken during the 1962 war.⁶ But then came the 1971 Bangladesh crisis and the third Indo-Pakistani war. Both Peking and Washington were worried by Moscow's scrambling for power and influence, and Soviet exploitation of regional tensions in South Asia.

As a result of the 1971 crisis, Sino-Indian relations remained frozen. On the other hand, Sino-Pakistani ties survived the Chinese Cultural Revolution and the Bangladesh crisis and, in fact, became more cordial; and Pakistan helped to develop the new Sino-American relationship during its formative stages in 1969-1971. The new balance of power in South Asia after the 1971 crisis was a diplomatic victory for Moscow and a setback for China and the United States.

In 1975-1976, the South Asian triangle began to shift. During Nehru's heyday, India enjoyed a strong diplomatic position: both superpowers sought her friendship, and India was a leader of the nonaligned countries. But after the 1971 crisis, India's image in the third world was tarnished; even in Bangladesh, her client state during 1972-1974, there was strong anti-Indian feeling, which culminated in the overthrow of Bangladesh's pro-Indian government on August 15, 1975. More important, India's relations with the United States were not cordial, and relations with Peking remained frozen. Thus India soon made serious bids to restore full diplomatic relations with Peking.

On April 15, 1975, it was announced that India would send an ambassador to Peking. Although the ambassadors have presented their credentials in a friendly atmosphere, it is still too early to forecast strong links between Peking and New Delhi. India still attaches great importance to Moscow's help, particularly Soviet military supplies, and is not comfortable about Peking's continued support of Pakistan. Yet the Indians want wider diplomatic options. And for the Chinese, some dent in the Moscow-New Delhi entente would be a diplomatic feat. It was reported in the Indian Parliament on August 20, 1975, that there had been no anti-Indian Chinese propaganda in recent months. Chinese scientists took a week-long study tour of enterprises and research and development centers in India in October, 1976. It was also reported in the Indian Parliament that India was

exploring the prospects of increased trade with China, commerce between the two countries having declined sharply since 1962.

Good neighborly relations between Asia's two largest countries is welcome; strong Sino-Indian ties would check Moscow's bid for dominance in the subcontinent and the Indian Ocean area.

What will be the impact of China's Indian policy on Pakistan, her informal ally in South Asia? Pakistan is, no doubt, worried about the prospect of better relations between China and India. The author has learned from reliable sources in Peking that Pakistan has been assured of China's continued friendship and help. But just as India wants to widen her diplomatic options, so China wants to have more than one friend in South Asia. The former Prime Minister of Pakistan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, never tired of talking loudly about his country's links with China. The Chinese know, however, that it was Bhutto who rejected Premier Chou En-lai's offer of a "Friendship Pact" on January 27, 1964.⁷ Similarly, after the 1962 Sino-Indian war, when President Ayub Khan was reshaping Pakistan's foreign policy and trying to improve relations with Peking, Bhutto's advice to Ayub was "to look toward Moscow" instead of Peking.

In an important note on April 6, 1969, Ayub wrote Bhutto:

You are trying to drag me into a futile venture. The Russians won't be our friends because of their long-standing commitments to India and Afghanistan. If the Soviets wish to improve relations with us, they could have done so in many ways. At present, they will wish only to play with us.⁸

The wisdom of this warning was made clear in 1971, when the Soviet Union backed India in the dismemberment of Pakistan. The Chinese will continue to have friendly relations with Pakistan because they know that the Pakistani people and Pakistan's army are the solid core of Pakistan's close ties with Peking.

China opened diplomatic relations with the new South Asian nation of Bangladesh on August 15, 1975, after the November, 1975, military coup there. Earlier, under Mujibur Rahman, the founder of the country, Bangladesh adopted a negative attitude toward Peking, influenced by India and the Soviet Union. After the change in the Bangladeshi government in November, 1975, China extended her full support and cooperation to Bangladesh. The new relationship is still in its formative phase, but both sides are eager to develop it quickly. Bangladesh will probably provide another foothold for China in the

Indian subcontinent-Indian Ocean area.

Since Mao's death, Chinese policy toward South Asia has been essentially an elaboration of China's more diversified approach during the year or so before the Chairman's death, although events in India and Pakistan have produced some changes in nuance. As far as Bangladesh is concerned, China has tried to solidify the links between the two countries. On January 2-6, 1977, General Ziaur Rahman, then Bangladesh's chief martial law administrator but now President, paid a state visit to China. He received a warm reception, with Chairman Hua Kuo-feng at the airport to greet him. Ziaur Rahman paid tribute to the growing China-Bangladesh friendship. More important from the Chinese standpoint, he specifically denounced "expansionism and hegemonism," a veiled reference to Soviet maneuvering in Asia.

The ties between Peking and Dacca have also had concrete manifestations. During Ziaur Rahman's visit to China, the countries signed an economic and technical cooperation agreement and a trade and credit agreement. More significant, the Chinese have offered military supplies to Bangladesh. Reliable sources have informed the author that China has agreed to send four squadrons of Mig 21's for the Bangladeshi air force. The Chinese, according to the report, were willing to provide as many as 12 squadrons, but Bangladesh was unable to accept this many because of "the lack of storage and maintenance facilities." Bangladeshi pilots have also gone to Peking for training.⁹

With regard to Pakistan, Chinese leaders have continued to be friendly, but they exhibited less enthusiasm about Prime Minister Bhutto than Soviet leaders. For instance, Moscow's Radio Peace and Progress attributed Bhutto's success in the Pakistani election of March, 1977, to his "sober and positive foreign policy," and *Pravda* spoke of his "realistic foreign policy." The Chinese, in contrast, reported the results of the election without comment.

For several months after Mao's demise, the new Chinese leaders behaved cautiously but amicably toward India. For example, they sent a group of scientists to make a week-long study tour of different enterprises and research and development centers in India in October, 1976. But the great weight that New Delhi attaches to Moscow's assistance, particularly Soviet military supplies, and India's displeasure at China's continued support of Pakistan kept the relationship from blossoming.

The defeat of Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and her Congress party in the March, 1977, election, however, introduced a new element. This was particularly true in light of speculation that the new Indian government, headed by Morarji Desai, might follow a genuine nonalignment policy—that is, it might move away from the close relationship that Gandhi had

⁷Based on the author's reading of unpublished Pakistani government documents and papers (1967-1971).

⁸*Ibid.*

⁹Based on the author's talks and discussion with the Bangladeshi President in March, 1977.

forged with Moscow and try to improve India's ties with both Peking and Washington.

Chinese media reported Gandhi's downfall hopefully. Commenting on the election results, *Peking Review* said:

This significant change in the Indian political scene will have an important bearing on the situation in the South Asian subcontinent and the Indian Ocean.

The results . . . declared the bankruptcy of the internal and external policies pursued by Indira Gandhi, who had tailed after the Soviet Union, policies which harmed the country and brought suffering to the people. . . .

India occupies an important strategic position in Asia and the Indian Ocean. To realize their fond dream of dominating the world, the new tsars curried favor with the Indira Gandhi government and tried to drag India into the orbit of their counterrevolutionary global strategy. . . .¹⁰

It is still too early to discern the shape of India's foreign policy under Desai, and the Chinese—like the rest of the world—seem to be waiting and watching.

CHINA'S NEW FOREIGN POLICY

In China, the first year without Mao (1977) was devoted to internal problems. But starting in 1978, China began an active global policy, with the prime objective of containing Soviet expansionist designs in the third world, particularly in Asia. The Sino-Japanese friendship treaty of August, 1978, and the full diplomatic relations with the United States announced by President Jimmy Carter and Chairman Hua on December 15, 1978, were two great diplomatic achievements for Peking; the Vietnam-Soviet friendship treaty of November, 1978, and the consequent defeat of Cambodia, China's only ally in Indochina, were two big setbacks. China's bids to win the friendship of ASEAN countries and Hua's visits to East Europe and Iran were part of the same global exercise.

Turning to South Asia, Chinese Vice Premier Li Shien-Nien, accompanied by Foreign Minister Huang Hua, visited Bangladesh in March, 1978, and was warmly welcomed. The author was in Dacca during the visit; the reception of the Chinese leaders at Dacca was reminiscent of the reception accorded Premier Chou En-lai during his visit to East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). The author had lengthy discussions with Bangladeshi President Ziaur Rahman and the Chinese ambassador in Bangladesh and gained a clear picture of Sino-Bangladeshi friendship. Ziaur Rahman subsequently went to North Korea as the head of the foreign countries delegations on the thirtieth anniversary of the founding of the "Democratic Republic of Korea." He was accorded a hero's welcome and enjoyed another fruitful dialogue with

Chinese Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping, who was the head of the Chinese delegation. China is now training Bangladeshi air force personnel, supplying Bangladesh with military supplies, and helping with development projects. China has a firm foothold in Bangladesh; the Bangladeshi President and his armed forces and the Bangladeshi people are strong supporters of the Sino-Bangladeshi friendship.

But some sections of the powerful civil service and some intelligentsia are trying subtly to weaken the emerging Sino-Bangladeshi friendship. The new Foreign Secretary, Sama Kibria, is noted for his pro-Moscow leanings. He assisted the former Bangladeshi Foreign Minister A. Samad, who is now in prison, during the "World Congress of Peace Forces" held in Moscow on October 25-31, 1973, to advocate the acceptance of Brezhnev's collective security plan for Asia, a Soviet version of SEATO.¹¹ Its sole objective is to encircle China with unfriendly, if not hostile neighbors. Since October, 1978, Bangladesh's foreign policy has been unclear. Kibria's subtle modus operandi is moving Bangladesh away from Peking. Kibria arranged a visit for the Vietnamese Vice Premier to Dacca in December, 1978, at the height of Sino-Vietnamese tensions. The Chinese were displeased with this gesture to their enemy number 2 (the Soviet Union is enemy number 1); it was clearly provocative for Bangladesh to welcome the Vietnamese Vice Premier when China has shown such friendship toward Bangladesh. Kibria is also making hectic efforts to "secure" an invitation for the President to go to Moscow—again at a time when Chinese leaders may have second thoughts on their relations with Bangladesh. The loser, of course, would be Bangladesh, which needs China's friendship. The Sino-Bangladeshi friendship, however, has strong roots. So the friendly relations that began with Ziaur Rahman's visit to Peking in January, 1977, may continue.

China's best friend in South Asia since the 1962 Sino-Indian war, Pakistan, is having many internal problems. Political unrest in Baluchistan and in the Northwest Frontier provinces, where yearning for regional autonomy is a veiled scheme of secession, is encouraged and assisted by the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul. The coup in Afghanistan and the new regime's pro-Soviet leaning are causing great concern in Pakistan; they are also sources of concern to Iran's leaders

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¹⁰*Peking Review*, April 8, 1977.

¹¹Choudhury, *op. cit.*

"The euphoria that greeted the Janata victory in March, 1977, has been displaced by frustration and uncertainty. Good monsoons and record harvests have sustained the economy, but government policy lacks sustained direction and is burdened by misplaced priorities (symbolized by the obsessive pursuit of the total prohibition of alcoholic beverages)."

India: From Crisis to Crisis

BY ROBERT L. HARDGRAVE, JR.

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IN March, 1977, the Indian people went to the polls in the largest democratic elections ever held. The 1977 parliamentary elections were, in effect, a referendum on the authoritarian rule of the Emergency imposed 21 months before. In an overwhelming defeat, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and her Congress party were turned from office, after 30 years of Congress rule. The election results were greeted with euphoria and hailed as a "democratic revolution," and the newly formed Janata party came to power under the leadership of Morarji Desai. Less than two years later, amidst drift and rising discontent, the Janata government was hobbled by factional warfare. Euphoria had been displaced by frustration and uncertainty. And Indira Gandhi, like a phoenix rising from the ashes of defeat, was laying claim to widening popular support.

On the morning of June 26, 1975, Indira Gandhi announced to the people of India that the nation had been placed under emergency rule.¹ The constitution empowers the President to declare a state of emergency if the security of the nation is threatened by external aggression or internal disturbance. The emergency proclaimed in 1971 during the Bangladesh crisis had never been lifted. Now, the Prime Minister stated, the nation was being threatened by a "deep and widespread conspiracy" to disrupt the normal functioning of government.

The "conspiracy" to which Gandhi referred was the opposition attempt to unseat her as Prime Min-

ister, rooted in two movements against the Congress governments of Gujarat and Bihar. No sooner had students successfully brought down the Gujarat ministry in 1974 than discontent in Bihar turned into mass agitation. Emerging from political retirement, Jayaprakash Narayan (or J.P., as he is called) assumed leadership of the movement. In 1954, 20 years earlier, Narayan, a respected socialist leader and the man many believed to be Nehru's political heir, had renounced "party-and-power" politics and dedicated himself to the Gandhian principles of Sarvodaya. In Sarvodaya ("welfare for all"), Narayan sought the reconstruction of society.

In 1974, at the head of the movement which came to bear his name, he called for "total revolution"—the fundamental transformation of Indian society. His movement was heavily urban and drew on a wide spectrum across the political opposition, from members of the Jana Sangh on the right to Socialists and Marxists on the left. The organizing force behind the movement was the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), a paramilitary Hindu extremist organization and the "parent" of the Jana Sangh. The political opposition submerged its differences in common opposition to the ruling Congress party and responded to J.P.'s call for *satyagraha* (nonviolent civil disobedience) against the government of Bihar.

Against this backdrop of political unrest, Indira Gandhi suffered two major blows. On June 12, 1975, the High Court of Allahabad found her guilty of election code violations. The following day, election results in Gujarat dealt the Congress—and Gandhi—a severe defeat at the hands of a united opposition Janata (People's) Front.

The High Court decision was the result of charges brought four years before by Raj Narain, Gandhi's Socialist opponent in the parliamentary constituency of Rae Bareilly in Uttar Pradesh. The court dismissed the more serious charges, including bribery and intimidation, but found the Prime Minister guilty of two relatively minor technical violations of the law. If the offenses were minor, the consequences were not. Under Indian law, Gandhi had been convicted of "corrupt electoral practices," and her 1971 election

¹For accounts of the events leading to the imposition of the Emergency and its immediate aftermath, see Norman D. Palmer, "The Crisis of Democracy in India," *Orbis*, vol. 19 (Summer, 1975), pp. 379-401; and Marcus F. Franda's series of reports from South Asia for the American University Field Staff, 1975. A superb collection of papers place the Emergency in wider perspective in Henry C. Hart, ed., *Indira Gandhi's India* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1976). Also see Lloyd I. and Susanne H. Rudolph, "To the Brink and Back: Representation and the State in India," *Asian Survey*, vol. 18 (April, 1978), pp. 379-400. On the excesses of the Emergency, the indispensable source is the 3-volume *Interim Report* of the Shah Commission of Inquiry, 1978. For a defense of the Emergency, see V.P. Dutt, "The Emergency in India: Background and Rationale," *Asian Survey*, vol. 16 (December, 1976), pp. 1124-38.

was held invalid. Losing her seat in Parliament, she would have to resign as Prime Minister and was barred from elective office for a period of six years.

Opposition parties called for the Prime Minister's immediate resignation. Several national newspapers urged her to step down, and so did a few members of her own party. The events of the two weeks after the Allahabad judgment remain unclear, but at least for a time, Gandhi is believed to have seriously considered stepping down temporarily in favor of a caretaker government, to await the result of her appeal to the Supreme Court. Those closest to her counseled against such action, and her 29-year-old son, Sanjay, was adamant that she remain in office.

On the evening of June 25, a mass rally was held on the Ram Lila festival grounds in New Delhi. Leaders of the opposition (including Jayaprakash Narayan and Morarji Desai, whose "fast unto death" had forced Gandhi to hold the elections in Gujarat) called for a nationwide movement to unseat the Prime Minister. Charging that Indira Gandhi was "moving toward dictatorship and fascism," J.P. called on the people of India to resist the corrupt and illegitimate government. As he had done before, he urged the police and the armed forces to refuse to obey "illegal and immoral" orders and to uphold the constitution against those who would destroy it.

In the early hours of the morning, before the Emergency Proclamation was issued, the principal leaders of the opposition—676 persons by the official tally—were arrested under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act (MISA). Among those arrested were Jayaprakash Narayan, Morarji Desai and Raj Narain, who had successfully brought the case against the Prime Minister.

On orders of the government, at 2 A.M., electricity to the major newspapers in New Delhi was cut off, imposing a news blackout. From the first day of the Emergency, a rigid press censorship was imposed—more complete than any censorship under the British. Most of the press acquiesced; some resisted; and a few journals ceased publication.

During the 21 months of the Emergency, some 110,000 people were arrested and detained without trial.* By presidential order, the right of any person to seek constitutional protection through the courts was suspended. India's bill of rights was, in effect, abrogated. Those arrested were not advised of the charges against them, nor were the police required to inform judicial authorities of the reasons for any arrest. Newspapers were forbidden to publish the names of those arrested. People simply disappeared. Arrests were often arbitrary, sometimes because of personal vendettas, and (as investigations later con-

*According to the Indian government, the number of persons arrested under Emergency regulations was 110,806 (34,988 under MISA and 75,818 under the Defence of India rules).

firmed) there were incidents of torture and even murder in the jails.

Under the Emergency, the government made frequent use of presidential orders, but legislation and constitutional amendment gave permanence to what were first announced as temporary measures. Among its first acts, Parliament amended the electoral law under which Gandhi had been convicted. The two offenses of which she had been found guilty were deleted retroactively to exonerate her and render her appeal to the Supreme Court unnecessary. A series of constitutional amendments further diminished the power of the courts and secured parliamentary—that is, the Prime Minister's—supremacy.

The actions taken under the Emergency—arrests, censorship, and constitutional changes—were continually justified. Invoking the name of Joan of Arc, her childhood heroine, Indira Gandhi sought to cast herself as India's savior. She proclaimed her dedication to democracy but warned that "there can be no return to the pre-emergency days of total license and political permissiveness." Borrowing Gunnar Myrdal's term, the Prime Minister described India as a "soft state," and claimed that the Emergency was a necessary shock treatment. Order and discipline were to be the hallmarks of the new India. Industrial peace was imposed by a ban on all strikes; the campuses were quiet; bureaucrats arrived at their desks for a full day's work; and the trains ran on time.

"The emergency," Gandhi declared, "provides us with a new opportunity to go ahead with our economic tasks." Her 20-point program of economic and social reforms was largely a rehash of long-postponed Congress programs, but rhetoric was now accompanied by the benefits of two good monsoons. In the months after the imposition of the Emergency, inflation, which had reached a rate of 30 percent, was brought under control. Food and essential commodities were readily available. Industrial production rose significantly; exports expanded; and the nation's foreign exchange reserves reached record levels. Gandhi gave credit to the Emergency, but the favorable economic situation was more the result of good harvests and policies already under way. Moreover, by mid-1976, the glow had begun to fade, and prices were again moving upward.

After the Allahabad decision, Gandhi's son, Sanjay, assumed increasing influence within "the household," the Prime Minister's inner circle. Tainted by the scandal surrounding the manufacture of the Maruti small car, Sanjay had an unsavory reputation, and his rise was viewed with apprehension in Congress party circles. Nonetheless, with no political experience and holding no public office, Sanjay was touted as the hope of India, the heir-apparent.

Sanjay's favorite cause was family planning; thus in Delhi and the Hindi-speaking states of northern In-

dia, the government's vasectomy program was aggressively pursued by means of inducements and disincentives. Quotas provided the impetus for compulsory sterilization, and widespread stories told of official raids on villages and roundups of the "weaker sections" of society—the poor and uneducated, untouchables and Muslims. There were reports of resistance and police violence. Often in concert with forced sterilization, slum clearance in Delhi was another of Sanjay's pet projects, and demolition of squatter settlements was carried out under his personal supervision.

In a climate of fear and repression, the police and paramilitary forces assumed increased importance. The press, the opposition, and the normal channels of criticism and debate within the Congress party had been silenced. Vital sources of information and "feedback" had been cut off. Indira Gandhi was limited to her intelligence sources and trusted members of her political household.

THE ELECTIONS

On January 18, 1977, having twice postponed elections, the Prime Minister announced that parliamentary elections would be held in March.² The rules of the Emergency would be "relaxed," press censorship would be lifted, and public meetings would be permitted. Thousands of members of the political opposition were released from jails.

A number of factors are believed to have influenced Gandhi's decision to hold elections. Most important, she expected Congress to win. The economy was strong, and the benefits attributed to the Emergency were believed to have attracted wide support, especially in rural areas and among the poor. In addition, "it seemed unlikely that the splintered opposition parties could organize themselves into an effective political force with a common platform and a set of candidates on such short notice." Another factor may have been Gandhi's desire to establish a case in Parliament for Sanjay so that he could succeed her as Prime Minister. Finally, a Congress victory would legitimize the Emergency and vindicate Gandhi's actions.³

Soon after the announcement that elections would be held, two decisive events upset Gandhi's calculations. The first was the formation of the opposition Janata party. The second was the resignation of Jagjivan Ram, a senior Cabinet minister and a leader of India's 85 million untouchables.

The Janata party, building on the alliance forged in the Bihar movement and in the 1975 Gujarat elections, was composed of four constituent parties: the

Congress (0), the Jana Sangh, the Socialist party, and the Bhatratiya Lok Dal (BLD).

The largest was the Congress (0), led by former Deputy Prime Minister Morarji Desai. The party was the product of the 1969 Congress split, when Indira Gandhi challenged the party bosses in her successful bid for control. Bound by personal association and only loosely ideological, the Congress (0) represented a blend of conservative and Gandhian perspectives.

The Jana Sangh, founded in 1951, was well organized and had a young and dynamic leadership, of whom the most notable was Atal Behari Vajpayee. Regionally concentrated in the Hindi heartland of North India, the Jana Sangh had participated in coalition governments in five states between 1967 and 1971 and had intermittently controlled the Delhi Council. The base of the party's support was the urban, educated Hindu middle class—professionals, small businessmen and white-collar workers. Though avowedly secular, its close association with the Hindu nationalist RSS gave the Jana Sangh a distinctly communal image. Reflecting the base of its strength, the party was a strong advocate for Hindi as the national language of India.

The Socialist party, founded in 1971, was heir to the faction-torn Indian socialist movement. An amalgam of Marxist, Gandhian and democratic socialist elements, the party had split and reunited half a dozen times. Its base of support, concentrated in North India, mainly in Bihar, was predominantly rural, young and poor. The patriarch of the Socialist party, though not formally associated with any party, was Jayaprakash Narayan. The party chairman was George Fernandes, leader of the railway workers union.

The Bhatratiya Lok Dal (BLD) was formed in 1974 by a merger of seven parties, caste or personal parties, each with limited and essentially regional support. Its largest constituents were the Bhatratiya Kranti Dal (BKD), led by Charan Singh, and the Swatantra party. The BKD, a Congress splinter, was confined to Uttar Pradesh, India's most populous state, and was supported mainly by prosperous middle caste (primarily Jat) farmers. The Swatantra party was India's party of free enterprise. Its support (concentrated in Gujarat, Rajasthan and Orissa) derived principally from the business community, landowners and former princely families. Among the smaller parties merging into the BLD was a Socialist faction led by Raj Narain. Under the leadership of Charan Singh, the BLD committed itself to a "middle Gandhian path."

These four parties merged in the new Janata party, led by Morarji Desai. The bonds which united them had been forged in the jails during the Emergency, and the urgency imposed by the impending elections left them little time to explore their differences.

Gandhi was even less prepared for her second jolt—

²See Myron Weiner, *India at the Polls: The Parliamentary Elections of 1977* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1978), and Iqbal Narain, "India 1977: From Promise to Disenchantment?" *Asian Survey*, vol. 18 (February, 1978), pp. 103-116.

³Weiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 7-12.

the defection of Jagjivan Ram from the Congress fold. Ram, a native of Bihar and the most prominent Harijan (untouchable) in Indian political life, had long nursed ambition for the prime ministership. Having seen his own power eroded during the Emergency, he resigned from the government and denounced Indira Gandhi for the destruction of democracy in India and in the Congress party. In forming his own party, the Congress for Democracy (CFD), Ram was joined by two other Congress leaders, H.N. Bahuguna, former chief minister of Uttar Pradesh, and Nandini Satpathy, who had been ousted as chief minister of Orissa by Sanjay.

The CFD and the Janata agreed on a common slate of candidates and, in effect, campaigned as one party. They entered into electoral alliance with the Communist party (Marxist) and with two regional parties, the Akali Dal in the Punjab and the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) in Tamil Nadu. Congress was allied with the Communist party of India (CPI) and with the All-India Anna DMK (AIADMK) in Tamil Nadu.

The Janata Election Manifesto defined the fundamental issue: "The choice before the electorate is clear. It is a choice between freedom and slavery; between democracy and dictatorship. . . ." The Janata committed itself to "revive democracy" and to "restore to the citizen his fundamental freedoms and to the judiciary its rightful role." It offered the voters "Both Bread and Liberty: A Gandhian Alternative."

The Congress offered a familiar litany of justification. Its message was simple: "For progress and stability—vote Congress." Chaos was the alternative. The formation of the Janata party and Jagjivan Ram's defection had surely cut into the expected margin of victory, but Congress remained confident. Most observers gave Congress the edge even as the polls opened, on March 16.

The results were stunning. Janata and its allies won 328 of the 542 seats in Parliament, and the Janata/CFD combination alone won 298, a secure majority. Its leadership routed, Congress was reduced to 153 seats. Gandhi lost to Raj Narain by a wide margin, and Sanjay was overwhelmingly defeated. The overall shift in the vote was substantial. Janata increased its strength from 27.6 percent of the vote in 1971 (representing the combined strength of its constituent parties) to 43.2 percent in 1977. The Congress share of the vote fell from 43.6 percent to 34.5 percent. In the 1977 results, there were no significant dif-

ferences between rural and urban voting—a surprise to many who had discounted the impact of the Emergency in rural India.

The pattern of support revealed a dramatic regional schism. Janata swept north India, but made virtually no inroad into the south. Of its 298 seats, 221 were from the Hindi-speaking region of northern India, and it won only 6 seats in the four southern states. In contrast, 92 of the 153 Congress seats were won in the south and Congress won only 2 seats in the Hindi north.

The pattern, in part, reflected the rigor with which the Emergency had been imposed. North India had been far more deeply affected—especially in the "excesses" of arbitrary arrest and forced sterilization. The fear generated by the vasectomy campaign was probably the most important factor in the Congress's massive losses in the north. It is ironic that the principal victims of forced sterilization and of Sanjay's slum clearance demolitions were Harijans and Muslims, who had been among Gandhi's most ardent supporters in 1971.

Two other factors contributed to the regional schism. First, the parties that had merged to form the Janata drew their support primarily from the north and, on the critical language issue, they were viewed in the south as strongly pro-Hindi. Second, in contrast to the north, where the Emergency was the issue, southern voters were heavily influenced by local considerations. In Tamil Nadu, the elections were fought between two regional parties; and in Kerala, where the Congress was the dominant member of the popular United Front government, state assembly elections, held simultaneously, overshadowed national issues. In Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh, where Congress scored its most impressive victories, the vote was more an expression of confidence in effective Congress chief ministers than it was a rally of support for Indira Gandhi and the Emergency.⁴

THE JANATA GOVERNMENT

After the elections, Ram's CFD merged with the Janata, and the internal struggle to form a new government began. In many ways the Janata, an umbrella party of disparate interests and conflicting personalities, looked remarkably like the old Congress.⁵ The task of maintaining party unity fell to Janata president Chandra Shekhar, a former Congress "Young Turk" and a follower of Jayaprakash. J.P., 74 years old and seriously ill with kidney disease, refrained from active political involvement.

Within the Janata, the left favored 68-year-old Jagjivan Ram as Prime Minister, but Ram was unacceptable to Charan Singh and many within the Jana Sangh, who gave their support to Morarji Desai. As infighting approached a crisis, a vote was avoided in favor of a decision by two elder statesmen,

⁴James Manor, "Where Congress Survived: Five States in the Indian General Election of 1977," *Asian Survey*, vol. 17 (December, 1977), pp. 1207-20.

⁵See the very perceptive article by Ram Joshi and Kirtidev Desai, "Toward a More Competitive Party System in India," *Asian Survey*, vol. 18 (November, 1978), pp. 1091-1116.

Archarya Kripalani and Jayaprakash Narayan. They gave the nod to 81-year-old Desai, austere and puritanical.

The Cabinet selection reflected the relative strength of the Janata factions and gave a slightly right-of-center character to the government. In addition to the prime ministership, the Congress (0) was allocated the largest number of important portfolios in the 20-member Cabinet. The Home Ministry, the number two position in the government, went to Charan Singh and the powerful Finance Ministry went to a BLD colleague. Raj Narain, who (despite his victory over Gandhi) was regarded as a buffoon and an embarrassment to the party, became Minister for Health and Family Welfare (family planning). Of the Jana Sangh's three portfolios, two were important, with Vajpayee appointed as Minister for External Affairs. Jagjivan Ram was given the Defense Ministry, number three in the government, but this was the only important portfolio going to the CFD group. The socialists were allocated relatively unimportant ministries, with Industries ultimately going to George Fernandes.

Before the new government took office, Gandhi gave the order to lift the 1975 Emergency. One of the first acts of the Janata government was the withdrawal of the external emergency. In the "restoration of democracy," the Janata sought to roll back the more pernicious effects of Emergency rule. The government ordered the release of political prisoners—save for those, like the Naxalite revolutionaries, who were perceived as a security threat to the nation. Press freedom was restored, and judicial authority was returned to the courts. But the Janata government was not prepared to rescind all structural changes enacted during the Emergency, nor was it ready to repeal MISA or to abandon preventive detention.

The Janata consolidated its position in elections held in June for the legislative assemblies in eleven states and three union territories. The elections covered two-thirds of the Indian electorate. Factional battles over nominations threatened to tear the party apart, but despite internal conflict Janata again swept the polls. Reflecting the pattern of its earlier victory, Janata strength lay in the Hindi heartland of north India. The Marxists, with Janata support, won in West Bengal and in the Punjab, Kashmir and Tamil Nadu, regional parties came to power.

With a majority of seats in the state assemblies, the Janata was assured that its candidate would be elected to fill the office left by the death of President of India Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed in February. Sanjiva Reddy, a respected Janata leader from the south, was put forward as a consensus candidate and, with Congress support, he was unanimously elected.

⁶See, for example, "The Summer of Discontent," *India Today*, May 1-15, 1978, pp. 42-48.

Ideological contradictions and a range of diverse interests have reinforced personality and group conflict in the Janata party. In foreign policy, the party reaffirmed India's commitment to nonalignment and sought a more balanced relationship with the United States and the Soviet Union. Domestic policy has been less coherent. The Janata offered a "Gandhian alternative" to the Congress emphasis on heavy industry. Its economic program emphasized decentralization, rural development and labor-intensive industry. In practice, Janata policy has differed little from Congress policy.

Janata, like the Congress government before it, is fundamentally dependent on the middle sectors of society—the urban middle class and the prosperous agriculturalists. It has important links, through the Congress (0) and old Swatantra ties, to industrialists and, through the socialists, to industrial labor. Like the Congress before it, Janata tried to balance the powerful interests to which it was beholden. A radical shift in policy is unlikely, and the new emphasis on rural development is likely to benefit the landed peasant more than the landless laborer.

Poverty remains the basic fact of India's existence; scarcity conditions her political life. By the government's own reckoning, 40 percent of the population lives below the poverty level, whether determined by income or by caloric intake. But redistribution of limited resources continues to meet resistance from the vested interests on which power in India rests. Janata, like Congress, promises more than it can deliver, and the gap between achievement and aspiration widens.

The euphoria that greeted the Janata victory in March, 1977, has been displaced by frustration and uncertainty. Good monsoons and record harvests have sustained the economy, but government policy lacks sustained direction and is burdened by misplaced priorities (symbolized by the obsessive pursuit of the total prohibition of alcoholic beverages). Strikes are on the increase, and student "indiscipline" has again closed universities throughout India. Caste tensions have erupted in armed clashes and in attacks on Harijans. Political unrest has been indicated by widespread agitation and violence, by rioting and police violence.⁶

Within the Janata, conflict again reached the crisis point in June, 1978, with the resignation of Charan Singh and Raj Narain from the Cabinet. A split in

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If the elected leaders of Bangladesh can establish a democratic constitution, political stability and progress in political institution-building might be achieved."

The Political Evolution of Bangladesh

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AS Pakistani troops in Dacca surrendered to the Indian army in December, 1971, the former East Pakistan emerged as an independent nation and became known as Bangladesh. Bangladesh is a country of 55,126 square miles, with nearly 78 million people. One of her serious problems is the challenge of nation-building after the devastation of the 1971 civil war.

The first important stage in the evolution of former East Pakistani politics was the period 1947-1958, the period of experiments with British-type parliamentary democracy, which culminated in the 1958 military coup of Ayub Khan. During this period, the Bengalis demonstrated a separatist nationalism of their own, fed by their economic grievances against the Pakistani federal government and their desire for autonomy. But, Bengali leaders failed to develop any sound political organization; their coalitions were weakened by intense factionalism and personal rivalries.

The second distinguishable stage in the evolution of Bangladesh (1958-1969) was marked by the martial law and constitutional autocracy enforced by General Ayub Khan. The administrative system of this period was sustained by a coalition of the military and bureaucracy, which was predominantly non-Bengali in composition. Confronted by Ayub Khan's harsh military-administrative order, the Bengali political leadership encouraged the agitational role of students and lawyer politicians.¹

The third and final stage of the pre-independent existence of Bangladesh (1969-1971) was dominated by mass movement and civil war. Bengalis supported guerrilla war in Bangladesh and tried to obtain support from India and other countries. For a brief period in 1970, electoral politics returned to Bangladesh; this only intensified Bengali grievances,

hitherto suppressed by the Pakistani military regime. As a result of the 1970 election, three political actors emerged in what was then Pakistan—General Yahya Khan, the military head of Pakistan's federal government, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the undisputed Bengali leader, and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the leader of the majority party in West Pakistan.² They failed to come to any compromise, and profound political polarization between Bengali demands and Pakistani leaders precipitated the military crackdown on the Bengalis in March, 1971. This was followed by guerrilla warfare, civil war and war between India and Pakistan, which finally led to an independent Bangladesh.

When Dacca fell in December, 1971, all institutions deriving authority from Pakistan became inoperative.³ The Indian military exercised real authority until a new political system took shape. The Awami League party had won an absolute majority in the 1970 election, and during the civil war its leaders constituted a government in exile based in India. As the Pakistani troops surrendered, the exile government arrived in Dacca, the capital city of the new nation, and confronted the enormous task of building a polity from the grass roots. The Awami League politicians who became ministers in independent Bangladesh were inexperienced in policymaking and offered little guidance to a bureaucracy that was suffering the strains of a civil war and a new political order.

The weakness of the administrative structure was exacerbated by the internal security threat posed by the so-called freedom fighters, who had proliferated since 1971. Following the euphoria of victory, the freedom fighters sought recognition of their services during nine months of the struggle for independence. Concerned about deteriorating law and order, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, hailed as the father of the nation after his release from a Pakistani jail, banned all freedom fighter organizations and ordered the freedom fighters to surrender their arms. While public ceremonies were held for the surrender of arms, most of the guns went underground, presumably to anti-social elements who rampaged through the countryside committing violent crimes.⁴ Bangladesh has never fully recovered from the administrative collapse that accompanied her independence.

¹See also, Raunaq Jahan, *Pakistan: Failure in National Integration* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972).

²David Dunbar, "Pakistan: The Failure of Political Negotiations," *Asian Survey*, May, 1972.

³M. Rashiduzzaman, "Changing Political Patterns in Bangladesh: Internal Constraints and External Fear," *Asian Survey*, September, 1977.

⁴According to one estimate, there were about 19,000 political assassinations in 1972. *The Dainik Bangla* (Dacca), October 9, 1972.

The Bengali lawyer politicians had always supported the British type of parliamentary democracy; it was thus no surprise when they established a parliamentary system in the fall of 1972, the first significant step toward political institutionalization in the new state.⁵ For all practical purposes, the government was symbolized by the charismatic personality of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, called Mujib. Under the new constitution, the head of the state was only a ceremonial figure, following the wishes of Prime Minister Mujib. Another significant political step was the election of 1973, when Mujib's Awami League party won a landslide victory. Although there were several opposition groups, until the end of 1974 Bangladesh had a single dominant party system sustained by Mujib.

The 1972 constitution and the 1973 election did not contribute much to the growth of political infrastructure in the new state. Several factors undermined the task of building a sound polity. Mujib's undisputed popularity led to an enormous concentration of power in his hands and the hands of his close relatives and friends. The national legislature was hardly a forum for making policies. Even routine matters were handled by the Prime Minister or his close associates. Inexperienced political appointees created a buffer between the Prime Minister and the senior bureaucrats; this alienated the civil bureaucracy, whose full commitment was sorely needed.

Mujib's Awami League was hardly a broad-based political organization, and its victory in 1973 was largely the result of Mujib's personal popularity. Instead of building a grass-roots base, most of his political associates were involved in personal and factional squabbles. To make matters worse, the galloping inflation, combined with the food crisis of 1974, undermined the political prestige of the government.

After two years of overwhelming popularity, Mujib faced widespread criticism of his poor management of the economy, his maladministration, and his inability to check blatant corruption. Relations between the military and the Awami League began to sour soon after independence, and the army gradually turned against Mujib.

In the context of the deteriorating political and economic situation, early in 1975 Mujib abrogated the constitution, made himself a virtual dictator and, in the name of a "second revolution," banned all political parties except his new BAKSAL (Bangladesh Krishak, Sramik Awami League). He brought all the newspapers under state control, and called public officials to join the new party. For all practical

purposes, Bangladesh had a one-party authoritarian regime. In a bloody coup in August, 1975, Mujib was overthrown by the young "majors." In the process, Mujib and his family were killed. The coup leaders who killed Mujib and his family were allegedly motivated by a personal vendetta. But the subsequent support of the armed forces and overwhelming public approval served to legitimize their action.⁶

After the coup leaders had overthrown the Mujib government, a senior Cabinet minister, Khandaker Mushtaque Ahmed, was invited to head the new military government. The martial law government headed by Mushtaque Ahmed continued until November, 1975, when a countercoup was staged by Khalid Mosharraf. Within a few days, that coup also failed, and General Ziaur Rahman emerged as the strong man of the military regime. Mushtaque Ahmed was replaced by Chief Justice Sayem, who functioned as the formal leader of the new government, with the real power in the hands of military generals.

Since the August 15, 1975, coup, Bangladesh is unmistakably following a new course. The military regime quickly disbanded Mujib's one-party system and his militia and took stern action to enforce law and order. For all practical purposes, the post-coup system of government in Bangladesh has been a partnership of the military and civil bureaucracy, with some advisers and ministers selected from the technocrats and political elements agreeable to the new regime.

Ziaur Rahman's martial law government faced formidable administrative, economic and political problems, many of which were legacies from his predecessors. The foremost problem for the new regime was to recover the hidden arms and restore law and order. Another important task was to improve the economy. Ziaur Rahman's regime has emphasized a development strategy. Political activities were banned until June, 1978, when Ziaur Rahman was elected President. Rahman promised the restoration of civilian government after a legislative election in February, 1979. As Rahman gradually became a political leader after the June, 1978, election, there were strong indications that he would establish a presidential type of government after the 1979 elections. The politicized military in Bangladesh would apparently be a strong force in the future political pattern of Bangladesh.

Even seven years after independence, Bangladesh is a country without established political institutions. Although Ziaur Rahman favors a presidential type of government, he faces formidable opposition. The followers of Mujib, the Awami League, and a wide range of lawyer politicians question the value of a strong executive and vigorously support a parliamentary democracy. Ziaur Rahman's main support comes from the army. His attempt to establish a broad-based political organization has not yet been successful.

⁵Raunaq Jahan, "Bangladesh in 1972: Nation-Building in a New State," *Asian Survey*, February, 1973.

⁶*The Times* (London), August 6, 1975, and *Bangladesh Observer*, August 6, 1975.

As East Pakistan, Bangladesh was identified with the Islamic ideology of a Muslim state. The lawyer politicians of the Awami League, however, believed in political secularism, and when Bangladesh was created they rejected Islamic ideology and banned the right-wing Muslim parties. Subsequent political development changed the ideology of the new state. The Indian army, which helped to create Bangladesh, did not endear itself for long. There was growing opposition against Indian dominance in Bangladesh politics. Mujib and his Awami League faced widespread opposition because they were amenable to New Delhi's influence.⁷

Bangladesh subsequently sought to define her identity through her opposition to Indian influence. To Mujib's critics, Bangladesh's professed secularism was an Indian ploy to encourage India's Hindu influence. The Bengali Muslims, about 90 percent of the population, seemed anxious to stress their Islamic identity, which became a source of strength in opposition politics. Anti-Indian feelings and sympathy for Bangladesh's identity as a Muslim nation became so strong that even Mujib began to modify his policies.

When Mujib was overthrown, the coup leaders declared an Islamic ideology. Islamic identity remained alive in the military regime headed by Ziaur Rahman; the government made several overtures to the growing influence of Islamic ideology and legitimized Muslim right-wing political organizations.

Like secularism, socialism was a guiding principle of the first constitution, but the Awami League's socialism was more rhetoric than a serious ideology. The political elites of the new state sought to establish an ideology called Mujibism, which articulated the principles of Bengali nationalism, democracy, secularism and socialism. There was no substance in the new ideological rhetoric, which was really a double-edged weapon—both to protect the new elites and to contain radical class polarization. The leftist opposition described the rhetoric as a "fascist" move designed to destroy radical politics.

The only practical manifestation of socialist ideology in Bangladesh was the rapid nationalization of jute mills, textile mills, sugar mills, major ports, airlines, shipping, banks and insurance. In the rural sector, the Awami League was essentially reformist. In spite of nationalization, the substantial private sector in trade and business was left untouched. The

⁷See also, Zillur R. Khan, "Leadership, Parties and Politics in Bangladesh," *The Western Political Quarterly*, March, 1976.

⁸See also, Leonard H. Gordon, *Bengal: The Nationalist Movement 1876-1940* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974).

⁹See also, *Report of the Panel of Economists on Fourth Five Year Plan 1970-75*, Islamabad, 1970.

¹⁰See also, A.R. Khan, *The Economy of Bangladesh* (London: Macmillan, 1972).

military regime has downgraded socialist rhetoric and has continued to encourage private enterprise and even foreign capital. Nationalization as an official policy was abandoned after the overthrow of Mujib in 1975.

Radical political ideology is a legacy of the Bengali nationalist movement since the British Raj.⁸ The political forces subscribing to leftist ideologies are diffused but articulate. After the creation of Bangladesh, the Communist party was legalized for the first time since 1954. Close to the ideology of the Bangladesh Communists was the ideology of the National Awami party (NAP), led by Muzaffer Ahmed. Both of these organizations were inclined to support Soviet communism. Another faction of the National Awami party was known to be pro-Peking. Its leader, Maulana Bhasani, was enormously popular with the rural masses but did not try to build any organizational base. He wanted to change the political system and the economic structure of Bangladesh through a mixture of socialism and Islamic egalitarianism.

Another Bangladesh Communist party (Marxist-Leninist) under the leadership of Toaha led an underground movement against Mujib and advocated a Maoist revolution. One of Mujib's prominent supporters, Abour Rab, challenged the government and formed a National Socialist party to implement "scientific socialism." His organization has a strong base among the students. There are several other radical groups. The leftist performance in the elections of 1970 and 1973 was far from strong, and they have not been able to demonstrate enough strength to win an electoral victory or to challenge the government.

The growing economic disparity between East and West Pakistan generated the political discord that eventually separated the two wings and created Bangladesh. According to official figures, East Pakistan received only 36 percent of Pakistan's total development expenditures in 1969-1970.⁹ The economic disparity between East and West Pakistan was encouraged by the fact that East Pakistan received fewer federal grants for development. And East Pakistan was used as a "captive market," in the sense that products manufactured in West Pakistan were sold behind high tariff barriers in the East.

Bangladesh, with a population of 75 million and a per capita GNP income of less than \$100 a year, was a serious economic challenge to her new political elites and to the international community.¹⁰ An agricultural country, she lacked an essential economic infrastructure. Most of her people live in 65,000 villages and depend on subsistence agriculture. Her main cash crops are jute and tea, and her food shortage is usually serious. In 1972-1974, in the aftermath of civil war, the expectations of independent Bangladesh were wiped out by inflation and food scarcity. No serious

development effort was initiated by Mujibur Rahman, although he was advised by a group of able economists. On a nationalization spree, the country's economy was neither socialistic nor a free enterprise system that would attract private investment. In fact, in early years, the economy was sustained by massive foreign aid, amounting to about \$3 billion.

The problem of managing nationalized industries proved enormous. Lack of skilled management and labor unrest contributed to declining industrial productivity. Even after seven years, in most cases industrial production has not exceeded the pre-independence level. After Mujib's fall in 1975, private and foreign investments received substantial incentive outside the nationalized industries that still occupy the main sectors of the economy. While the supporters of private investment and state control clash, strong economic arguments are marshalled against a free enterprise system. Bangladesh's economy was dominated by Pakistani industrialists who no longer play a strong economic role. Unrestricted private enterprise will concentrate wealth in the hands of a few, and its distributive impact on society will be negative. And as a country of scarce resources, Bangladesh cannot afford to leave her economy entirely in private hands.

The agricultural sector of the economy has been largely left to private enterprise, although the government provides high yielding seeds and fertilizers, often subsidized by foreign aid. According to the ruling Awami League party's policy, land ownership per family was to be reduced to about 33 acres. There have been many proposals to increase the productivity of small peasants, to introduce cooperative farming and rural development. Actually, Bangladesh's rural economy is characterized by a large number of marginal farmers, sharecroppers and landless peasants. Affluent farmers farm with the help of family members or use a sharecropping system, whereby the workers receive produce as compensation for working the land. In spite of official pleas for modernization, the small farmer is neglected. The real beneficiaries of rural development have been the "surplus farmers," who own sizable landholdings and exercise a strong influence in local administration. As a result of higher prices and scarce supplies of food, peasants have been forced to sell land to more affluent farmers.

With her limited resources, Bangladesh cannot sustain her growing population. The crux of her problem is to evolve an effective population control program, difficult to achieve in a traditional and illiterate society. After a few years of ambivalence, the government appears to be committed to population control, and international agencies are urging Bangladesh to give top priority to this problem. Even with

¹¹Badruddin Omar, *Indo-Bangladesh Relations*, Dacca, 1973.

reasonable success in family planning, it will take several years before the population control program shows tangible results.

In all probability, Bangladesh could not easily have become independent without direct Indian intervention. So the new state had very special ties with India. The Soviet Union provided diplomatic and indirect support for the independence struggle in 1971, while the United States and China continued to reinforce Pakistan's efforts to crush Bengali nationalism. As a result, public opinion in Bangladesh was hostile to the United States and China. Bangladesh was not recognized by China until Pakistan accepted her estranged eastern wing as a sovereign nation. She had to wait until 1974 to become a member of the United Nations because of China's veto. Her relations with Pakistan continued to be strained over the release of prisoners of war, the distribution of assets and the exchange of stranded Bengalis and Pakistanis. Although China and Pakistan withheld recognition, Bangladesh was widely accepted as a sovereign nation in the first few months of 1972. Most Western nations, including the United States, extended relief and economic assistance to the war-torn, impoverished state. The Soviet Union rushed into Bangladesh with a strong diplomatic presence, and it exerts a considerable attraction for the intelligentsia and political groups inclined toward radical ideologies.

The change from warm friendship to hostility between Bangladesh and India is the most dramatic event in South Asia in the last few years.¹¹ Soon after Indian soldiers were welcomed as "liberators," Bengali perceptions of India began to change. The educated elite overcame its euphoria and began to question India's motive in Bangladesh. India's real concern, it was argued, was to dismember Pakistan so that India could become the dominant power in South Asia. The resurgence of Islamic identity alienated Bangladesh from India. And pro-Peking radical forces also took a fiercely anti-Indian posture. The people of Bangladesh began to blame India for all their economic ills. While public antipathy towards India increased, the official cordiality between the two governments did not change much until Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was killed in August, 1975.

The economic interests of Bangladesh and India also appeared to be competitive; witness the repeated failure of trade agreements between the two countries. One of the most crucial issues is the Farakka Barrage,

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"[In Pakistan] the fact that the military took power so easily and has held it for nearly two years is not so much a reflection of its use of naked force—of which there has been relatively little—but rather of Pakistan's 30-year heritage of varying degrees of irresponsible authoritarianism."

Pakistan under Zia

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IN Pakistan, the July 5, 1977, military takeover ended one era and ushered in another. Ousted were Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and his Pakistan People's party (PPP), who had ruled Pakistan for slightly more than five and one-half years. Thrust into power by their own actions were General Zia ul-Haq and Pakistan's third military regime in two decades.¹ The Bhutto era, which had begun in the wake of the disastrous Bangladesh war and the vivisection of the country, ended with a period of public protest and civil unrest that weakened government authority and led to the army takeover.

In some respects, however, the Bhutto era may not have ended; although the coup of July 5 was far-reaching in its consequences, it was not the sort of watershed event that marked previous regime changes in 1958, 1969 and 1971. Unlike Ayub Khan, who promised a "revolution,"² or Yahya Khan, who resolved to undo Ayub's Basic Democracies system and return the country to parliamentary representative government, Zia proclaimed his role to be that of a caretaker, for the limited purpose of holding new nationwide elections "within 90 days" and returning political power to the people's elected representatives. Zia did not abrogate the 1973 constitution that had been established under Bhutto's leadership, but mere-

ly declared that certain (unspecified) parts of it would be "held in abeyance."³ He did not immediately assume the role of President of Pakistan, as each of his martial law predecessors had done, but rather retained President Fazal Elahi Chaudhry in this figure-head position until mid-1978. The regime's murky goals, the seemingly impulsive character of its leadership, and its inability to solve its political problems make the future of Pakistan cloudy indeed.

A central difficulty in the government's calculations is the recently deposed Prime Minister, who still enjoys wide popular support. In the past, national leaders who toppled from power faded rather rapidly from public view. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, although he was overthrown and later sentenced to death after his conviction for a 1974 murder, has continued to hold the key to Pakistan's future. Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA) Zia's plan to hold elections three months after he seized power were abandoned just two weeks before the scheduled October 18, 1977, polling date, when it became obvious that Bhutto and his PPP still had sufficient support to win majorities in at least the two largest provinces of Pakistan. Zia has continued to postpone the promised elections while he searches for new ways to discredit the former Prime Minister. Meanwhile, Bhutto's sentence has been confirmed by the Supreme Court of Pakistan. Zia and his advisers still have to choose between creating a martyr and allowing Bhutto to remain a living symbol of resistance to the government that overthrew him.

Although the legitimacy of the present regime is tenuous and will become increasingly so the longer it postpones the elections by which it justified its seizure of power, it has not played the role of passive caretaker, but rather has actively pursued a wide range of policy objectives. These include: (1) dismantling the authoritarian power structure created by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto during his half-decade in power; (2) making governmental and political efforts to find an acceptable arrangement under which the army could return power to civilian leadership; (3) instilling Islamic values in Pakistan's political, economic and social system; (4) restoring some degree of health to the nation's badly shattered economy; and (5) main-

¹Technically, there have been four periods of martial law government, under M. Ayub Khan (1958-1962), A.M. Yahya Khan (1969-1971), Z.A. Bhutto (1971-1972), and Zia, but Bhutto's martial law administration was transitional during the writing of a parliamentary constitution and ended peacefully with the adoption of the constitution. In this sense, it was merely the extension or continuation of the martial law established under Yahya Khan in March, 1969. For a more thorough discussion of the origins and early months of the current regime, see William L. Richter, "Persistent Praetorianism: Pakistan's Third Military Regime," *Pacific Affairs*, vol. 51, no. 3 (fall, 1978), pp. 406-426.

²See Herbert Feldman, *Revolution in Pakistan: A Study of the Martial Law Administration* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967).

³The rationale for this may have included the facts that Zia and his fellow army officers had taken an oath to uphold the constitution, and that the Supreme Court of Pakistan, in 1972, had declared the martial law regime of Yahya Khan to be an unconstitutional usurpation of power.

taining national unity in a country in which centrifugal pressures and regional animosities appear endemic.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto is a complex and contradictory personality,⁴ and the system of political control that he established reflected his complexity and contradictions.⁵ While espousing socialist rhetoric and styling himself the "leader of the masses,"⁶ Bhutto instituted policies that crippled the freedom of political expression through control of the press and the harassment of opposition parties, destroyed the political neutrality of the judiciary and the bureaucracy, and even undermined the Pakistan People's party, which had served as his vehicle to power. He forced the retirement of many high-ranking military and bureaucratic officials and promoted lower-ranking ones above the heads of their superiors to ensure their personal indebtedness.⁷ A liberal system of lateral entry further turned the bureaucracy into a fertile field for political patronage.

The military's role in the society was circumscribed by the creation of a new command structure and (in 1972) of a Federal Security Force (FSF) which many of Bhutto's critics likened to Hitler's Stormtroopers. Additionally, special intelligence services served the Prime Minister's political ends. Bhutto engineered the downfall of opposition-led governments in the provinces of Baluchistan and Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP); subsequently, in 1975, he outlawed the largest opposition party, the National Awami party (NAP) and jailed its top leadership, including its president, Khan Abdul Wali Khan.⁸ Within the PPP, and in Pakistan generally, Bhutto acted like a feudal chieftain; he linked subordinates to himself through personal ties of loyalty, centralized control in his own hands, and minimized local grass-roots political ac-

tivity. These strategies, variously termed *patri-monialism*, *centralization*, and *depoliticization*, were not limited to Pakistan during this period; they were also found in Indira Gandhi's India, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's Bangladesh, and Sirimavo Bandaranaike's Sri Lanka.

Eliminating Bhuttoism has proved to be almost as difficult a task as toppling Bhutto himself. Although General Zia promised "no witch hunts" when he seized power, there have been extensive investigations and prosecution of politicians—mostly from the PPP—who were allegedly guilty of corruption during the Bhutto era. The Zia regime has abolished the FSF and has taken control of "charitable trusts," which it claims were used for the personal and political benefit of Bhutto, his family and his party. Zia virtually emptied the jails of Bhutto's political prisoners, including Wali Khan and his associates, thereby gaining the commendation of the United States State Department for his "human rights" efforts. However, almost as rapidly, he filled the same jails with Bhutto's supporters and has often treated them more harshly. Similarly, though the press in Pakistan today is supposedly much freer than it was under Bhutto or Ayub, PPP publications have been closed and their editors have been imprisoned. In short, although he began with a promise of evenhandedness, Zia's practice has in fact been to discriminate against the PPP.

These attempts to undercut Bhutto's power base have been accompanied by attacks on his reputation, but such moves thus far appear to have restored to him the role of underdog, which he enjoyed in the late 1960's and which contributed to the PPP's electoral victories in 1970. Interestingly, none of the anti-Bhutto activities began immediately after the military takeover, when Zia was highly respectful to Bhutto, apparently hoping that the deposed leader might accept the military's caretaker role. As these hopes waned, respect was replaced by derision. Zia denounced Bhutto as a "liar and a cheat" and made public pronouncements about his guilt in the murder case, which had by that time been brought against him. Copies of Bhutto's files were released to the press to illustrate his corruption in office, and two large white papers—one of them a massive 1,450 pages in length—were published by the government in July and August, 1978, detailing Bhutto's misdeeds in the March, 1977, elections and his control of the media during his time in office.⁹

Underlying all this is the question of Bhutto's personal survival. He appealed his conviction for murder, and the Supreme Court's consideration of his appeal consumed months of argument, delay and deliberation. A judgment was expected in December, 1978, when large numbers of PPP partisans were rounded up and placed in preventive detention, but no decision was announced until February, 1979. The

⁴Anwar H. Syed, "Z.A. Bhutto's Self-Characterizations and Pakistani Political Culture," *Asian Survey*, vol. 18, no. 12 (December, 1978), pp. 1250-1266.

⁵Eqbal Ahmad, "Crisis of State and Power," *Pakistan Progressive* (September-October, 1977), p. 17.

⁶The Urdu appellation *Quaid-i-Awam* can also be translated as "leader of the people." It was used to give Bhutto a symbolic link with the founder of Pakistan, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, who is widely referred to as *Quaid-i-Azam*, or "Great Leader."

⁷Paradoxically, one of the officers so promoted was General Zia ul-Haq.

⁸The NAP was subsequently reborn under a different name, the National Democratic party (NDP), under the leadership of Sardar Sherbaz Khan Mazari and Begum Nasim Wali Khan, the wife of Abdul Wali Khan.

⁹*White Paper on the Conduct of the General Elections in March 1977* (Rawalpindi: Government of Pakistan, July, 1978); *White Paper on Misuse of Media (December 20, 1977—July 4, 1977)* (Rawalpindi: Government of Pakistan, August, 1978). A third white paper has been promised, but has yet to appear. Bhutto's extensive reply, smuggled out of Pakistan, has been published as "The Pakistan Papers," *Executive Intelligence Review* (Supplement, January, 1979), pp. 9-48.

case, already complex because of the nature of Bhutto's crime,¹⁰ was complicated even further by the irresponsible pronouncements made by Zia and others.¹¹ On February 6, the Supreme Court upheld the lower court's verdict and sentence of death by hanging. Extensive appeals for clemency came from foreign countries, particularly from nearby Arab states and from the United States, and there were rumors that Zia might commute the sentence to long-term imprisonment and lock Bhutto away in some remote corner of Baluchistan. But at this writing there is no clear indication of what his fate might be.

In retrospect, it appears that Zia and his colleagues expected their task to be short-term, a "90-day operation," culminating in fair elections (which they expected the PNA* to win), the restoration of prestige to the military, and civilian disposal of any problems concerning Bhutto and his record in office. When Bhutto's continued popular support and the regime's decision to pursue "accountability before elections" led to the cancellation of the October, 1977, elections, the Zia government found itself more deeply entrenched in politics than it had anticipated. Trying to find a way out of its impasse, it has manipulated political alignments, exploited factional cleavages and co-opted civilian politicians into the operation of the government. If this strategy is to succeed, however, the political allies Zia seeks must possess an unlikely combination of assets: sufficient popularity to draw support away from Bhutto and other critics of the regime, but sufficient pliability to obey the military.

Shortly after calling off the October, 1977, elections, Zia appointed a Council of Ministers made up largely of bureaucrats, military men, and other non-politicians. Then, during the first few months of 1978, he attempted to put together a "National Government," representing all political parties, but excluding the majority of the PPP loyal to Bhutto.¹² This eventually proved impossible, but by mid-1978 Zia had managed to attract politicians into the govern-

ment, first from Pir Pagaro's Pakistan Muslim League and then from five other PNA parties.

Zia's efforts to "civilianize" his government have therefore accomplished his short-run objective—sharing responsibility for government successes and failures—but they have apparently not been able to increase the legitimacy of the martial law regime or to elicit public support. If anything, civilianization has made the task of finding a viable civilian government more difficult, because of the political fragmentation and alienation it has engendered. Such a predictable effect should have been foreseen by the military. Political polarization had reached its peak in the March, 1977, elections, when the nine-party PNA was formed to battle the incumbent PPP. In 1977, the voters were presented with a relatively clear choice between the "ins" and the "outs." Later, with Bhutto removed from power, it was only a matter of time before the diverse collection of parties that had unified to topple him split into their component units.

The first party to leave was the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal of Retired Air Marshal Asghar Khan. The Tehrik was one of the more secular and less conservative units of the alliance. With Bhutto in jail, the October elections canceled, the military obviously entrenched for some time to come and the PNA dominated by the Muslim League and the Jamaat-i-Islami, Asghar decided that it would be in his long-term interest to oppose the martial law regime and bid for the support of the middle- and lower-class groups where Bhutto had built his own political base. Indeed, Asghar's strategy has not been unlike the strategy pursued by Bhutto with respect to Ayub during the late 1960's. Accordingly, Asghar split with the PNA in November, 1977. During 1978, two more of the nine stars fell from the PNA constellation: Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani's Jamiatul-Ulema-i-Pakistan (JUP) and Sherbaz Mazari's NDP. Spokesmen of all three "dropout" parties have been critical of the failure of the martial law authorities to deliver their promises to hold elections. Even in the remaining PNA six, differences continue to surface, often with Maulana Mufti Mahmood's Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam (JUI) and Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan's Pakistan Democratic party (PDP) pitted against the Jamaat-i-Islami and the PML. Late in 1978, the PML split into two parties, one led by its president, Pir Pagaro, and the other by its General Secretary, Malik Qasim.

Fragmentation has not been limited to the PNA. The PPP, like most large parties in South Asia, was faction-ridden throughout its tenure. Bhutto, in fact, exploited such factional cleavages to maintain his own position. His awarding of party offices and tickets (candidacies) to landlords and other "rightists" prior to the March elections only accelerated the disaffection of leftist groups in the PPP. During the intensive anti-government agitations of April, 1977, several

*The Pakistan National Alliance, formed in January, 1977, was a coalition of opposition parties.

¹⁰Bhutto was convicted of ordering the murder of his former protégé, Ahmad Raza Kasuri. In 1974, an attack was made on an automobile carrying Kasuri and members of his family. Kasuri escaped but his father, Nawab Mohammad Ahmad Khan, was killed. Ostensibly, the FSF mounted the operation on Bhutto's orders, but the sole authority linking Bhutto to the crime was Masud Mahmud, the former director of the FSF, who was granted immunity by the martial law government in return for his testimony against Bhutto.

¹¹Former United States Attorney General Ramsey Clark recounts some of the circumstances of Bhutto's trial in "The Trial of Ali Bhutto and the Future of Pakistan," *The Nation*, August 26, 1978, pp. 136-140.

¹²See "Three Good Reasons against National Government," *Pakistan Economist*, vol. 18, no. 15 (April 15, 1978), p. 506.

former PPP stalwarts joined to form the Pakistan Awami Jamhori party (PAJP—Pakistan People's Democratic party), which later nominated candidates for the abortive October elections.

Bhutto's arrest and imprisonment, however, created still greater pressures for division in the PPP. A contest for leadership ensued between Bhutto's wife and his Minister for Religious Affairs, Maulana Kausar Niazi. Bhutto's wife, Begum Nusrat Bhutto, succeeded in retaining the position of acting party leader.¹³ Some months later, Niazi led his faction out of the PPP and rather inappropriately named it the Progressive Pakistan People's party. Like the collaborationist parties of the PNA, Niazi's splinter group has watched its support base dwindle as it flirts with a regime whose legitimacy has been increasingly subject to criticism not only on the part of the left (which had largely returned to the Bhutto fold) but also on the part of the business community and the non-government press.

PNA leaders who joined the government justified their actions by arguing that Zia had promised: (1) to hold elections by October, 1979; (2) to resume restricted political activity; (3) to retain the parliamentary system and the degree of regional autonomy guaranteed in the 1973 constitution; (4) not to make any major amendment to the constitution without PNA agreement; and (5) to secure PNA approval for the appointment of the successor to President Fazl Elahi Chaudhry.¹⁴ Considering Zia's track record on promises, these PNA justifications ring hollow. When Chaudhry resigned a month later, Zia himself stepped into the vacancy, thereby moving "Pakistan still further from the possibility of a return to democracy, as well as removing the past [sic] remaining symbol both of the unity of the Federation of Pakistan and of continuity of the first-ever constitution to have received unanimous national endorsement."¹⁵ Zia liberalized restrictions on political activity, but later in the year he reimposed them, particularly on the PPP, as discontent grew over the uncertainty of Bhutto's fate. Though Zia continues to promise that elections will be held by October, 1979, the odds are against this.

¹³On the frequent occasions when she has been arrested, the mantle of leadership has generally fallen on the young shoulders of their daughter, Benazir, former president of the Oxford Union and, like her mother and father, a skillful politician in her own right.

¹⁴Salamat Ali, "Early Test for Zia's Cabinet," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (FEER), vol. 101, no. 33 (August 18, 1978), p. 37.

¹⁵Salamat Ali, "Stepping Back into the Past," *FEER*, vol. 101, no. 39 (September 29, 1978), p. 28.

¹⁶*Ibid.*

¹⁷See Ashfaq Bokhari, "Local Bodies Polls," *Pakistan Economist*, vol. 18, no. 31 (August 5, 1978), pp. 9-10.

¹⁸*Pakistan Times*, July 6, 1977, p. 8.

¹⁹Khurshid Hyder, "Pakistan under Bhutto," *Current History*, vol. 63, no. 375 (November, 1972), p. 202.

Concern over the preservation of the 1973 constitution is well founded. Neither the suspended constitution nor the Supreme Court's judgment (in November, 1977) that the Zia regime's seizure of power was legitimized only by the "doctrine of necessity" and by its promise to hold elections have limited Zia's often capricious use of authority. The realization that Zia might arbitrarily alter the constitution to fit his own preferences and that the promise to hold elections was long overdue was a primary consideration in President Chaudhry's resignation from office.¹⁶

The political directions in which Zia would like to take Pakistan have been hinted at in his numerous public statements. One direction may be the restoration of many of the features of Ayub Khan's Basic Democracies system. Zia has frequently voiced his opinion that a presidential system is better suited to Pakistan than a parliamentary system, and that Pakistani democracy ought to be built "from the bottom upward," beginning with elections to local government bodies.¹⁷

When Zia took power in July, 1977, political sentiment in Pakistan was intensely polarized between the PPP and the PNA, and the general thought that he could provide the means by which power might be transferred peacefully. Today, a new polarization appears to be taking shape—centered on Zia rather than Bhutto.

Perhaps the most prominent feature of General Zia's Pakistan is the reassertion of Islamic values and the attempt to develop a true *Nizam-i-Mustafa* (system of the Prophet). In his opening address to the nation on the evening of July 5, the self-proclaimed CMLA praised "the spirit of Islam, demonstrated during the recent movement," and declared "the introduction of Islamic system [to be] an essential prerequisite for the country."¹⁸ In his nearly two years in power, Zia has instituted a series of Islamic reforms ostensibly calculated to create a true Islamic society. He apparently sees no contradiction between this thrust and his temporary, caretaker role; he argues that he is simply enacting agreements which had been agreed on between Bhutto and the PNA in negotiations during June, 1977, and thereby making easier the task of whatever civilian government succeeds him.

The resurgence of Islam in Pakistan is particularly striking in contrast to expectations at the beginning of the Bhutto era. Then, the dominant trend appeared to be toward "the secularization of politics," toward a system in which economic, rather than religious, issues would "determine the dynamics of politics."¹⁹

(Continued on page 185)

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In Afghanistan, "the Taraki regime has initiated programs and policies which, if implemented, will have a profound impact on the country's domestic and foreign policies."

Afghanistan: A Marxist Regime in a Muslim Society

BY HANNAH NEGARAN
Consultant on International Affairs

THE crises of economic development, political legitimacy and international ideological conflict in many developing countries have created a variety of political groups with conflicting conceptions of a desirable political order. These conflicts are further aggravated by the absence of a consensus on the manner of political competition. Afghanistan's experience over the past 16 years conforms to this pattern.

In 1964, under foreign and domestic pressure, King Mohammed Zahir Shah adopted a new constitution that allowed greater political activity and freedom of the press. Subsequently, a variety of political groups surfaced, covering the entire political spectrum. The conflict in the small Afghan intellectual community exacerbated the country's domestic and international problems. This situation continued after the overthrow of the King and the establishment of the first Afghan republic, which lasted from 1973 to 1978, and the April, 1978, takeover of the country by the Democratic party of the Masses (DPM), which is known as Khalq.

The DPM was established on January 1, 1965. Noor Mohammad Taraki, now Prime Minister, was elected a member of the central committee and Secretary General of the party. He was also selected to be the publisher of the party newspaper *Khalq*, 6 issues of which appeared between April 1 and May 16, 1966. The articles in *Khalq* and Taraki's books, especially *The New Life*, aid in an understanding of the ideological predisposition and the policies of the current regime. These publications questioned the legitimacy of the monarchical government and analyzed the country's sociopolitical condition in a Marxist-Leninist framework. The DPM believed that only a government representing the interests of the oppressed classes, i.e., the proletariat and the peasantry, could be legitimate. They emphasized class struggle as a means of achieving this goal. The DPM also

argued that Afghanistan's economic problems were caused by her feudal economic structure, the concentration of wealth in the hands of "landlords" and "capitalists," and the "exploitation of man by man." Only a proletarian revolution that was the "logical consequence" of class struggle could lead to a society "in which the freedom of each would be the condition for the freedom of all."

The class struggle concept was also applied to the global conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States. To the DPM, imperialism is the inevitable product of capitalist economic development, and the United States is the leader of the imperialist camp.¹ The DPM argued that Afghanistan should side with the Soviet bloc.

For a variety of reasons including a personality conflict, there was a split in the DPM. The seceding group became known as Perchamis, because it published a newspaper called *Percham* in 1968, while the remainder of the DPM was called Khalq. Although Khalq and Percham, like most other political groups, participated in parliamentary elections between 1965 and 1973, they apparently believed that, given the structure of Afghan society and especially the conservative and Islamic orientation of the majority of the population, they were unlikely to win control of Parliament. The Taraki group is likely to have been convinced of this limitation from the beginning, but the Perchamis showed a greater willingness to participate in the monarchical political system while exploring extra-constitutional means for seizing control of the country. One such means was the infiltration of the armed forces, with the aim of staging a military coup d'état. According to Taraki, "We [the Khalq] trained our colleagues and comrades in the Army, made them politically conscious and led them."²

By 1973, Khalq and Percham had enough support in the armed forces to take part in the overthrow of the Zahir Shah regime. It may be assumed that Khalq and especially Percham were the backbone of the 1973 coup, in the light of the political affiliation of many officers involved in the military takeover and in view of subsequent appointments and government policies. Officers like Pacha Gul and Abdul Qader played

¹This was reaffirmed by Taraki in a recent interview with *Die Zeit*, reported in Foreign Broadcasting Information Service (FBIS), June 9, 1978, p. 53.

²May 6, 1978, speech, published by the Government Printing Press.

important roles in the 1973 coup and are known to have been linked with Percham. Several Perchamis became members of the central committee of the new republican regime. Pacha Gul and many other Perchamis were appointed as Cabinet members by the central committee. The bulk of those appointed to governorships and sub-governorships were also either Perchamis or Khalqis.

Mohammad Daoud Khan, who had been the Prime Minister between 1953 and 1963, was asked to lead the military coup. He was highly regarded in the armed forces as well as in the country as a whole because of his support of the Baluchi and Pashtun nationalists in Pakistan, and because of the economic projects that were initiated during his premiership. He also had friends among both Perchamis and Khalqis because of his arms imports from the Soviet Union, his economic and political relationships with the Soviet Union, and his favorable attitude towards economic planning and expansion of the public sector.

Like Egyptian officers in a similar situation, the Perchami and Khalqi officers apparently selected a suitable figurehead for their coup. However, Daoud took power from the officers instead of allowing himself to be removed or accepting their policy dictates. During the two years after the 1973 coup, he systematically replaced leftist high level officials with officers personally loyal to him. Daoud's refusal to share power with Khalq and Percham and his demand, after 1976, that they disband their independent organizations and become members of his proposed National Revolutionary party further alienated them.

Daoud's foreign policies also reflected a break with the groups that had helped him return to power. At first he emphasized his commitment to Pashtunistan and Baluchistan, showed hostility to Iran and tilted the national stance to a more pro-Soviet posture, including support for the Soviet plan for an Asian collective security system.³

But by 1976, relations with all three countries had changed. Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto visited Afghanistan in 1976; in return, Daoud visited Pakistan. Both sides agreed to respect each other's territorial integrity and to seek peaceful resolution of their disputes.⁴ Daoud's relations with Iran also changed significantly between 1973 and 1976. At first, he expressed dissatisfaction with the previous Afghan government's 1972-1973 agreement with Iran with regard to the division of Helmand River waters,

Iran's commitment to the territorial integrity of Pakistan, and her large arms purchases.⁵ However, by 1976, Afghanistan and Iran had signed several cooperation agreements, including the construction of a railroad linking Kabul to Iran's port city of Bandar Abbas.

Iran's offer of substantial economic aid (estimated at \$2 billion, although very little was received through April, 1978) was intended in part to provide Afghanistan with incentives for decreasing her dependence on the Soviet Union. Iran also wanted Afghanistan to join the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) (which consists of Turkey, Iran and Pakistan), an organization attacked as being a "branch of CEN-TO" by the Soviet Union and its friends in Afghanistan. It is probable that Daoud's establishment of cordial relations with Iran and Pakistan, especially the agreement to construct a railroad between Afghanistan and Iran, seriously displeased the Soviet Union. His trip to Saudi Arabia and Egypt after Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's visit to Israel, and his reported statement a few days before the 1978 coup that Afghanistan sought "true nonalignment" and that countries like Cuba, which claim to be nonaligned, may not be so in reality, probably further alienated Khalq and Percham. According to Taraki, "the foreign policy of Daoud's regime assumed increasingly the form of dealing, collusion and surrender to imperialism. . . ."⁶

Daoud's failure to deal with the country's economic problems further contributed to his unpopularity. During the first republic, the number of unemployed Afghans increased substantially. It is estimated that more than 300,000 (Premier Noor Mohammad Taraki has estimated one million)⁷ Afghans left the country to find employment in Iran and other Persian Gulf states.⁸ The country's seven-year economic development plan was a shambles. From an anticipated development budget of about \$400 million for 1976-1977, only slightly more than one-third was spent, and from a development budget of \$570 million for 1977-1978, only about one-sixth was spent.

By 1978, Daoud's regime had lost the support of most organized political groups, including Khalq, Percham, Ikhwan-i-Muslemin (the Muslim Brotherhood) and Shulahi Jawid (a group influenced by the "thoughts" of Mao Tse-tung). The National Revolutionary party organized by President Daoud, which aimed at replacing all other major political groups, failed to generate much popular enthusiasm. The intelligentsia criticized the fact that the party's theoretical literature and reading list consisted of a few speeches by the President.

Daoud's change of policies between 1973 and 1976 was opposed by a Khalq-Percham coalition, which organized large anti-Daoud demonstrations before the April military revolt. After the leaders of these two

³*Pravda*, June 6, 1974, p. 4.

⁴*Pakistan Times*, August 24, 1976.

⁵*The Republic of Afghanistan Annual*, 1976, Kabul, 1974.

⁶Noor Mohammad Taraki's speech, May 10, 1978. Text distributed by Afghanistan's embassy in Washington, D.C.

⁷*Ibid.* Afghanistan's population is 15 million.

⁸Of course, these workers have helped Afghanistan's balance of payments by several hundred million dollars each year through transfer of their remittances.

groups were arrested, their supporters in the armed forces began to rebel against Daoud's regime.

The coup that brought Percham and Khalq to power in April was perhaps one of the most violent uprisings in the less industrial world. The fighting lasted 36 hours. Estimates of the number of people killed are as high as 10,000, although a more reasonable estimate is believed to be 2,000.⁹ President Daoud and several members of his family, including his brother and sons, were killed.

However, no sooner did the Percham-Khalq coalition come to power than conflict arose over the distribution of power and the policies of the new regime, in the course of which Khalq eliminated a number of top Perchami leaders from high positions of government. Two of the founders of Percham—Anahita, a member of Parliament known also for her championship of the rights of women, and Kamal Babrak, the post-coup Vice President—were accused of plotting with Defense Minister Brigadier General Abdul Qadir, the military leader of the coup, and Army Chief of Staff General Shahpoor, to attempt a coup against the Taraki government. Qadir and Shahpoor and a number of Perchami ministers, including Ali Kishtmand and Mohammad Rafi, were arrested. Other Perchamis, including Anahita and Babrak, are seeking political asylum in the West.

THE NEW GOVERNMENT

The Khalq regime has not changed the fundamental structure of the Afghan bureaucracy. Under the monarchy, the government was responsible to the King and Parliament, and under the first republic, to President Daoud; at present, it is responsible to Khalq. The party's central committee is the most powerful institution in the country. It appoints the members of the revolutionary council (which has 35 members), which, in turn, selects the members of the government.

To increase DPM control, many high level bureaucrats have been replaced by party loyalists or people sympathetic to them. In the armed forces, many senior officers (some say 800)¹⁰ have been purged. The policy of substituting party loyalists and sympathizers for former government employees has extended to school staffs and teachers, university professors and

⁹*Iellahat*, Wednesday, 13th of Ordebehesht 2536.

¹⁰*The Guardian*, November 5, 1978.

¹¹Interview, May 6, 1978. Text published by the Government Printing Press in Kabul, 1978.

¹²In the case of subsequent mortgages, only varying percentages are returnable (20 percent for 1974, 40 percent for 1975, 60 percent for 1976 and 90 percent for 1977).

¹³Text of Brezhnev's speech in the Kremlin on December 5, 1978, released by the U.S.S.R.'s mission to the United Nations on December 5, 1978.

¹⁴Article 4 of the treaty as released by the U.S.S.R.'s U.N. mission on December 6, 1978.

¹⁵*Kabul Times*, July 30, 1978.

deans, governors of provinces and internal security forces. According to Taraki, there are plans to "reeducate" those who have been retained.¹¹

The regime has acted to implement the party program. To generate support for the regime in the countryside, it has issued a decree cancelling the loans of usurers and mortgages negotiated before 1974 by peasants who had little or no land.¹² The government has also ordered the establishment of a network of local organizations to implement this decree and raise the "class consciousness" of the peasantry. The introduction of major land reform is also on the agenda.

The Khalq government has introduced a new marriage law. It has outlawed "giving a woman in marriage in exchange for money in cash or commodity," and forbids marriages or engagements for women under 16 and for men under 18 years of age.

Like the Daoud regime, the Taraki government puts great emphasis on the expansion of the public sector and the government's role in the country's economic program. It has already announced that the government will play a strong role in trade and industry and will provide direct financing of industrial projects. Foreign insurance companies and many foreign trade agencies have been eliminated. Other reforms being considered include the overhaul of the educational system and the establishment of new universities.

In the area of foreign policy, improving relations with the Soviet Union has been a priority. The Taraki regime signed a 20-year treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union similar to treaties signed between the Soviet Union and East European countries in the 1940's and to more recent treaties with Vietnam and Iraq. According to Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev, Afghan-Soviet relations have the caliber not "simply of good neighbourliness but a profound, sincere and durable friendship."¹³ The 20-year friendship treaty calls for the development of "all-around cooperation" between the two countries, including consultation and the introduction of "appropriate measures to ensure the security, independence and territorial integrity of the two countries."¹⁴ The treaty also calls for the development of "cooperation in the military field."

In addition to the 20-year treaty, a number of other cooperation agreements between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union have been signed since April, 1978. These agreements cover a variety of fields, including trade and culture. This intensification in relations between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union is reflected in statements by Afghan leaders and in Afghan policy toward countries friendly to the Soviet Union.¹⁵

Afghanistan's new regime has also supported Soviet allies, including Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique, Cuba, Vietnam and the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea. Afghanistan was one of the first

countries to recognize the new regime in Cambodia. And in a speech in honor of Foreign Minister Ho Dam of North Korea, Amin announced the end of diplomatic relations with South Korea.

The qualitative improvement in Soviet-Afghan relations has resulted in the presence of many Soviet citizens, especially Central Asians, in Afghanistan. Well-educated Central Asians, mostly Tajiks who speak a dialect of Persian that most Afghans understand, are playing crucial roles in almost all Afghan ministries. The presence of large numbers of Soviet citizens in Afghanistan has led some groups to oppose the regime, and some Soviet citizens have allegedly been killed by the regime's Islamic opponents.

While relations with the Soviet Union have been cordial, relations with the United States have been marked by ideological hostility combined with a desire to receive American economic aid. In a speech to the United Nations in June, 1978, Hafizullah Amin called the Soviets the "real advocates of peace," in contrast to "imperialistic reactionaries and warmongers," a reference to the United States and its allies.

Because the United States is regarded as an imperialistic country, the Taraki regime is ideologically hostile to it. The regime, however, has expressed interest in receiving economic aid from the United States and from other countries. President Jimmy Carter, for his part, has shown interest in continuing American economic aid to Afghanistan.

Nonetheless, United States allies in the region, especially Pakistan, have expressed concern about the implication of the Khalq regime for their security. Pakistan is especially concerned because of Afghanistan's historical support of secessionist movements in Baluchistan and the North West Frontier Provinces. Afghanistan is in a particularly favorable position to help Baluchi and Pashtun insurgents. Only some parts of the over 1,000 miles of common border she shares with Pakistan are guarded against the "illegal" movement of goods and population. The change of regime in Kabul probably gave a psychological boost to secessionist elements, especially the popular Front for Armed Resistance in Baluchistan.

At the same time, the insurgents in Pakistan are faced with serious problems. Baluchistan's population is heterogeneous; besides Baluchis, many other ethnic groups including Brahui, Pashtun, Hindu, Punjabi and Sindhi live in Baluchistan. And the Baluchis, who constitute less than 50 percent of the population of Baluchistan, are divided into 500 tribes and clans. This diversity confined insurgency to areas in central Baluchistan in the 1973-1976 period. The Merkanis, for example, who are not Baluchis and who occupy the coastal areas of Baluchistan, did not participate in the revolt against the central government. In order for the leftist insurgents in Baluchistan to develop a

province-wide organizational network, they would have to overcome the problems posed by ethnic and tribal diversity and mutual suspicion.

Although the Afghans could provide substantial help to the insurgents, the outcome of conflict between Afghan-backed insurgents and Pakistan is uncertain. The outcome would depend not only on factors like the military force ratios and the quality of the weapons, but also on alliance relationships, leadership quality, the surprise element, and so on. Until 1979, the Taraki regime's statements on the Baluch and Pashtun questions resembled those made by previous Afghan governments. Taraki expressed a desire for the peaceful resolution of this conflict on a number of occasions. At present, the Afghan government has serious internal problems, including the security of the regime, which make large-scale military operations against Pakistan in support of Pashtun or Baluch secessionists unlikely. In the long run, however, Afghan policy is likely to be influenced by domestic developments in Pakistan and Afghanistan, the relative military balance between the two countries, and the international political military environment, including alliance relationships.

The April, 1978, military uprising brought to power one of the many political groups that have long been in conflict with one another. Many other political groups, especially religious groups, do not regard the Taraki regime as legitimate. The survival of the regime depends on its ability to limit popular opposition, maintain the unity and support of the armed forces, and attract continuing Soviet support. However, the more the regime depends on Soviet support, and the more Soviet personnel become involved in running the country, the more it will lose its legitimacy in the eyes of many Afghans. Already the Rescue Front, which consists mainly of religious groups, has reportedly begun military operations against the Taraki government.

The Taraki regime has initiated programs and policies which, if implemented, will have a profound impact on the country's domestic and foreign policies. Domestic policies are likely to lead to a greater integration of the countryside by the central government, more bureaucratization, more political mobilization of peasants and workers, land reform, and the expansion of party control over many facets of Afghan life. Externally, the Taraki regime has qualitatively improved relations with the Soviet Union and its allies. The changed nature of Soviet-Afghan relations is a source of worry for Afghanistan's neighbors and for domestic political groups. ■

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"In the years ahead, Moscow will seek to establish a stable relationship with the countries of South Asia as part of its continuing effort to counter Chinese influence For the foreseeable future, the political role of Soviet naval forces in the Indian Ocean . . . will be more important than their strictly military role."

Soviet Policy in the Indian Ocean Region

BY RAJAN MENON

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THE Soviet Union has no coherent and pre-planned policy toward the Indian Ocean region. On the contrary, it is far more likely that Soviet policy toward this part of the world emerges as part of an effort to assess and respond to developments that are often unanticipated.

The Soviet Union's effort to improve its relationship with Pakistan in the 1960's generated some uneasiness in India. Moscow's multifaceted support of India during the Bangladesh war of December, 1971, dispelled such suspicion. Although India viewed her victory as a demonstration of her capability, Indian leaders realized the important role of Soviet support. Soviet popularity in India rose dramatically after the war and stood at its highest point since 1966.¹ In 1973, the Soviet Union gave India a \$350-million wheat loan on fairly lenient terms, and in November of that year, Soviet party Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev received a rousing welcome when he visited New Delhi. During his visit, a number of economic agreements were signed, and though the Indo-Soviet joint statement failed to refer to Brezhnev's call for an Asian Collective Security System, there was every reason for Moscow to be pleased with the state of its relations with New Delhi.²

Yet less than four years after the Brezhnev visit, Soviet leaders faced a situation in India for which they were unprepared.³ In June, 1975, in an effort to cope

with mounting economic problems and growing political opposition, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi proclaimed a State of Emergency, jailed her political opponents and imposed press censorship. The Soviet Union endorsed her actions as a response to the challenge posed by internal "reactionaries." When the opposition Janata party was formed to contest the elections that Gandhi scheduled for March, 1977, the Soviet press took an uncharitable view of Janata, categorizing it as a reactionary force representing the interests of India's propertied classes and foreign monopolies.

After the Congress party was defeated, Morarji Desai formed a Janata government. Soviet leaders thus had to come to terms with a leadership they had recently attacked. Soviet press reports understandably betrayed some apprehension about the future of Indo-Soviet relations in general and the bilateral treaty that had been signed between the two countries—in August, 1971—in particular.

However, Moscow's fears were soon allayed. The Janata leaders were pragmatists and realized that it was inadvisable to interrupt India's long-standing relationship with the Soviet Union. India had received \$1.943 billion in economic aid from the Soviets, and although no aid extensions had been made since 1966—aside from the 1973 wheat loan—the agreements signed during Brezhnev's 1973 visit indicated that the Soviet Union was a source of future economic aid. In addition, since 1965, the Soviet Union had emerged as India's most important arms supplier, having provided 81 percent of the monetary value of arms transferred to India from 1965 to 1974.⁴ Finally, although there had been signs pointing to an improvement in Sino-Indian relations after 1976, the change had not been dramatic enough to render the "Soviet connection" irrelevant to India's security. These considerations cautioned against sudden steps that would damage Indo-Soviet relations.

As a consequence, in April, 1977, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko visited New Delhi, and in October Prime Minister Desai and Foreign Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee visited the Soviet Union. The agreements signed on those occasions as well as the

¹Indian Institute of Public Opinion, *Monthly Public Opinion Surveys*, vol. 17, no. 3 (December, 1971), p. 25.

²For details on Brezhnev's visit, see *Hindu* (Madras), November 26, 27, 30, 1973. In an address to India's Parliament, Brezhnev referred to the need for an Asian Collective Security System.

³The following discussion of Indo-Soviet relations is based on Rajan Menon, "India and the Soviet Union: A New Stage in Relations?" *Asian Survey*, vol. 18, no. 7 (July, 1978), pp. 731-750, unless otherwise indicated.

⁴Orah Cooper, "Soviet Economic Aid to the Third World," in U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Soviet Economy in a New Perspective*, 94th Cong., 2d sess., 1976, Table I, p. 194, for Soviet economic aid to India from 1954 to 1975. For Soviet military aid, see U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1966-1975* (Washington, D.C.: ACDA, 1976), Table V, p. 78.

explicit endorsement of the Indo-Soviet treaty by Desai and Vajpayee showed that there would be no sudden change in Indo-Soviet relations.

One development viewed with some uneasiness by Soviet leaders is the recent trend toward improved Sino-Indian relations. In August, 1976, it was announced that India had decided to establish ambassadorial links with Peking, and in September of that year the Chinese ambassador presented his credentials to India's President. Subsequently, cultural and economic contacts between the two countries have increased. After the advent of the Janata government, Chinese Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping indicated Peking's interest in normalizing relations with India, and Indian Foreign Minister Vajpayee visited China in February, 1979.

Moscow's concern about a rapprochement between China and India should be seen in the context of the Soviet suspicion of the Sino-Japanese treaty signed in August, 1978, the recent establishment of full diplomatic relations between Peking and Washington, and the planned sale of Harrier aircraft to China by Britain. For their part, the Indian leaders have tried to reassure Moscow that they will not normalize Sino-Indian relations at the expense of India's ties with the U.S.S.R.

SOVIET-PAKISTANI RELATIONS

Although the Bangladeshi crisis left Soviet-Pakistani relations in the doldrums, both sides subsequently moved to repair the damage. Pakistan's Prime Minister Ali Bhutto visited Moscow in March, 1972, and October, 1974, and in 1973 and 1974 the Soviet Union extended \$287 million in economic aid to Pakistan.⁵ Although Moscow had reservations about Bhutto's advocacy of close ties with China, Soviet leaders welcomed the agreements signed by Gandhi and Bhutto to improve Indo-Pakistani relations after 1971, and the efforts to set Pakistan's relationship with Bangladesh on an even keel.

After the national elections of March, 1977, in Pakistan, Bhutto was ousted in a coup. The trend toward an improved Indo-Pakistani relationship was not reversed by Pakistan's military government headed by General Mohammed Zia ul-Haq; nonethe-

less, Soviet leaders are uncertain of the direction of Zia's foreign policy.⁶

SOVIET-BANGLADESHI TIES

After the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971, Soviet leaders established ties with Bangladesh. Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Mujibur Rahman visited Moscow in 1972 and 1974, and for two years after the war Soviet minesweepers worked to clear wreckage off Chittagong and Cox's Bazar. Though they were reportedly unenthusiastic about a suggestion made by India in December, 1971, that they negotiate a friendship treaty with Bangladesh,⁷ Soviet leaders increased trade with the new state and extended \$300 million in economic aid as of 1975.⁸ Given Bangladesh's relations with India and the Soviet Union and the approving way the Soviet press had evaluated the Mujib government, Moscow was concerned when Mujib was overthrown in August, 1975.

Mujib's ouster was a setback to the Soviet Union on two counts. The more conservative Ziaur Rahman government has weakened Bangladeshi ties with India. And unlike Mujib, Ziaur Rahman, who visited Peking in January, 1977, seems anxious to strengthen ties with China. Taken together, these trends turn Bangladesh's foreign policy in a direction that Moscow may find unsuitable.

AFGHANISTAN

While Soviet leaders were perturbed by the sudden turn of events in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, they viewed the Afghanistan coup of April, 1978, differently.⁹ Noor Mohammed Taraki—who took power after the coup—is regarded as a Communist of long standing, and his People's Democratic party is Communist-dominated. There can be little doubt that the Taraki government wants to identify closely with Moscow. After the coup, it was reported that Soviet advisers were beginning to play a key role in Afghanistan's army and government ministries. In December, 1978, after a Taraki visit to Moscow, the U.S.S.R. and Afghanistan signed a 20-year treaty of friendship and cooperation.¹⁰ And when Vietnamese-backed Cambodian rebels ousted the government of Cambodian Prime Minister Pol Pot, Afghanistan joined the Soviet Union in recognizing the new regime.

These developments led observers to overdramatize the significance of the Afghan coup and to see it as a virtual extension of Soviet borders. It should be noted that the Soviet Union and Afghanistan were bound by close ties even during the Zahir Shah monarchy under the government of Mohammed Daoud. Afghanistan received \$1.263 billion in economic aid from the Soviet Union from 1954 to 1975. In per capita terms, this was greater than the economic aid provided to India. In the military field, the Soviets have been Afghanistan's sole military supplier, having transferred \$309 million

⁵Cooper, *op. cit.*, Table I, p. 194.

⁶In the past year, important Chinese officials have visited Pakistan on three occasions—army chief of staff Yang Cheng-wu and Deputy Prime Minister Keng Pao in March, 1978, and Deputy Prime Minister Li Hsien-nien in January, 1979.

⁷See Bhabani Sen Gupta, "Moscow and Bangladesh," *Problems of Communism*, vol. 24 (March-April, 1975), p. 61.

⁸Cooper, *op. cit.*, Table I, p. 194.

⁹For Brezhnev's comments on the change of government in Afghanistan, see *Pravda*, September 23, 1978, translated in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (CDSP), vol. 20, no. 38 (October 18, 1978), p. 4.

¹⁰Text in *Pravda*, December 6, 1978.

in the 1965-1975 period.¹¹ Daoud visited Moscow in April, 1977; and as late as November, 1977, the Soviet magazine *New Times* published an interview with Daoud in which Soviet-Afghan ties were praised.¹² Thus the advent of Taraki does not presage any sudden transformation of Soviet-Afghan relations. Further, given the favorable Soviet attitude toward the Daoud regime, it is unlikely that Moscow engineered his ouster.

IRAN AND THE SOVIET UNION

Soviet ties with Afghanistan's neighbor, Iran, were strengthened significantly after the Shah announced, in 1962, that he would not permit the stationing of nuclear weapons in Iran. Despite Iran's membership in CENTO,¹³ the Shah's outspoken anti-communism and his close ties with the United States, Soviet-Iranian relations improved markedly in the 1960's. High-level visits between Soviet and Iranian leaders increased, and the Soviet Union took part in a number of Iranian development projects—including a steel mill at Isfahan and a gas pipeline through which the Soviet Union began to receive natural gas from Iran in 1970. In 1967, the Soviet Union made its first sale of military equipment to Iran, and as of 1975, Soviet arms transfers amounted to \$589 million.¹⁴

In early 1978, anti-Shah demonstrations erupted in Iran and mounted progressively, leading to the Shah's departure in January, 1979. President Carter subsequently indicated that there was no evidence of Soviet involvement in Iran and, in November, Soviet technical personnel stationed there began to leave the country.¹⁵ As a consequence of the crisis, the flow of natural gas from Iran to the U.S.S.R. was halted at the end of October, seriously affecting industries and power plants in Armenia and Azerbaijan.

The establishment of an Islamic republic along the

¹¹For Soviet economic aid to Afghanistan, see Cooper, *op. cit.*, Table I, p. 194. The figure for Soviet arms transfers to Afghanistan is derived from U.S., Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *op. cit.*, Table V, p. 78.

¹²"President Daoud: Four Years of the Republic," *New Times* (November, 1977), pp. 14-15.

¹³The Central Treaty Organization.

¹⁴U.S., Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *op. cit.*, Table V, p. 78. Soviet economic aid to Iran amounted to \$750 million as of 1975. Cooper, *op. cit.*, Table I, p. 194.

¹⁵Robert Rand, "The Crisis in Iran: Public Diplomacy East and West," *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 262/78, November 21, 1978, p. 2.

¹⁶*Der Spiegel*, November 20, 1978, cited in Rand, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

¹⁷After the Shah's departure from Iran in January, 1979, the Soviet press began to criticize him explicitly and to speak favorably of Khomeini.

¹⁸Geoffrey Jukes, "Soviet Policy in the Indian Ocean," in Michael McGwire, Ken Booth and John McDonnell, eds., *Soviet Naval Policy* (New York: Praeger, 1975), p. 308.

¹⁹"Useful Visit," *New Times*, no. 22 (June, 1965), p. 10.

lines envisaged by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini would not be an unambiguous political victory for the U.S.S.R. In an interview with *Der Spiegel* in November, Khomeini rejected the Soviet Union's claim to support liberation movements on the ground that the Soviet Union denied freedom of religion to the Islamic peoples in the U.S.S.R.¹⁶ For their part, Soviet leaders are likely to worry about the establishment of an Islamic republic in Iran, because the country adjoins Soviet Central Asia, an area with about 20 million people of Muslim origin.¹⁷

THE INDIAN OCEAN AREA

The deployment of Soviet naval forces in the Indian Ocean began in 1968 and by 1969 a permanent presence had been established. On average, there have been between four and six Soviet ships and two to three submarines maintained in the waters of the Indian Ocean, with an increase in their number during political crises like the October, 1973, Middle East conflict and the Bangladesh war.¹⁸

The initial forward deployment of Soviet ships was preceded by several events. The development by the United States of the Polaris A3 missile—with a range of about 2,800 nautical miles—in the mid-1960's and the subsequent acquisition of the Polaris and Poseidon missiles meant that United States submarines could threaten the industrial areas of the U.S.S.R. from an Arabian Sea location. Because of the time that would be lost in transit, it would have been unwise for the United States to deploy submarines in the Indian Ocean from bases at Guam, Holy Loch or Rota. However, the agreement reached in December, 1966, between Britain and the United States providing for the construction of an American naval facility, Diego Garcia, in the Indian Ocean indicated that the United States planned to acquire a permanent naval presence there.

Even before the Anglo-American agreement, a Soviet report on the visit to Moscow of Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri pointed out that the demilitarization of the Indian Ocean—mentioned in the joint communiqué at the end of Shastri's visit—was of special significance for India, "considering that the Pentagon, in conjunction with British military agencies, is setting up Polaris submarine bases on some of the Indian Ocean islands."¹⁹ In this period, developments elsewhere also seemed to suggest the likelihood of a United States naval deployment in the Indian Ocean. The establishment of United States communications stations at Asmara in Ethiopia and North West Cape in Australia indicated an American effort to acquire means of communicating with naval forces in the Indian Ocean.

In view of United States actions, the Soviets may have decided on a permanent Indian Ocean pres-

ence²⁰ for two principal reasons: to familiarize themselves with the region and, if possible, to secure access to naval facilities in the littoral states; and to indicate their resolve to react to what was perceived as the deployment of United States naval forces there.

Of course, the Soviet decision to establish a naval presence in the Indian Ocean cannot be explained solely as a response to American activities. It is significant that the Soviet entry into the Indian Ocean followed on the heels of Great Britain's decision to terminate her military presence east of the Suez. In addition, the long tenure of Admiral Sergei Gorshkov—who has served as Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet navy since 1956—has undoubtedly enhanced his ability to lobby for a more balanced, modernized, "blue water" fleet. In his writing, Gorshkov has supported the expansion of the Soviet navy not only on military-strategic grounds, but also in terms of its ability to serve foreign policy goals and increase Soviet influence and prestige.²¹ The increased visibility of the Soviet navy in areas like the Indian Ocean must also be viewed in terms of the impact that its growth and modernization have had on its bargaining power inside the Soviet Union.

After 1968, Soviet Indian Ocean naval units visited the ports of a number of littoral states, focusing primarily on countries located in the northwestern part of the Indian Ocean. In addition, mooring buoys have been established at various points in the western half of the Indian Ocean. There are also reports concerning the existence of Soviet bases in Aden, Berbera, Socotra, Visakhapatnam and Umm Qasr.

²⁰For the view that the Soviet Union's entry into the Indian Ocean was primarily a response to a perceived threat from the United States, see Jukes, *op. cit.*, pp. 307-313; and Oles M. Smolansky, "Soviet Entry into the Indian Ocean: An Analysis," in Michael McGwire, ed., *Soviet Naval Developments* (New York: Praeger, 1973), pp. 409-412.

²¹For a recent analysis of Gorshkov's writings, see James McConnell, "The Gorshkov Articles, The New Gorshkov Book, and their Relation to Policy," in Michael McGwire and John McDonnell, eds., *Soviet Naval Influence* (New York: Praeger, 1977), pp. 565-620.

²²Knowledgeable United States officials have testified that there is no evidence to indicate the existence of Soviet naval bases in India. See Atherton testimony in U.S., Congress, House of Representatives, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia, *South Asia, 1974: Political, Economic and Agricultural Challenges*, 93rd Cong., 2d sess., September 19 and 24, 1974, p. 32.

²³See *USSR and Third World*, vol. 5, no. 5 (May 13-July 6, 1975), pp. 218-255-257.

²⁴Michael T. Klare, "Superpower Rivalry at Sea," *Foreign Policy*, no. 21 (Winter, 1975-1976), p. 165.

²⁵On the importance of the Indian Ocean sea lanes, see Michael McGwire, "The Proliferation of Maritime Weapon Systems in the Indo-Pacific Region," paper prepared for the conference on "The Proliferation of Weapons in the Indo-Pacific Region," Center for Strategic and Defense Studies, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, Canberra, July 26-28, 1977.

The Soviet quest for naval facilities in the Indian Ocean reflects the Soviet effort to maintain an effective and permanent presence in the area.

Reports about Soviet bases must be evaluated with care. First, the word "base" is often used in an ambiguous and, therefore, misleading fashion. It is not at all clear that access to naval facilities for repair and replenishment are equivalent to the acquisition of exclusive base rights that can be utilized in conflict situations. For example, it is grossly inaccurate to suggest that India's east coast port of Visakhapatnam is, in any meaningful sense, a Soviet base.²²

Second, an examination of Moscow's relationship with countries like Egypt and Somalia suggests that guaranteed access to military facilities is a function of the Soviet Union's political relationship with the host country. In the case of Somalia, it was reported in 1975 that United States aerial photographs had revealed the existence of a missile storage and handling facility as well as a runway in Berbera, a port that the Soviets helped to modernize.²³ However, as a consequence of Moscow's backing of Ethiopia in her territorial dispute with Somalia, Soviet-Somali relations deteriorated sharply and the rights acquired in Berbera were nullified.

Thus, while the Soviet Union may have acquired port facilities in a number of littoral states, it does not possess exclusive and guaranteed bases. As Michael Klare has pointed out,

nowhere does it [the U.S.S.R.] have access to full-service installations that can compare to the United States Navy facilities at Subic Bay in the Philippines, Yokosuka in Japan, or Rota in Spain. United States bases, moreover, are usually secured by treaty and defended by American forces, whereas many of the ports now used by Moscow would be closed to Soviet vessels in the event of hostilities.²⁴

One might add that Diego Garcia is a more secure facility than any base that the Soviet Union has been able to acquire in the Indian Ocean.

Some analysts have raised the possibility of Soviet attempts to interdict Western shipping along the sea lanes connecting the Persian Gulf with Australia, Japan and Western Europe (via the Cape of Good Hope).²⁵ However, it is not clear that this would bring substantial benefits to Moscow. On the contrary, the disruption of these oil supply lines would be tantamount to a declaration of war; and, in addition, the Soviet Union would have no assurance that the resulting conflict would be localized. Further, it should be

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THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTH ASIA

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clearly stated by Prime Minister Kirtinidhi Bista in March, 1978. "Nepal's world view," he declared, "is derived from the perception of the need for peaceful coexistence between India and China on the one hand and between the U.S. and the Soviet Union on the other." He expressed the belief that both the United States and the Soviet Union would play "direct constructive roles" in the region to reduce "both by example and by precept" the tensions there. "I hope," he added, "they will recognize the primacy of our regional interest over their global interests." Apparently this admonition was aimed more at the Soviet Union than at the United States. The Prime Minister underscored the "warm relations happily subsisting between Nepal and the United States" and asked for "even increased cooperation from the United States in the region's development."

United States relations with Bangladesh got off to a very shaky start because of the United States "tilt toward Pakistan" during the 1971 civil war. The continued improvement in United States-Bangladesh relations may be interpreted as a remarkable tribute either to Bangladesh's forbearance or to United States imaginative diplomacy or both. More realistically, the United States may have realized its mistakes in 1971 and soon recognized new realities in the area, and Bangladesh may have had no alternative to the United States for the economic assistance that she desperately needs.

The United States and the countries of South Asia are interacting far more extensively than is generally realized, at least by Americans. For the South Asian states, the United States will inevitably continue to be the object of special attention for economic and political reasons. For the United States, South Asia will continue to be a low-priority area, unless crises in the region have serious international spillover effects. United States relations with the South Asian states will probably continue to be technically correct and good. Relations with India and Bangladesh will probably continue to improve, relations with Sri Lanka and Nepal will continue to be satisfactory, if limited, and relations with Pakistan will continue to be difficult, but again officially good.

But the great gulfs of ignorance and misunderstanding, the vast differences in ways of life, patterns of thought, domestic conditions, internal orientation and external policies will remain. So will continuing differences on specific issues, mostly behind the scenes but with occasional flareups that cannot be buried in diplomatic double-talk. Relations will not be made any easier by the growing internal tensions in the

major states of South Asia, the growing preoccupation of the United States with domestic problems, increased threats and pressures (both for the United States and South Asia) as a result of recent developments in Afghanistan and Iran, and many other international problems.

South Asians have deep-seated antipathies toward the United States, and they doubt American credibility, capabilities and will; but they do not need to be reminded of the continuing importance of the United States in the changing international system. Americans have many negative stereotypes about the countries and peoples of South Asia, complicated by vast ignorance and limited interest; but Americans are increasingly aware of the importance of South Asia and South Asians in man's future on this planet. After all, South Asia contains the second largest aggregation of people in the world, nearly one-fifth of the human race. In many respects it is the heartland of the third—or fourth—world and of the nonaligned world. Much of the world's future depends on how the peoples and governments of this region deal with basic problems of human and national survival and development.

Thus South Asia must be given a larger place on the agenda of American concerns in spite of the limited nature of official relations and the limited contacts between Americans and South Asians. The real encounter between the United States and South Asia and between Americans and South Asians lies in the future. However stressful and disturbing this may be, it will provide a challenge and perhaps an opportunity that cannot be ignored. ■

INDIA

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the party was averted, but factionalism had virtually immobilized the government, and more than a year after the Emergency had been lifted, the Janata leadership remained preoccupied by one question—what to do about Gandhi.

Although Congress had been dramatically swept from office in March, 1977, it had secured 34.5 percent of the vote; with 153 seats in Parliament, it was the major opposition party. Torn by recrimination over the Emergency and by Indira Gandhi's reentry into politics, the Congress split, and in January, 1978, the breakaway Congress (I)—for Indira—was formed. The regular party, led by Y.B. Chavan, repudiated the Emergency and condemned its "excesses." Gandhi was unrepentant—though she expressed "deep sorrow for any hardship caused."⁷ She justified the Emergency in the name of the poor and

⁷Letter to the Shah Commission, dated December 2, 1977, Shah Commission of Inquiry, *Interim Report I*, March 11, 1978, p. 28.

appealed to the downtrodden—the landless, minorities, and especially Harijans—for their support.

Elections for five state assemblies in March tested rival Congress claims for popular allegiance—both against each other and against Janata. In the southern states of Karnataka and Andhra, where popular chief ministers sided with Gandhi, the Congress (I) won overwhelming majorities. Overall, the Indira Congress won 394 seats in the five states, compared to 271 for Janata and 147 for Congress. Defections from the regular Congress to Gandhi accelerated, spurred by her own victory in November in the Chikmagalur parliamentary by-election. The election in Chikmagalur, a remote constituency in the Congress stronghold of Karnataka, was hardly a national plebiscite, but Janata's all-out effort to defeat Gandhi gave it special significance. She returned to New Delhi in triumph to take her seat in Parliament as leader of the opposition.

Indira Gandhi, Sanjay, and a number of her associates face criminal prosecution on charges of misconduct and abuse of authority. Among the charges, based on the findings of a judicial inquiry into the Emergency, was the allegation that before the Emergency was imposed, Gandhi harassed officials engaged in an investigation of Maruti, Sanjay's automobile company. Because the investigation had been undertaken at the request of Parliament, a parliamentary privileges committee made its own inquiry and found Gandhi guilty. She was also held in contempt of Parliament for her refusal to testify. In December, six weeks after her election, Parliament voted to expel Indira Gandhi and had her jailed for the duration of the session—seven days.

A year before, Gandhi had been taken briefly into custody, only to turn a bungled arrest to her own advantage. Again she sought martyrdom. In widespread demonstrations protesting her imprisonment, 20 persons were killed by police and some 120,000 of her supporters were arrested. On her release, she vowed to run again and return to Parliament.

Despite Gandhi's political comeback, Janata remains more seriously threatened from within than by any challenge that the Congress (I) now poses. The constituent parties of the Janata retain their identity as factions, and Charan Singh, at 76 still ambitious for the prime ministership, has threatened to reconstitute the BLD. Morarji Desai, now 83, is in good health, but his death or resignation would surely lead the Janata factions to struggle over the succession. His successor could well be Vajpayee, leader of the Jana Sangh group, the organizational core of the party and increasingly its dominant element. The Jana Sangh role accentuates the limited base of Janata support—its concentration in the Hindi-speaking area of north India—and may give further impetus to the regionalization of Indian politics. ■

CHINA'S POLICY TOWARD SOUTH ASIA

(Continued from page 158)

or, to put it more bluntly, to the global interests of China and the United States in the Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf areas. Internal division and debate continue to focus on the fate of former Prime Minister Bhutto, who is facing a death sentence. The military regime in Pakistan, headed by General Zia ul-Haq, has maintained "law and order" after the political upheaval following Bhutto's rigging of the 1977 elections. Although the author learned from his talks in Peking in July, 1978, and from talks with top Pakistani leaders that China would not request a pardon for Bhutto, China subsequently asked Zia to spare Bhutto's life. Nonetheless, the Sino-Pakistani friendship has survived the political change and upheaval in Pakistan.

Chinese Vice Premier Keng Piao went to Pakistan in June, 1978, to open the Chinese-built Karkoram highway, carved through the mountains of northern Pakistan along the ancient silk route. The highway gives China greater influence in Pakistan and access to the Arabian sea port of Karachi. Pakistan's military ruler, General Zia ul-Haq, like all his predecessors since the 1960's, has visited China and has reaffirmed his country's "unqualified" friendship with China. The Sino-Pakistani friendship is now nearly two decades old. It has survived many crises, including the Cultural Revolution in China, the 1971 Bangladesh crisis and the 1977 Pakistan internal political upheaval.

SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS

Turning to Sino-Indian relations, there are no significant trends either from New Delhi or from Peking toward any closer or friendlier relations. Although India's new Prime Minister, Morarji Desai, has talked about "genuine" nonalignment, hinting that his government would not "tilt toward Moscow," there is still no indication that Indo-Soviet friendship has weakened or that India is moving toward Peking. Desai has gone to Moscow to reaffirm his country's unchanged friendly relations with the Soviet Union. The major factor in India's foreign policy is still her close alliance with the Soviet Union, formalized by a friendship treaty in 1971.

The main reason for the friendship is security—India depends on Moscow for her defense supplies. Commenting on Desai's visit to Moscow, *Pravda* wrote gleefully that "the results of this visit and the joint communiqué were epitomized in the work of the inter-government Soviet-Indian commission.¹² Thus, not-

¹²Reprinted in the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, November 10, 1978.

withstanding Desai's earlier promise of so-called "genuine" nonalignment, India's tilt toward Moscow remains. Similarly, during his visit to Moscow before his abortive plan to visit Peking, Indian Foreign Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee assured the Russians that India's new China policy would not be developed at the expense of the Soviet Union.¹³ Vajpayee's visit to Peking has been postponed because of "illness"—presumably "diplomatic illness."

While both Desai and Vajpayee favored a flexible attitude toward China, other leaders of the ruling Janata party are totally opposed to any softening toward Peking unless China "vacates" the so-called "Indian territories occupied" during the 1962 Sino-Indian war.

China, on her part, is willing to improve relations with India, not so much in a bilateral relationship but in the context of China's multilateral global diplomacy. Thus, while China has always been willing to settle the NEFA border controversy, she cannot afford to return the Aksai Chin territory in the "Azad" Kashmir area—the area of Kashmir that is under Pakistan's control—because Aksai Chin is inextricably linked to Chinese Sinkiang defenses against the Soviet Union.

China apparently welcomed President Carter's visit to India and the Indian Prime Minister's return visit to the United States in 1978, and hopes for a better understanding between Washington and New Delhi because it might reduce India's singleminded attention to Moscow.

On October 2, 1978, on the eve of Vajpayee's proposed visit to Peking, the New China News Agency (NCNA) gave India credit for her "good-neighborhood relations" with Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal. India is no longer described as a "regional expansionist" power blackmailing her smaller neighbors. The NCNA quoted the Japanese newspaper *Yomiuri Shimbun*:

The trends toward better mutual relations, reconciliation and cooperation among the South Asian countries mark a departure from the . . . type of relations that the Soviet Union has been striving to set up with India.¹⁴

On the Indian side, China's continued military supplies to Pakistan and, recently, on a very modest scale, to Bangladesh are regarded as unfriendly and as "threats" to Indian security. Nor is India pleased about China's continued support for the right of self-determination of the people of Kashmir. China continues to support Pakistan and has recently begun to support Bangladesh; she is anxious to keep these South Asian countries out of the Soviet orbit.

This brings into focus the interrelationship between

China's policy and the policies of the superpowers in South Asia. Until the recent crisis in Iran and the pro-Soviet coup in Afghanistan in April, 1978, South Asia was not a priority area for major powers. But recent developments gave rise to concern in Peking and in Washington. In South Asia, the United States and the People's Republic of China share common though not identical interests. The interacting South Asian interests of the United States and China can be seen as functions of each power's perceptions of Soviet aims in the subcontinent and the Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf areas. Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's national security adviser, painted a grim picture of current troubles in the region and the Soviet "hidden hands" in these regional tensions:

An arc of crisis stretches along the shores of the Indian Ocean, with fragile social and political structures in a region of vital importance to us threatened with fragmentation. The resulting political chaos could well be filled by elements hostile to our values and sympathetic to our adversaries.¹⁵

The Chinese leaders never tire of warning the Western powers, particularly the United States, and the smaller South Asian nations like Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka about the expansionist designs of the Soviet Union in the Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf areas and in the subcontinent.

China's primary objective in South Asia is to contain Soviet influence and power. China's recent flexible attitude toward India and her favorable reaction to the prospects of an improved Indo-United States relationship are related to the growing Sino-Soviet rift. Similarly, China's continued support to Pakistan, her pleas to American policymakers to "smile" toward Pakistan and her fast-growing ties with Bangladesh are all directed toward the containment of what the Chinese perceive, not without justification, as the Soviet policy of "hegemony" in Asia.

The strategic balance in Asia, long dominated by the United States, began to change when the Americans became tired of their involvement in the protracted Vietnam war and began to withdraw from Vietnam, Thailand and South Korea and when the Soviet Union began new attempts to step into the American shoes. This alarmed the Chinese, and they began to try to ensure the global encirclement of the Soviet Union.

China's effort to win friends in Asia in the context of her global policy has shaped her policy toward South Asia. China's relations with India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and other South Asian countries can be understood only in light of the Chinese perception of the contemporary world. The Chinese believe that the Soviet "social imperialists" constitute the "primary contradiction," "the greatest threat" to world peace, just as Japan's designs in Asia threatened world peace

¹³*Ibid.*

¹⁴*Ibid.*

¹⁵Interview in *Time*, January 15, 1979.

in the 1930's and the 1940's. During that period, Mao tried to form a "grand alliance" against Japan, irrespective of ideologies. Similarly, China's post-Mao leaders are trying to build an anti-Soviet alliance on a global scale (including South Asia) irrespective of ideologies. ■

BANGLADESH

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a dam on the Ganges in India within a few miles of the Bangladeshi border. When the dam went into operation in 1974, water was diverted from the Ganges to flush the Hoogly River, to save the Calcutta port from siltation. Bangladesh was critical of the diversion of water, because it adversely affected her lower riparian area during the dry months and ruined irrigation, agriculture and inland navigation.

After failure in bilateral negotiations, the Farakka issue was internationalized in 1976, when the Bangladesh government brought the matter to the non-aligned countries conference in Colombo and, later, to the United Nations. The main purpose of this action was to gain wider diplomatic support against India.

Another matter contributing to tension between the two countries was the allegation of Indian intervention in Bangladesh's internal domestic politics. After the fall of Mujib, it was reported that some of his followers had taken shelter in India and were using their foreign base to attack Bangladesh's border outposts. The Indian government continues to deny any involvement, but there is a widespread feeling that India will continue to interfere in Bangladesh's internal politics to establish a more amenable regime there.¹²

The decline of Soviet influence in Bangladesh was very clear in the first year of independence. The country was badly in need of help and the Soviet Union could not offer enough assistance. After the United States recognized Bangladesh, it quickly provided massive aid to diminish Soviet influence. The educated elite, with their Western orientation, gravitated toward United States influence. One visible Soviet project was to clear the sunken ships from Chittagong Port, a project that was criticized by the radicals as well as by right-wing elements. Both the pro-Peking radicals and the right-wing elements believed that the Soviet objective was to allow the perpetuation of Indian influence in Bangladesh. Soviet usefulness also declined as Bangladesh won more international recognition. Another factor contributing to the fading of Soviet influence was the total subservience of pro-Moscow leftists to the ruling Awami League in Bangladesh, which was rapidly declining in popularity.

¹²The Washington Post, March 23, 1976. M. Rashiduzzaman, *op. cit.*

The military regime in Bangladesh has led the country out of its Indian orbit, and there is no doubt about their pro-Western orientation. Ziaur Rahman has received a steady flow of aid from Western countries. The World Bank and the United States Agency for International Development (AID) have been supplying aid for population control and development activities. Bangladesh has signed an agreement with the United States for Peace Corps volunteers. In the context of her strained relations with India, Bangladesh has tried to cultivate the Western powers.

After the overthrow of Mujib, Bangladesh's relations with China improved dramatically. The countries exchanged ambassadors and Ziaur Rahman paid a visit to China, which was reciprocated by Chinese leaders. Economic aid and mutual cooperation have been promised. Because Bangladesh is afraid of India, China is her natural ally, in terms of the balance of power in South Asia. As Bangladeshi ties with China improved, the pro-Peking radicals inside the country began to support Ziaur Rahman. Bangladesh is geographically close to China and, in view of Sino-Soviet rivalry in South Asia, it is in China's interest to keep Bangladesh away from Moscow's influence. Nor does China want Indian dominance in Bangladesh.

In 1971, most Muslim countries opposed the creation of Bangladesh. But as Pakistan and Bangladesh normalized their ties, Islamic countries extended aid and friendship to the new Muslim nation. Saudi Arabia offered quick recognition after the overthrow of Mujib in 1975. Ziaur Rahman has traveled to the oil-rich Arab countries, and substantial Arab aid has been given to Bangladesh during the last three years. Bangladeshi citizens are employed in the Middle East, and their remittances are generating much needed foreign exchange.

CONCLUSION

Bangladesh's political and economic problems are enormous. At the moment, she is a country without established political institutions. Serious efforts to establish a constitutional system may begin after the elections, and that will mark the beginning of another political era. There are, however, opposing views about a future political pattern. Ziaur Rahman's main support still comes from the army, and he can remain in office as long as he retains its confidence. After his election, Ziaur Rahman became a political leader and even established a party with a view to winning the legislative election. According to all indications, Ziaur Rahman would like to establish a presidential system, and his party supports that view.

To the opposition, consisting of the followers of the late Mujib and the lawyer politicians, a presidential form of government will conceal a constitutional autocracy, with Ziaur Rahman at the apex of power.

Rahman's opponents support a parliamentary democracy, which is one of the strong political legacies of colonial India.

In February elections, Ziaur Rahman's Nationalist party won 206 of the 300 parliamentary seats; the opposition party, the Awami League, which had previously threatened to boycott the elections, won 40 seats. If Rahman can maintain his popularity, he may be able to establish a constitution based on his political ideas, which call for a presidential system.

If the elected leaders of Bangladesh can establish a democratic constitution, political stability and progress in political institution-building might be achieved. ■

THE DEMOGRAPHIC CONUNDRUM IN SOUTH ASIA

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present population growth continues. It seems useful to add that statistics related to food production and consumption in traditional societies must be accepted with considerable caution. Yields of mixed crops ripening progressively are at best merely estimated, and food grown in dooryard gardens is usually not included. Food picked and eaten in the fields or at the roadside likewise does not appear in statistical summaries.²⁸ These reservations are not intended to mock the gravity of the situation but rather to counter the absurd view that more than 200 million Indians do not eat enough to stay alive.²⁹ One is reminded of the old saw that bumblebee wings are too small to permit flight. Many South Asians have an often precarious existence but up to now, at least, the villagers of South Asia have survived and are continuing to increase in numbers.

THE SOUTH ASIAN FARMER

Some words on behalf of the South Asian farmer seem appropriate. Despite an image abroad of ineptitude, indolence and ignorance, most of these traditional farmers are very efficient. The more than 800 million people who survive from their daily efforts give evidence of their skills. The ability of the rural economies to absorb massive increases of population over the span of human history represents successful rather

²⁸An especially lucid account of the defects of statistics is found in B.H. Farmer, "Available Food Supplies," pp. 75-78 in Joseph Hutchinson, ed., *Population and Food Supply* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969).

²⁹Vasaria, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

³⁰Kingsley Davis, "Demographic Reality and Policy in Nepal's Future," p. 13 in *Workshop—Conference on Population, Family Planning, and Development in Nepal* (Berkeley: University of California Family Planning/Material and Child Health Project, August 24-29, 1975).

than inappropriate environmental management. Not only are the traditional systems of agriculture compatible with the South Asian societal structure, but they have also exhibited remarkable ecological stability over thousands of years. Key factors have been reliance on renewable resources and adaptability.

In a forthcoming book, the geographer Donald Q. Innis refers to Indian farmers as "native scientists." Through careful field observations he has identified ingenious methods of intercropping and species selection, some of which consistently outyield fields cultivated by Green Revolution technology. He notes the readiness of these farmers to test new varieties and crop combinations within the context of their own systems. There is increasing scientific recognition of the values of many native systems, and research is in progress to learn how they function.

Not all farmers are efficient, and much improvement is possible. But even assuming universal excellence in agriculture, the productive capacities of the region have never contended with demographic expansion on the current scale. Population densities per square mile of cultivated land in the three most populous countries are estimated to be as follows: India, 1,133; Pakistan, 1,467; and Bangladesh, 2,119. Because no major areas of cropland remain to be developed, given a continuation of present rates of population growth, the level of these man:land ratios after two or three decades is awesome to contemplate. The options for change are few. As Kingsley Davis has observed, these nations are not new lands, they have long been occupied under conditions of high density agriculture. Each is now considering conversion to a modern economy near the end, not the beginning, of the world's golden age of energy exploitation. Attempts to duplicate Europe and industrialization in South Asia seem doomed to fail.³⁰

CONCLUSION

The puzzle remains. What economic, social, political and economic changes will occur as a result of continued demographic growth in South Asia? Thus far, government programs intended to reduce birth rates significantly have not been successful. International assistance, which in the past has mitigated food stress and aided family planning, is not likely to increase and may even decrease. In the developed countries, a belated realization of the finiteness of the energy resources on which their economies depend has led to reassessment of national priorities. These new priorities may not include significant concern for the fate of a region poor in mineral resources and not astride any major sea routes. Whatever adjustments are made to ease the general condition in South Asia probably will derive from domestic actions. In any event, South Asia's population growth cannot continue indefinitely. ■

PAKISTAN UNDER ZIA

(Continued from page 171)

The radical reversal of this trend reflects a variety of interrelated factors: Pakistan's search for a national identity and her Islamic "roots" after the trauma of the Bangladesh war; Bhutto's manipulation of Islamic symbols; the PNA's effective use of the Nizam-i-Mustafa slogan to hold the alliance together and to engender public support in the 1977 elections; and the increase in wealth and political prestige of the oil-producing Middle Eastern countries. It is also important to note that Zia is a more devout Muslim than the generals who have previously ruled Pakistan, more devout than any previous ruler of the country including its founder, Mohammad Ali Jinnah. Zia is a *Muhajir* (refugee from East Punjab) of the Arian agricultural caste from a relatively humble socio-economic background. He is related to one of the leaders of the fundamentalist Jamaat-i-Islami, and has many of the characteristics typical of Jamaat-i-Islami supporters.²⁰

Zia's first wave of Islamic reform came within days after he assumed power. In a martial law order, he specified that stringent Koranic punishments would be meted out for specified crimes, including severance of the hand for stealing and public flogging for lesser crimes. Although amputation has been used as a punishment only sparingly in the ensuing several months, public whippings have been a prominent feature of the present regime. Perhaps most questionable has been the use of flogging for political crimes, like demonstrating in defiance of martial law rulings.

Zia appointed a new Islamic Ideology Council, which has helped him to work out the details of Nizam-i-Mustafa. The ban on eating during the daylight hours in the holy month of Ramadan (*roza*, one of the five major obligations of Islam) has been strictly enforced. Prohibition had been introduced before Zia took control, but the punishment for Muslims who drink has been increased. Zia has called for an end to coeducation in schools and colleges and has specified the clothing which women may wear in offices and on Pakistan television. He has renamed streets, cities and universities after prominent Muslims and has instituted a system of "Shariat Benches" to review the Supreme Court and Provincial High Court decisions, to make sure that they are in keeping with the spirit of Islam. He amended the constitution by fiat (after Chaudhry's resignation) to provide that Muslims and non-Muslims vote separately in national and provincial elections. Finally, he instituted several Islam-

based reforms in the economy and promises more.

To a non-Pakistani, some of these reforms may appear frivolous, but it would be a mistake to conclude that these developments are merely the whims of a despot. This would ignore the unique role that Islam has played in the history of Pakistan and the depth of feeling about Islam that permeates the society. Economic issues will no doubt return to center stage in Pakistan—continuing inequalities and the awakening of the masses that Bhutto helped to effect should guarantee that—but they are likely to do so in the context of Islamic values, not in opposition to them.

The major economic policies of the Zia ul-Haq regime have been directed toward restoring economic health, which has largely been defined in terms of undoing Bhutto's "socialism." Private and foreign investment has been encouraged; some nationalized industries have been denationalized; and assurances have been given to businessmen that renationalization will not occur. Zia has promised that the constitution of Pakistan will be amended to prevent further nationalization, a promise which seems to contradict his assurances that the 1973 constitution remains intact.

At the end of its first year in power, the martial law government claimed that it had held inflation to a "single-digit," i.e., 8.9 percent. This would have been an accomplishment if it were true, but subsequent commentary has noted that many of the items in the government's list of price indicators were part of a system of controlled prices; it was these figures, rather than the far higher black market figures that were used to compute the inflation rate. A report by the State Bank of Pakistan showed that gross domestic product (GDP) increased by 6.5 percent during the first year of the present martial law regime (versus 1.4 percent in 1976-1977) and GNP, boosted by remittances from overseas Pakistani workers, rose by an even greater 9.2 percent (versus 2.8 percent in 1976-1977).²¹

The overseas employment of Pakistanis, particularly in the Middle East, is of political and social as well as economic significance. Remittances from these workers constitute the country's largest single source of foreign exchange; remittances almost doubled in 1977-1978. Pakistan ranks first among sizable nations in terms of the proportion of her labor force working abroad. One consequence is the reinforcement of Islamic ties to the Arab countries. Another consequence is the extent to which remittances are devoted to consumer goods rather than to capital formation.

In the rural economy, the regime sides with the landowners rather than with the poor peasants and landless laborers. In the industrial and urban sector, its bias favors the large industrialists over the workers. In general, the regime takes a dim view of labor unions, even among the professionals. Despite the

²⁰Eqbal Ahmad, "Crisis of State and Power," *Pakistan Progressive* (September-October, 1977), p. 21.

²¹*Overseas Weekly Dawn*, vol. 3, no. 65 (November 18, 1978), pp. 1, 10.

loosening of press controls, journalists' unions have fared badly. Similarly, college teachers and principals have been arbitrarily transferred, as a result of their Teachers' Union activities.

The general direction of the present regime, in its economics and politics if not in its Islamic social and cultural policies, is toward a duplication of the Ayub Khan era.²² Though economic growth and persistent anti-Bhuttoism among non-PPP politicians may bolster Zia for some time, his protracted tenure may throw Pakistan into the sort of nightmare that ended the Ayub era.

Underlying all the current political, economic and social developments in Pakistan is the danger that the country may further disintegrate. One of the continuing tragedies of Pakistani politics has been a failure to establish a permanent working relationship between the center and the provinces. Throughout the 1950's and 1960's, the "provincial problem" remained a central issue, temporarily solved by the system of "parity" between the two wings of the country.²³

The loss of East Pakistan in 1971, however, did not end the difficulty, but only transformed it to a different configuration; Punjab, the largest and wealthiest province, now constitutes approximately 60 percent of the population. The other three provinces resent Punjabi political domination. It is greatly to the credit of Bhutto and other political leaders that the 1973 constitution arrived at an acceptable federal formula for the "new Pakistan."²⁴ Recognition of this fact has led many Pakistanis to express concern over the danger to Pakistani unity if the present constitution is abandoned, even in the piecemeal fashion that has been Zia's style.

For Bhutto, regional problems were greatest in Baluchistan and NWFP, where the PPP was weakest in the 1970 elections. Opposition governments were established under the National Awami party and the Jamiatul-Ulema-i-Islam, but they were later toppled by Bhutto and replaced with PPP governments. The NAP was banned and leaders from both provinces were jailed. Zia's pardon of these prisoners and his declaration of amnesty for Baluch rebels who had fled the country have restored some regional balance.

Concern over the loyalty of Pushtu-speaking NWFP, particularly in the wake of the April, 1978, Communist coup in Afghanistan, has led Zia to pay particularly close attention to this flank.

Under President and Prime Minister Zia ul-Haq,

²²Posters sold in the bazaars soon after the military take-over pictured General Zia before a large, framed portrait of former President Ayub with an Urdu inscription proclaiming that Zia was acting in remembrance of Ayub.

²³See Rounaq Jahan, *Pakistan: Failure in National Integration* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), *passim*.

²⁴See Hafeez Malik, "The Emergence of the Federal Pattern in Pakistan," in J. Henry Korson, ed., *Contemporary Problems of Pakistan* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1974), pp. 45-55.

Pakistan has a certain air of unreality. The regime's legitimacy lies in its promise to hold elections which, however, have been several times postponed. Zia's claims to be preserving the constitution, restoring democracy, and creating a new social and economic order are contradictory and are not substantiated by observable reality. A regime that seems accountable to no one, least of all the people of Pakistan, sits in judgment on the accountability of its elected predecessor. The fact that the military took power so easily and has held it for nearly two years is not so much a reflection of its use of naked force—of which there has been relatively little—but rather of Pakistan's heritage of varying degrees of irresponsible authoritarianism. ■

SOVIET POLICY IN THE INDIAN OCEAN REGION

(Continued from page 179)

remembered that the Soviet merchant marine grew from a strength of 483 ships (1.9 million deadweight tons) in 1953 to 2,140 ships (15.4 million deadweight tons) in 1973.²⁶

The Soviet Union obviously has an economic interest in increasing the income earned by its expanding merchant fleet. Soviet trade with the countries of the Indian Ocean basin increased from over 200 million rubles in 1960 to over 1,400 billion rubles in 1973.²⁷ In addition, the Indian Ocean waterway supplements the Trans-Siberian rail line as a transit route linking the Soviet far east with the western U.S.S.R.²⁸ In view of all this, it is doubtful that the disruption of Western shipping is a major objective of Soviet policy in the Indian Ocean.

Recent Soviet accounts reflect a concern that American activity in the Indian Ocean is likely to increase in the years ahead. According to one analyst, American plans to lengthen the landing strip and deepen the lagoon at Diego Garcia represent an effort to transform the communications facility into a "naval support base" capable of handling B-52 bombers, aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines.²⁹

(Continued on page 192)

²⁶Robert T. Ackley, "The Merchant Fleet," in McGwire and McDonnell, *Soviet Naval Influence*, Table 14.1, p. 293.

²⁷Richard B. Remnek, "The Soviet Presence in the Indian Ocean: Current Realities and Future Prospects," paper prepared for the annual meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, San Francisco, California, March 24, 1975, Figure 1, p. 5.

²⁸The importance of the Indian Ocean as a year-round maritime route between the European and Far Eastern ports of the U.S.S.R. is noted in Dmitry Volsky, "A Strategy without a Future," *New Times*, no. 33 (August, 1978), p. 5. It should also be noted that the Trans-Siberian railway is likely to be disrupted in the event of a Sino-Soviet conflict.

²⁹V. Zhitomirsky, "The Tragic Story of Diego Garcia," *New Times*, no. 44 (October, 1975), pp. 5-6.

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A Current History chronology covering the most important events of February, 1979, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

Middle East

- Feb. 3—Israeli Justice Minister Shmuel Tamir says that, in view of the Iranian crisis, any pact with Egypt about the return of the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt must include guarantees of the delivery of Sinai oil to Israel; Sinai oil provides about 15 percent of Israeli requirements.
- Feb. 8—President Anwar Sadat of Egypt accepts a U.S. invitation to resume peace negotiations with Israel at a ministerial level in Washington, D.C.
- Feb. 10—U.S. Defense Secretary Harold Brown confers with Saudi Arabian officials in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, and pledges American support "against external threats" to Saudi Arabia.
- Feb. 15—In Tel Aviv, Harold Brown assures Israel that the U.S. plans to increase arms shipments and security ties to Arab nations in the Middle East "with very careful consideration of Israel's security."
- Feb. 21—At Camp David, Maryland, Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan and Egyptian Prime Minister Mustafa Khalil begin peace negotiations.
- Feb. 25—Harold Brown says that the U.S. is "prepared to defend its vital interests [in the Middle East and Persian Gulf] with whatever means are appropriate, including military force where necessary..." U.S. Energy Secretary James Schlesinger expresses similar views in a separate interview.
- Feb. 26—U.S. President Jimmy Carter announces that "we are discussing with . . . [Israel and Egypt] the possibility of moving these negotiations to the head-of-government level later this week."
- In Teheran, a senior Al Fatah leader, Hani al-Hassan, says that the new Iranian government has "made the liberation of Jerusalem from Israeli occupation one of its foremost religious and moral commitments."
- Feb. 27—The Israeli Cabinet votes overwhelmingly to direct Prime Minister Menahem Begin to reject President Carter's invitation to a Middle East summit meeting in Washington, D.C., "so long as the Egyptians maintain what is seen here as a stubborn posture."
- Later in the day, President Carter announces that Prime Minister Begin will meet with him March 1 in Washington, D.C., "for a frank discussion of all the issues involved."
- Feb. 28—In Jerusalem, Begin says that "grave issues" remain to be settled in peace negotiations with Egypt.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

- Feb. 17—The House Armed Services Committee's subcommittee on the Atlantic alliance reports that "the NATO alliance does not have enough military resources to provide a credible defense."
- Feb. 24—White House sources report that U.S. President Jimmy Carter will name Army Chief of Staff Bernard Rogers as U.S. European commander and will nominate him to succeed General Alexander Haig, Jr., as NATO's Supreme Commander.
- Feb. 28—NATO agrees to Roger's appointment as commander; he takes this post July 1.

Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)

- Feb. 14—According to the *Petroleum Intelligence Weekly*, Abu Dhabi and Qatar, both members of OPEC, are raising their oil prices by 7 percent today.
- Feb. 26—The Venezuelan embassy in Washington, D.C., says that Venezuela will raise the price of her heavy fuel oil about 14 percent on March 1.
- Retroactive to February 20, Kuwait raises the price of her oil 9.35 percent; Libya has raised the price of her oil 5 percent.
- Feb. 27—Saudi Arabia announces that she will not raise oil prices in the 1st quarter of 1979; Iraq and non-OPEC-member Mexico follow suit; non-member Oman raises her oil prices more than 7 percent, retroactive to February 15, while Canada announces a smaller increase of 1.2 percent.

United Nations

- Feb. 22—The U.S., Britain, Norway and Portugal ask the U.N. Security Council to consider "the situation in Southeast Asia and its implications for international peace and security."
- Feb. 23—The U.S. asks the Security Council to call for a cease-fire in Vietnam, and the withdrawal of Chinese forces from Vietnam and Vietnamese forces from Cambodia.

AFGHANISTAN

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

- Feb. 14—In Kabul, right-wing Muslim terrorists abduct U.S. Ambassador Adolph Dubs and hold him hostage in a Kabul hotel. Afghan security forces storm the hotel, and the terrorists shoot and kill Dubs.

ALGERIA

- Feb. 7—Presidential elections are held; Secretary General of the National Liberation Front Benjedid Chadli is the only candidate.
- Feb. 8—Chadli receives almost 100 percent of the vote; he succeeds the late President Houari Boumediene.

BANGLADESH

- Feb. 18—Nationwide parliamentary elections are held.
- Feb. 19—Election returns give the Nationalist party of President Ziaur Rahman 206 of the 300 seats in Parliament.

CAMBODIA

(See also *Intl. U.N.; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

- Feb. 16—In Phnom Penh, Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Van Dong is greeted at the airport by Prime Minister Heng Samrin.
- Scattered resistance by guerrillas loyal to the former government of Pol Pot continues.
- Feb. 20—Vietnamese Prime Minister Dong and Cambodian Prime Minister Samrin sign a Treaty of Peace and Friendship that gives Vietnam the right to maintain "advisers" in Cambodia to "preserve the territorial integrity."

CANADA

Feb. 13—French Premier Raymond Barre returns to France after a 6-day visit in Canada. He reaffirmed French support for Quebec, regardless of the outcome of the nationalist movement, and emphasized his government's desire to maintain strong economic ties with Canada as a whole.

CHAD

Feb. 12—President Félix Malloum's forces reportedly quash an attempted coup d'état by guerrillas who support Prime Minister Hissen Habré. The guerrillas attack the presidential palace and airport.

Feb. 13—Fighting continues between government and guerrilla forces; the guerrillas reportedly have seized the capital city, N'djamena.

Feb. 15—Commander of the gendarmerie Wadal Abdelkader Kamouge assumes control of the government.

Feb. 16—The U.S. State Department begins evacuating U.S. citizens; on February 14, an American pilot for the Continental Oil Company, George Henry Suhre, was killed by a stray bullet.

Feb. 17—A cease-fire goes into effect. More than 500 people have been killed in the recent fighting.

CHINA

(See also *Intl, U.N.; India; U.S., Foreign Policy; Vietnam*)

Feb. 1—In Washington, D.C., a joint communiqué is issued at the close of Senior Deputy Prime Minister Teng Hsiao-ping's visit with U.S. President Jimmy Carter. Teng flies to Atlanta, Georgia, where he addresses a group of civic and business leaders.

Feb. 6—Teng arrives in Tokyo, Japan, for talks with Japanese leaders.

Chiang Nan-shiang, former Minister of Higher Education and a former president of Tsinghua University, is appointed Minister of Education.

Feb. 7—In Tokyo, Teng criticizes U.S. policy in the Middle East; he says "the measures the United States has taken in Iran and in dealing with Cuba are no good."

Feb. 8—Teng arrives in Peking.

Hsinhua, the official press agency, announces the establishment of diplomatic relations with Portugal.

Feb. 9—In Washington, D.C., U.S. State Department spokesman Thomas Reston says the U.S. "would be seriously concerned over a Chinese attack on Vietnam."

Feb. 13—At the U.N., a \$15-million aid program for China is approved.

Feb. 18—Heavy fighting is reported on the Chinese-Vietnamese border (see *Vietnam*).

Feb. 20—In Beirut, a spokesman for the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) calls China's invasion of Vietnam "incomprehensible" and says that the PLO will "stand on the side of Vietnam against the Chinese invasion."

EGYPT

(See *Intl, Middle East*).

FRANCE

(See *Canada*)

INDIA

Feb. 12—Foreign Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee arrives in Peking for an official visit, the first by an Indian government official in 20 years.

Feb. 18—Vajpayee ends his visit a day early to protest China's invasion of Vietnam. He returns to New Delhi.

Feb. 26—Former Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's son Sanjay is convicted of engaging in illegal activities during his mother's tenure as Prime Minister; he faces a maximum of 10 years in jail.

IRAN

(See also *Intl, Middle East; U.S.S.R.; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Feb. 1—In Teheran, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini returns to Iran after 15 years in exile. He says that his nationalist forces will "arrest" Prime Minister Shapur Bakhtiar if Bakhtiar refuses to resign.

Feb. 5—Ayatollah Khomeini names Mehdi Bazargan, a political opponent of Shah Mohammad Riza Pahlavi's, to head a "provisional government" and to organize elections for a constituent assembly.

Feb. 6—Prime Minister Bakhtiar vows to remain as Prime Minister until the next elections. In a show of force, Iranian air force fighter-bombers and helicopters fly over Teheran.

Feb. 7—In Washington, D.C., ambassador to the U.S. Ardeshir Zahedi announces that he will resign his post February 17.

In several large cities, Khomeini supporters take control of government agencies.

Feb. 8—In Teheran, more than 1 million demonstrators march peacefully to demand Bakhtiar's resignation.

Feb. 9—At an air force base outside Teheran, the Imperial Guard clashes with Khomeini supporters; between 20 and 70 workers are reported killed.

Feb. 10—In Teheran, in clashes between pro-Khomeini air force cadets and the Imperial Guard loyal to Bakhtiar, nearly 100 people are killed.

Feb. 11—Following the defeat of the Imperial Guard by armed civilians, General Abbas Garabaghi declares that the armed forces are "neutral" in the political conflict; he orders all troops to withdraw from the city.

Feb. 12—Prime Minister Bakhtiar resigns.

Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan appoints 3 Deputy Prime Ministers.

The Ayatollah asks his supporters to hand over their weapons and to protect public buildings.

In Washington, D.C., supporters of the Ayatollah take over the Iranian embassy.

Feb. 13—Prime Minister Bazargan names 7 ministers to his Cabinet; Karim Sanjabi, leader of the National Front political federation, is Foreign Minister.

Feb. 14—The U.S. embassy in Teheran is attacked by members of a leftist guerrilla faction; 2 Iranian embassy employees are killed and 2 American marine guards are wounded.

The U.S. government orders the evacuation of almost all embassy personnel as soon as possible.

Feb. 15—Officials of the new government accuse leftist guerrillas of attacking government buildings in an attempt to undermine the new government.

Feb. 16—The Revolutionary Council announces the execution yesterday of 4 generals who served under the Shah, including the former chief of Savak, the Shah's secret police.

A U.S. State Department official says the U.S. will retain formal diplomatic relations with the Bazargan government.

Feb. 17—For the first time in several weeks, merchants and office workers return to work.

Feb. 18—In Teheran, Yasir Arafat, leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), meets with Prime Minister Bazargan and Ayatollah Khomeini. Arafat says the

Iranian revolution has "turned upside down" the balance of forces in the Middle East.

The PLO seizes the Israeli mission in Teheran as its headquarters.

Feb. 20—The Revolutionary Council of Ayatollah Khomeini is reportedly holding a U.S. marine; he was abducted from a hospital after he was wounded in the assault on the U.S. embassy.

The Revolutionary Council executes 4 more generals, including Major General Parviz Amini-Afshar, commander of the Imperial Guard.

Prime Minister Bazargan completes his Cabinet, establishes a national guard, and prepares to assume the authority to prosecute former officials.

Feb. 21—U.S. ambassador to Teheran William H. Sullivan meets for the first time with Prime Minister Bazargan.

Kenneth Kraus, the U.S. marine taken captive, is released.

Feb. 23—In Teheran, despite a request from Khomeini to ignore it, 70,000 to 80,000 people attend a rally sponsored by the People's Fedayeen, a left-wing organization.

Feb. 24—Deputy Prime Minister Abbas Amir Entezam says that Iran will begin selling oil abroad within 15 days.

Feb. 25—In Teheran, Khomeini meets with Soviet Ambassador to Iran Vladimir M. Vinogradov.

Feb. 28—In a radio broadcast, Prime Minister Bazargan deplores the activities of Ayatollah Khomeini's Council of the Revolution, and radical political groups. Bazargan says that their wanton actions may force his government to resign.

The newly appointed chairman of the National Iranian Oil Company says that Iran will no longer cooperate with the foreign oil consortium and will probably nationalize all joint production ventures in which the National Iranian Oil Company shares ownership with foreign companies.

ISRAEL

(See also *Intl. Middle East; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Feb. 8—In response to a U.S. State Department report that Israeli authorities have tortured prisoners, Justice Minister Shmuel Tamir says the report is an attempt "to smear our country and way of life" on behalf of "murderers."

ITALY

Feb. 3—President Sandro Pertini asks Giulio Andreotti, who resigned as Prime Minister last week, to try to form a new government. The Communists, who withdrew their support from the Christian Democrats, are demanding full participation, including their own Cabinet ministers, in a new government.

Feb. 8—The Communist party joins other major political groups in demanding an official investigation of the kidnapping and killing of former Prime Minister Aldo Moro last year.

Feb. 21—Acting Prime Minister Andreotti tells President Pertini that he is unable to form a coalition government.

President Pertini asks Ugo La Malfa, head of the Republican party, to form a new government; this is the 1st time since 1945 that the leader of a party other than the Christian Democratic party has been asked to form a government.

JAPAN

(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

KOREA, NORTH

(See *South Korea*)

KOREA, SOUTH

Feb. 18—For the first time in 6 years, representatives of North and South Korea meet in Panmunjom; they agree to meet again on March 7.

MEXICO

(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

NICARAGUA

Feb. 8—In Washington, D.C., U.S. State Department spokesman Hodding Carter 3d announces that half of all official U.S. personnel is being withdrawn from Nicaragua. President Anastasio Somoza Debayle has rejected the mediating team's proposals to end the fighting between government forces and Sandinist National Liberation Front guerrillas.

PAKISTAN

Feb. 6—In Rawalpindi, the Supreme Court votes 4 to 3 to uphold a lower court ruling that sentenced former Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and four others to death for complicity in a 1974 political murder.

Feb. 10—President Mohammad Zia ul-Haq announces the adoption of Islamic laws providing severe punishments for certain offenses; he also announces new taxes on land and accumulated wealth.

Feb. 14—The Supreme Court grants a stay of execution to former Prime Minister Bhutto.

PORTUGAL

(See *China*)

RHODESIA

Feb. 2—Antidiscriminatory statutes go into effect across the country.

Feb. 12—In Kariba, an Air Rhodesia plane crashes, killing the 59 people on board; the plane was hit by a missile fired by guerrilla forces.

Feb. 17—In Zambia, Rhodesian air force planes bomb a nationalist guerrilla camp, apparently in retaliation for the February 12 bombing of an Air Rhodesia plane.

Feb. 23—Government air force planes bomb a nationalist guerrilla camp, 22 miles west of Lusaka, Zambia.

Feb. 26—Rhodesian air force planes bomb a training camp for guerrillas led by Joshua Nkomo 185 miles inside Angola, 625 miles from Rhodesia.

ST. LUCIA

Feb. 21—At midnight tonight, the island becomes an independent nation; Great Britain has ruled it since 1802.

SAUDI ARABIA

(See also *Intl. Middle East; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Feb. 27—Because of the fighting between Yemen and South Yemen, the government recalls its troops from the Arab peacekeeping force in Lebanon, places the troops on alert, and asks for an emergency meeting of the foreign ministers of the Arab League.

SOUTH YEMEN

(See *Yemen*)

TANZANIA

(See *Uganda*)

THAILAND

Feb. 4—In Washington, D.C., Prime Minister Kriangsak

Chamanand meets with U.S. President Jimmy Carter.
Feb. 7—In a news conference in Washington, D.C., Prime Minister Kriangsak says the U.S. has promised to take "definite action" if Thai security is threatened by the fighting in Cambodia.

TURKEY

Feb. 1—In Istanbul, Abdi Ipecki, editor of the Istanbul daily newspaper *Milliyet*, is assassinated.
Feb. 5—Parliament extends martial law for 2 more months. Martial law was originally declared on December 26, 1978.

UGANDA

Feb. 18—The governments of Tanzania and Uganda agree to submit their border dispute to a meeting of the Organization of African Unity.
Feb. 25—On Uganda radio, President Idi Amin says that Tanzanian forces have captured a regional center in southern Uganda about 80 miles south of Kampala.
Feb. 28—President Amin asks neighboring states to try to convince Tanzania to accept peace efforts by the Organization of African Unity. Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere is asking Uganda to pay compensation for damages caused by her invasion of Tanzania.

U.S.S.R.

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy; Vietnam*)

Feb. 1—In Washington, D.C., U.S. government officials report that the Soviet Union has conducted 8 test firings of its own version of the long-range cruise missile.
Feb. 7—The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency reports that the Soviet Union's military budget for 1978 was about \$146 billion, approximately 45 percent more than the defense appropriations in the U.S. budget.
Feb. 9—In Moscow, Prime Minister Aleksei Kosygin tells Frank Press, science and technology adviser to U.S. President Carter, that the remarks made by Chinese Deputy Prime Minister Teng Hsiao-ping in the U.S. were "outrageous" and should have been "refuted" by President Carter.
Feb. 12—Kosygin officially recognizes "the provisional government of Iran."
Feb. 18—The government issues a statement demanding the withdrawal of Chinese troops from Vietnam.

UNITED KINGDOM

Great Britain

Feb. 7—19,000 workers go on strike at the Birmingham plant of British Leyland, the country's largest automobile manufacturer.
Feb. 9—Union negotiators representing public service workers reach an agreement with employers for pay increases of 16 percent. The government is trying to maintain an 8.8 percent ceiling on wage increases.
Feb. 12—Queen Elizabeth II flies to Kuwait to begin a 3-week, 6-nation tour of the Arabian Peninsula.
Feb. 13—Striking garbage haulers agree to return to work on an overtime basis to collect the garbage that has accumulated in more than 3 weeks.
Part-time municipal workers go on strike, forcing the closing of schools.
Feb. 14—Prime Minister James Callaghan announces an agreement with the Trades Union Congress to grant pay increases of 9 percent, plus some extra payments, to all Trades Union members.
Feb. 27—The coal miners' union leaders accept a 9 percent wage increase.

UNITED STATES

Administration

Feb. 7—Testifying before the Senate Energy Committee, Energy Secretary James Schlesinger warns that the potential shortage in oil supplies because of the Iranian crisis is "prospectively more serious" than the 1973-1974 shortage during the oil embargo.
Feb. 8—Appearing before the Senate Budget Committee, Treasury Secretary W. Michael Blumenthal says that Energy Secretary Schlesinger's assessment of the curtailment of oil from Iran is "clearly the type of thing that causes people to run to gold." Blumenthal says that both the oil curtailment and the cancellation of the Iranian arms order will have a limited effect on the U.S. economy.
Presidential press secretary Jody Powell confirms reports that President Carter has told his advisers on foreign and domestic policy to avoid making conflicting statements.
Feb. 12—At a televised White House news conference, President Carter urges the adoption of voluntary methods of coping with the oil shortage.
Feb. 14—In U.S. District Court in Washington, D.C., anti-Castro Cuban exiles Guillermo Novo Sampol and Alvin Ross Diaz are convicted of murder, and Ignacio Novo Sampol is convicted of lying about his knowledge of the 1976 murder of Orlando Letelier, former Chilean diplomat in the Salvador Allende government. Letelier and his aide Ronni Moffitt were killed by a bomb planted under their car in Washington, D.C. The key prosecution witness, American Michael Townley, who actually planted the bomb, received immunity from prosecution in return for his testimony.
Feb. 15—Transportation Secretary Brock Adams announces a new \$200-million transit program, to be administered by the Urban Mass Transit Administration to finance transit-related projects.
White House press secretary Jody Powell says that President Jimmy Carter will ask Congress to approve an International Development Cooperation Administration to consolidate and coordinate U.S. foreign aid programs; Congress will have 60 days to veto the proposed reorganization.
Feb. 27—The Department of Energy makes public President Carter's proposed mandatory oil conservation program, to be imposed only if there is a 15 percent shortfall in the oil supply.
Feb. 28—White House sources report that President Carter has approved a plan setting up a Department of Natural Resources, which will include the Interior Department and some functions of the Agriculture and Commerce Departments.

Civil Rights

Feb. 15—Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare Joseph Califano, Jr., makes public a 323-page report that outlines several proposals to eliminate sex discrimination from the Social Security System.

Economy

Feb. 2—The Department of Labor reports that unemployment declined slightly, to 5.8 percent, in January.
Feb. 9—The Department of Labor reports that its producer price index rose 1.3 percent in January, the largest increase since a 2-percent rise in November, 1974.
Following the January 30 lead of the Chase Manhattan Bank, Citibank reduces its prime rate to 11.5 percent.

Feb. 15—The Federal Reserve Board reports that the nation's industrial output rose only 0.1 percent in January.

Feb. 28—The Commerce Department reports a trade deficit of \$3.1 billion in January.

Foreign Policy

(See also *Intl. Middle East, U.N.; Afghanistan; Chad; China; Iran; Nicaragua; Thailand; U.S.S.R.*)

Feb. 1—The U.S. and China issue a joint press communiqué in Washington, D.C.; they "reaffirm that they are opposed to efforts by any country or group of countries to establish hegemony or domination over others."

In a talk in Florida, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Frank Church (D., Id.) says that it "is time for plain speaking with the government of Saudi Arabia."

Feb. 9—In a letter sent in December, 1978, and made public today, President Carter advised Japanese Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira that the economic summit planned for Tokyo in June is endangered because of the huge trade imbalance between the U.S. and Japan in favor of Japan.

Feb. 10—The State Department issues its annual report to Congress on the observance of human rights in 115 countries receiving military or economic aid from the U.S.

Feb. 11—A Pentagon spokesman says that the U.S. is sending 69 marines and 6 helicopters to Turkey for possible use in evacuating Americans from Iran or to protect the American embassy in Teheran.

Feb. 12—After 3 days in Saudi Arabia, Defense Secretary Harold Brown arrives in Amman, Jordan, for talks with Jordanian King Hussein; he pledges that the U.S. will take steps to defend and arm Saudi Arabia and other friendly Persian Gulf states including the Sudan and Yemen, because the Iranian crisis has made the strengthening of the "ties between ourselves and Saudi Arabia" imperative.

At a meeting of 30 ambassadors in Manila, the U.S. says that it is willing to accept 1,500 refugees from Indochina who are seeking sanctuary in the Philippines.

Feb. 14—U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Adolph Dubs is murdered in Kabul, Afghanistan (see *Afghanistan*).

U.S. Ambassador to Iran William Sullivan, his staff, marine guard, and the embassy itself in Teheran are seized by armed Iranians; Iranian authorities loyal to Ayatollah Khomeini effect their release; 2 marine guards are wounded.

President Carter arrives in Mexico City, Mexico, for 3 days of discussions with Mexican President José López Portillo.

Defense Secretary Harold Brown visits Israeli military installations on the West Bank of the Jordan River.

Feb. 15—President Carter and Mexican President José López Portillo meet to discuss oil, trade, illegal aliens and other mutual problems.

The State Department summons Soviet Ambassador to Washington Anatoly Dobrynin to protest "in the strongest terms . . . the role played by Soviet advisers" to the Afghan police in Kabul who made the decision not to negotiate with Ambassador Dubs's captors.

Feb. 16—The State Department announces that it will maintain normal diplomatic relations with the government of Iranian Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan.

President Carter's Mexican visit ends; a joint U.S.-Mexican communiqué notes that the Presidents dis-

cussed many subjects, particularly the sale of Mexican natural gas and oil to the U.S.

Feb. 17—State Department spokesman Hodding Carter 3d says that the U.S. is calling "for the immediate withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia and Chinese troops from Vietnam."

Feb. 18—Administration sources say that the U.S. will avoid involvement in the Vietnamese-Chinese war.

Defense Secretary Harold Brown leaves Cairo for Washington, D.C., after a 10-day Middle East trip.

Feb. 22—White House press secretary Jody Powell says that the U.S. aid program to Afghanistan will be heavily reduced, taking "into account circumstances surrounding the death of Mr. Dubs."

Meeting with editors and broadcasters in Washington, D.C., President Carter warns Americans to resist "the temptation to see all changes as inevitably against the interests of the United States."

Feb. 23—A private shipping accord between the U.S. Lykes Brothers Steamship Company and the China Ocean Shipping Company (operated by the Chinese government) opens American and Chinese ports to one another's ships for the first time in 30 years.

White House press secretary Jody Powell says that President Carter is "willing to match restraint to the extent that it is verifiable" in case the Senate refuses to approve a new strategic arms limitation agreement with the Soviet Union.

Saudi Arabian Crown Prince Fahd cancels his planned trip to the U.S.

Feb. 27—In Peking, Treasury Secretary W. Michael Blumenthal delivers a letter from President Carter to Chinese Deputy Prime Minister Teng Hsiao-ping, which calls for the withdrawal of Chinese troops from Vietnam "as quickly as possible."

Labor and Industry

Feb. 5—General counsel of the General Accounting Office Milton Socolar tells a House subcommittee that he can find no legal basis or government policy to allow the administration to declare a company ineligible for federal contracts because it fails to comply with the voluntary price-wage standards.

Feb. 22—President of the AFL-CIO George Meany says that the AFL-CIO will sue to prevent the government from imposing sanctions against companies that do not voluntarily abide by the price-wage control programs on the grounds that current law bars mandatory controls.

In reaction to Libya's 5-percent rise in the price of her oil, a number of American oil companies say that they will cut U.S. deliveries of both crude and refined products.

Legislation

Feb. 19—Closed-circuit televised coverage of the proceedings of the House begins; it is expected that, starting March 1, the coverage will be extended.

Feb. 22—By a 78-16 vote, the Senate agrees to limit post-cloture debate to 100 hours.

Political Scandal

Feb. 3—In U.S. District Court in Washington, D.C., Judge Oliver Gasch declares a mistrial in the bribery, conspiracy and perjury trial of Representative Daniel Flood (D., Pa.).

Feb. 24—Documents from the files of the White House Office of Telecommunications Policy during the years

1969-1974, disclosed by *The New York Times* today, show that the administration of President Richard Nixon attempted to control public broadcasting, to purge hostile commentators and to mold public broadcasting to serve administration ends.

Former Representative Joshua Eilberg (D., Pa.) pleads guilty to 1 count of illegally accepting money for aiding his former law firm to acquire a \$14.5-million grant for Hahnemann Hospital in Philadelphia; he is fined and put on probation.

Supreme Court

Feb. 21—The Supreme Court chooses to hear full arguments in 17 cases selected from a possible 346; a case on benzene safety standards is included.

Feb. 22—By a 7-2 decision, the Supreme Court reverses a lower court decision and rules that the Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company did not violate antitrust laws when it received a discount from the Borden Company as long as the Borden Company believed that it must discount its product to meet competition.

VATICAN

Feb. 1—Pope John Paul II returns to Rome after his trip to Latin America.

VIETNAM

(See also *Cambodia; China; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Feb. 3—The Vietnamese press agency claims Chinese troops have crossed the border into Cao Bang province, 125 miles northeast of Hanoi, and have attacked a sugar mill, wounding an undisclosed number of workers.

Feb. 11—In a letter to U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim and U.N. Security Council president Abdalla Yaccoub Bishara, Vietnam protests the recent invasion of Vietnam.

Feb. 18—The Vietnam News Agency reports heavy fighting along the Chinese-Vietnamese border from Quang Ninh province on the coast to Lai Chau province in the west, a 480-mile border area, 6 miles inside Vietnam.

Feb. 21—Regular Vietnamese army units are moved up to the border area from Hanoi; Chinese forces, estimated at 8,000 men, are reported within 12 miles of the border.

Feb. 22—It is reported that 4 Soviet long-range cargo planes are en route to Vietnam. A Soviet delegation is reportedly heading for Hanoi.

Feb. 24—Heavy fighting between Chinese troops and Vietnamese military forces is reported around Lang Son, 85 miles northeast of Hanoi, and in Lao Cai, northwest of Hanoi.

Feb. 25—In Peking, Deputy Prime Minister Wang Chen says China has "no intention" of moving into the Vietnamese flatland and declares that "We are still in the process of teaching Vietnam a good lesson . . . our action will be limited in scope and duration."

Feb. 27—Vietnamese forces attack the city of Ningming, China, across the border from the Chinese-beleaguered Vietnamese city of Lang Son.

YEMEN

(See also *Saudi Arabia*)

Feb. 24—Fighting is reported along the border between the forces of Yemen and South Yemen.

Feb. 25—Yemen's representative to the Arab League requests a meeting of the Arab League Council to intervene in the fighting between Yemen and South Yemen. ■

SOVIET POLICY IN THE INDIAN OCEAN REGION

Continued from page 186)

The Conservative governments in Australia and New Zealand have been criticized by the Soviet Union for supporting an increased United States presence in the Indian Ocean and abandoning the policy of their Labor predecessors by allowing nuclear-powered warships into their ports. At the other end of the Indian Ocean, Saudi Arabia has been depicted as a bastion of conservatism trying to establish a pro-Western grouping from the states located on the Red Sea littoral.³⁰


In December, 1964, the Soviet Union endorsed Sri Lanka's proposal to demilitarize the Indian Ocean and declare it a zone of peace. In the 1970's, Soviet leaders have continued to support this idea. Brezhnev referred to it in his report to the twenty-fifth party congress in February, 1976; and it has figured in disarmament proposals submitted by the Soviet Union to the United Nations General Assembly and in the joint statements signed between India and the U.S.S.R. in April and October, 1977, and September, 1978. Though it welcomed the proposal made by United States President Jimmy Carter in March, 1977, for the total demilitarization of the Indian Ocean, an *Izvestia* article criticized his failure to mention Diego Garcia as well as Masirah (Oman), an island which the United States has used for reconnaissance flights.³¹ Between June and December, 1977, Soviet and American negotiators met on three occasions to discuss the issue, but no significant progress was made toward demilitarization.

In the years ahead, the Soviet Union will seek to establish a stable relationship with the countries of South Asia, as part of its continuing effort to counter Chinese influence. Given the strategic location and importance of Iran, Soviet leaders will also try to establish a working relationship with Iran's government, whatever its political orientation.

In an effort to provide the Soviet navy with a more effective presence in the Indian Ocean, Moscow will undoubtedly continue its efforts to gain access to naval facilities in the littoral states. For the foreseeable future, the political role of Soviet naval forces in the Indian Ocean—demonstrating support for Soviet-backed governments during crises, displaying the superpower credentials of the Soviet Union through port calls—will be more important than their strictly military role. ■

³⁰See A. Chernyshov, "Peace and Security for the Indian Ocean," *International Affairs*, no. 12 (December, 1976), p. 48; Yuri Tsaplin, "The Red Sea in Reaction's Plans," *New Times* (April, 1977), pp. 20-21; "Playing with Fire," *New Times*, no. 25 (February, 1977), p. 12.

³¹*Izvestia*, April 14, 1977, translated in *CDSP*, vol. 29, no. 15 (May 11, 1977), pp. 5, 13.



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